

*This is the best edition, and quoted in  
De Cœ's Tracts by A. Warburton and a  
Warburtonian."*

# DISSERTATION

ON THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

# HUMAN ELOQUENCE:

With PARTICULAR REGARD to the

STYLE and COMPOSITION

OF THE

NEW TESTAMENT.

IN WHICH

The Observations on this SUBJECT by the LORD  
BISHOP of GLOUCESTER, in his Discourse on the  
DOCTRINE OF GRACE are distinctly considered.

BEING

The Substance of several LECTURES read in the ORA-  
TORY-SCHOOL of TRINITY-COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

---

The SECOND EDITION;

CORRECTED and AMENDED by the AUTHOR,

Dr. THOMAS LELAND.

---

To which is added,

A LETTER to the Rev. Dr. THOMAS LELAND, in  
which the DISSERTATION is CRITICIZED.

A L S O,

An ANSWER to the above LETTER.

D U B L I N :

Printed for A. LEATHLEY, Bookseller, in Dame-street.  
M,DCC,LXV.



DISSERTATION

ON THE

PRINCIPLES

HUMAN BLOOD

AND COMPOSITION



46.

10. 10.

11.

DE THOMAS L. L. A. D.

A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Thomas L. A. D. in  
which the Author's Views are stated

As a Vindication to the above

Printed for A. L. A. D. in Great Britain

## ADVERTISEMENT.

**T**HE Reader will easily perceive from several illustrations, and other particulars in the following sheets, that they were intended originally for YOUNG Hearers ; to whom, (as is intimated in the Title Page) they were at first addressed in another form, merely to fulfil the duties of an *Academical Office*, and without intention of further publication.

If they are now submitted to the censure of the world, it is not from any ambition of appearing in a Contest with a Writer of distinguished Eminence ; but principally from a deference to their Opinions, who thought that the liberties taken with such a Character, and the examination of his Opinions should be strictly *public* : and that to confine them to a small Circle, might appear equally disingenuous, with secret and clandestine Censure, in Common Life.

# ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Reader will easily perceive from several illustrations, and other particulars in the following sheets, that they were intended originally for young Writers; to whom, (as is intimated in the Title Page) they were at first addressed in another form, merely to fulfil the duties of an educational Office, and without intention of further publication.

If they are now submitted to the censure of the world, it is not from any ambition of appearing in a Contest with a Writer of distinguished Eminence; but principally from a desire to their Opinions, who thought that the liberties taken with such a Character, and the examination of his Opinions should be strictly public; and that to confine them to a small Circle, might appear equally dangerous, with secret and clandestine Censure, in Common Life.





## INTRODUCTION.

**E**LOQUENCE, STYLE, COMPOSITION, and such like, have already been so frequently and so fully treated by various writers, that it seems scarcely justifiable to resume them, but on some occasion, or for some purpose of consequence. Nor can I plead any apology for the critical discussions in the following sheets, but that they are connected with a subject of real moment: I mean an objection which the enemies of our holy religion have made to the Apostolical writings, which indeed hath oftentimes received answers sufficiently satisfactory, but, like others, hath as often been repeated.

The objection is thus stated by a learned person, who is said to *lend the libertine these arms*:

“We should naturally expect to find an inspired language to be such as is worthy of God, that is, pure, clear, noble, and affecting, even beyond the force of common speech, since nothing can

## vi INTRODUCTION.

“ come from God, but what is perfect in it's kind :  
“ In short, the purity of Plato, and the eloquence  
“ of Cicero. Now, if we try the Apostolic lan-  
“ guage by this rule, we shall be so far from ascribing  
“ it to God, that we shall scarce think it worthy  
“ of man, that is, of the liberal and polite, it being  
“ utterly rude and barbarous, and abounding with  
“ every fault that can possibly deform a language.”  
[Dr. MIDDLETON.]

The Lord Bishop of GLOUCESTER, in his late treatise on the DOCTRINE of GRACE, hath considered this objection at large ; and, in his reply, seems to have displayed that bold opposition to the general opinions of mankind, by which his learned labours are distinguished. The substance of his answer is here collected with all the care and caution in my power.

His Lordship observes, that the objection is founded on two propositions, neither of them true \*. One is, that

“ An an Inspired language must be a language of  
“ perfect Eloquence.”

The other, that

“ Eloquence is something congenial and essential  
to human speech.”

\* DOCTRINE OF GRACE, Lord, Ed. B. 1. C. 8. p. 41. Dub.  
Ed. p. 54.

To

# INTRODUCTION. vii

To the first he answers, by what he justly calls it bold to affirm \*, That "the rudeness and barbarousness of the Apostolical Style, even tho' as great as the most exaggerated Accounts would persuade us to believe, is so far from proving such language not divinely inspired, that it is one certain mark of this original."

To the second he replies, by affirming that "† Eloquence is no essential part or quality, but merely an accidental abuse of human speech. ‡ That it is a mode of communication which changes with the changing climates of the earth. That it's constituent parts are arbitrary, casual, and capricious. That, among all the different kinds or species of composition which have been adopted by different people, || any one may, by being thus adopted and imitated, become as real and substantial a pattern of Eloquence as any other whatsoever. § That if the Apostolical writers had adhered to any one of these various patterns, it might still have been objected that they had not chosen some one of many others, all equal in their intrinsic value. That none of them, however, || could have been adopted, because \*\* Eloquence, even when it extends only to the more general principles common to all languages, is

\* Lond. Ed. Ibid. Dub. Ed. Ibid.

† Lond. Ed. C. 9. p.

52. Dub. Ed. p. 65.

‡ Lond. Ed. Ibid. Dub. Ed. Ibid.

|| Lond. Ed. C. 8. p. 51. Dub. Ed. p. 64.

§ Lond. Ed.

P. 56. Dub. Ed. p. 69.

\*\* Lond. Ed. P. 56, 57. Dub. Ed. p. 69.

"nothing



## viii INTRODUCTION.

“ nothing more than a persuasive turn given to the  
 “ elocution to supply that inward, that conscious  
 “ persuasion so necessary to gain a fair hearing : and  
 “ that the *end* of eloquence, is to stifle reason, and  
 “ inflame the passions.”

There is no distinction more frequently observed by those who write or speak of composition, than that between real, genuine Eloquence, and the affected ornament and artifice of Rhetoricians. And, at first view, it was natural to suppose, that the censure of the learned Prelate was confined to these latter, and that by the term *Eloquence*, he understood no more than these. But as the objection to the Apostolic writings is founded on the supposition that there is something of *real* and *intrinsic* excellence, something *naturally* forcible, conciliating, and affecting, in certain modes of elocution ; his Lordship's attack must have been directly pointed against this supposition. And as the objectors affect to require real and genuine eloquence in the inspired writers, it would be presumption to suppose that their able and judicious antagonist thought he had effectually silenced their rash censures, by proving that *Rhetorical artifice* (a thing totally different from the former, and by no means acknowledged as an excellence) was inconsistent with the genius of the Gospel.

Besides, his Lordship seems to have sufficiently explained his own meaning, by extending his censure to every thing in speech, which exceeds the strict bounds



## INTRODUCTION. ix

\* bounds of *clearness* and *precision*; every thing which deviates from Metaphysical or Logical accuracy.

I presume, therefore, that I have fairly and regularly proceeded in the following examination of his Lordship's Sentiments, first, by considering Eloquence in it's general acceptation, as including all those forms of speech usually called *tropical* or *figurative*, those modes of address which are principally intended to *influence* and *persuade*, by exciting passion or emotion; and by enquiring whether these be not congenial to language; whether they be merely the abuses, or necessary and essential parts of human speech; and whether their natural power and tendency be to deceive and betray.

Secondly, by proceeding to a more artificial view of Eloquence, as a compound of several qualities, according to the division of the learned Prelate, and of other eminent Critics. And here we are to enquire whether these several qualities in their nature and principles, be really vague, arbitrary, fantastical, and capricious.

Hence we shall be led (in the last place) to the consideration of that more important question, "Whether an inspired Language must be a language of perfect Eloquence."——And when the sacred writings are defended upon principles acknowledged to be paradoxical, should these principles ap-

\* Lond. Ed. P. 57, 58. Dub. Ed. p. 70.

## X INTRODUCTION.

pear the least defective in point of evidence ; should they only prove obviously liable to be misconceived or misapplied ; it may be no useless attempt to shew that they are not *necessary* : and that the *manner* in which the truths of Christianity have been conveyed, can be defended against the cavils of infidelity, without any hardy opposition to the general sense of Mankind.

Secondly, by proceeding to a more artificial view of Evidence, as a compound of several qualities, according to the division of the learned Fretate, and of other eminent Critics. And here we are to enquire whether these several qualities in their nature and principles, be really vague, arbitrary, fanciful, and capricious, or whether they be really solid, and founded in reason. Hence we shall be led (in the last place) to the consideration of that more important question, "Whether as inspired language must be a language of perfect Evidence."—And when this is determined, are defined upon principles acknowledged to be philosophical, should these principles ap-

CONTENTS

# CONTENTS.

## CH A P. I.

**E**loquent modes of speech, the natural effusions of passion and emotion. page 1

## CH A P. II.

Modes of Eloquence the most artificial and refined, arise from nature and necessity. 9

## CH A P. III.

Animated forms of Elocution the natural signs of sincere emotion. 12

## CH A P. IV.

Eloquent modes of speech the natural result of sincere and lively conviction, even in those who condemn them as the instruments of deceit. 19

## CH A P. V.

Tropes and Figures not vicious, as a deviation from the Principles of Metaphysics and Logic. 25

## CH A P. VI.

Of the constituent parts of Eloquence.——Purity not arbitrary and capricious. 38

## CH A P. VII.

Elegance, no arbitrary or capricious quality of speech. 44

## CH A P. VIII.

Sublimity doth not necessarily consist in the application of images according to the B. of G. 48

## CH A P. IX.

Sublimity not local, casual, or arbitrary.——The authority of Longinus opposed to that of the Lord B. of G. 51

## CH A P. X.

Sublimity not local or arbitrary. 55

## CH A P. XI.

Difference of sentiment with respect to what is sublime or



# CONTENTS.

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <i>or eloquent; no argument to prove that sublimity, or Eloquence in general is local and arbitrary.</i>                                                                                                                    | 63  |
| C H A P. XIII.                                                                                                                                                                                                              |     |
| <i>Remarks on an observation of Dr. Browne. Of the gradual progress of Eloquence at Athens and Rome. The same general modes of Eloquence universally acknowledged as fit and proper, by all polished nations.</i>           | 75  |
| C H A P. XIV.                                                                                                                                                                                                               |     |
| <i>Summary of the argument. Inconveniences attending the Theory of the Lord B. of G.</i>                                                                                                                                    | 83  |
| C H A P. XV.                                                                                                                                                                                                                |     |
| <i>Of the B. of G's Character of an inspired language, and the arguments brought to establish it.</i>                                                                                                                       | 88  |
| C H A P. XVI.                                                                                                                                                                                                               |     |
| <i>That an inspired language is not to be a perfect model of human Eloquence, proved from other principles. The objection of want of Eloquence, &amp;c. in the Apostolical writings, unreasonably and ignorantly urged.</i> | 97  |
| C H A P. XVII.                                                                                                                                                                                                              |     |
| <i>What qualities we may reasonably expect to find in the Apostolical Composition. All these eminently discoverable in the New Testament.</i>                                                                               | 107 |
| <i>A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Thomas Leland, in which the Dissertation is criticized.</i>                                                                                                                                     | 121 |
| <i>An Answer to the above Letter.</i>                                                                                                                                                                                       | 187 |



DISSERTATION  
ON THE  
PRINCIPLES  
OF  
ELOQUENCE, &c.

CHAP. I.

*Eloquent modes of speech, the natural effusions of  
passion and emotion.*

THE great author of our being hath so constituted this human frame, that our sensitive faculties are scarcely ever employed without some degree of emotion, some species of pleasure or pain, some affection or passion. In our infant days, before words are learned, or the organs formed to utter articulate sounds, we observe strong natural signs of such emotion in the looks and voice. As we advance in life, and examine the objects of sense with greater accuracy, when we are enabled to compare them, and to perceive their

B

beauty,

beauty, their grandeur, or other like ideas, delight and wonder are their necessary attendants ; and such forcible impressions are instantly, and instinctively communicated to the voice and language.

So that the language of man in a solitary state, before it was directed to inform and persuade his fellow creatures, must have been in some degree vehement and animated, the effusions of a mind not in the torpid state of indifference, but moved and agitated by all the objects which surrounded him, and oftentimes eager to express its affections. Accordingly the great English Poet, when he describes our first parent just created, and surveying the magnificence of that theatre in which he was placed, makes him break out into the following *eloquent* address, as the *natural* expression of his rapture.

————— Thou Sun ! ————— fair light !  
 And thou enlighten'd Earth, so fresh and gay !  
 Ye hills, and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains !  
 And ye that live and move, fair creatures ! tell,  
 Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus ? how here ?  
 Not of myself : by some great maker, then,  
 In goodness and in pow'r præminent.  
 Tell me how may I know him, how adore,  
 From whom I have that thus I move and live,  
 And feel that I am happier than I know. MILTON.

The exercise and improvement of reason, whatever effect it may have in regulating and directing the passions, neither seeks nor tends to suppress them. Every accession of knowledge is in itself pleasing and affecting.



affecting. Even mathematical truths, which have the least intercourse with human passions, are not received with cold indifference: when considered as purely speculative, without any attention to their use or application, we are delighted with them; nay sometimes even transported by what metaphysical Critics call the *beauty of Theorem*.

And if truths merely speculative have such an effect upon the mind, much less can those be received with lifeless indifference, which have an obvious connection with our interest and happiness. Informations of this kind, whether from sense or reason, are ever attended with joy, pleasure, fear, hope, desire, or aversion: and these are passions which cannot be suppressed: they agitate our whole frame, and break out involuntarily in our looks, our voice, and language.

That intercourse with mankind, in which we are engaged, calls forth another tribe of passions and affections, as anger, indignation, benevolence, sympathy, and all those numerous emotions which are excited by the appearance of amiable or odious qualities in our fellow-creatures, by the occupations, interests and contests of social life. We know from general and uniform experience, nay we feel that these naturally and unavoidably produce an elevation or vehemence of speech, or a tender and melancholy flow of words, or a disorder and abruptness of discourse, lively images and similitudes, glowing expressions, or some other of those modes which Rhetoricians call *tropical* and *figurative*. As Na-

ture hath formed us to these agitations of mind, so it is nature herself, who thus

—effert animi motus, INTERPRETE LINGUA. HOR.

Metaphor, Similitude, and Allegory, tho' some of them are ranked, by teachers of Rhetoric, among the tropes of mere ornament, have yet been ever used most frequently, and with greatest freedom, by those whose understandings, manners, and languages are too rude and unrefined for ornament or artifice. The origin of tropical expression is deduced from necessity and the deficiencies of human language, with the utmost justness and elegance of reasoning, in the fourth book of the DIVINE LEGATION of Moses demonstrated : and we may safely subscribe to the determination of the learned author, that \*  
 “ the first simple ages, uncultivated and immersed  
 “ in sense, could express their rude conceptions of  
 “ abstract ideas and the reflex operations of the  
 “ mind only by material images ; which so applied  
 “ became Metaphors :” and that, “ this, and not  
 “ the warmth of a poetic fancy, as is commonly  
 “ supposed, was the true origin of figurative ex-  
 “ pression.”

And it may be affirmed, I presume, that there is no language however cultivated and improved, which is not still defective and confined ; so as to fail in natural and proper expressions on a great variety of occasions. We know that when that of the Romans had attained to it's greatest perfection, Quincti-

\* V. 2. p. 148. Ed. Lond. 8vo. 1742.

lian confesses, \* “ NECESSITATE NOS *durum* homi-  
 “ nem atque *asperum* [dicimus.] Non enim propri-  
 “ um erat. quod daremus hisce affectibus nomen.”  
 And in another place, † “ res plurimæ CARENT ap-  
 “ pellationibus, ut eas *neceſſe* sit *transferre*.”

Then, as to individuals, there are but few who can have acquired their own native language in it's utmost extent. And the greatest part of mankind, in every age and nation however enlightened and refined, seem to be still in that rude state which the learned author of the *DIVINE LEGATION* speaks of, ‡ where “ *language* is too narrow, and the minds  
 “ of men too undisciplined, to support only abstract  
 “ reasoning, and a direct address.” They are themselves principally influenced by their passions and affections; and they speak to the passions and affections of other men. Even the improved part of mankind, if engaged in the business and transactions of the world, must be moved and agitated, and their speech must be consonant to their feelings, and adapted to their occasions; not always to convey distinct and scientific propositions, not to inculcate strict and formal reasonings, not to express particular ideas with a philosophical precision; but to display some quality, character, or temper, to conciliate the affections of their hearers, to alarm their fears, to enliven their hopes, to move their pity, to awaken their indignation, and to rouse them to action: all which is constantly effected by the use of words and forms, which make perhaps the greatest part of all

\* Inst. Orat. L. 8. C. 6.

† Ib'd. L. 12. C. 10.

‡ Vol. 2. p. 87.



languages, and yet when distinctly considered, are found to convey no precise and exact information.

Just at the time when Achilles is making dreadful ravages in the Trojan army, the poet makes Hector address himself to his Soldiers, with all the force and energy of figurative speech.

Τὸν δ' ἔγχε' ἀντίος εἶμι, καὶ εἰ πρὸς χεῖρας ἵσταται  
 εἰ πρὸς χεῖρας ἵσταται, μένος δ' αἰθ' ὧν σιδήρεα.  
 ILIAD. Y. L. 371.

Nor from yon boaster shall your Chief retire :  
 Not tho' his heart were steel, his hands were fire !  
 That fire, that steel your Hector should withstand ;  
 And brave that vengeful heart, that dreadful hand.

POPE.

\* A learned critic observes on this passage, that if we examine the several phrases in the original, in order to know what particular Ideas the poet annexed to each, we shall find ourselves involved in some difficulty. He notes † the equivocation in each.

\* Johan. Clerici Artis Criticæ, Tom. 1. p. 7. C. 15.

† Si singula verba exequiamur ut accurate norimus quas notiones eis subjecerit poeta, deprehendemus, non levem esse difficultatem. 1. εἰς ὅς ἐστιν an simpliciter significat contra ire, an vero ea locutione contineatur resistendi aut aggrediendi animus? 2. ἀντίος εἶμι estne solitus sum contra eum consistere, antehac contra consilii, vel illico hoc faciam si necesse sit, vel decrevi facere, & certo faciam? 3. Quid est πρὸς χεῖρας ἵσταται; estne manuum motu celeritatem ignis æquare; an manu id præstare quod ignis facit;

each, and doubts whether the Poet himself, were he to return to life, could say, whether he had all the different senses in view, or any one, or which of them. Hence he infers the obscurity of such modes of speech, which he seems to attribute to the artifice of those who use them. But the passage here quoted seems but a bad proof of such artifice. The speaker is represented as too violently agitated to use his terms with precision, much less to concert means of deception. Nor are his words obscure or insignificant: for they express his passions not only with clearness but with energy. His purpose was to impress the minds of his hearers with a lively sense of his own undaunted valour, and to encourage them to fight bravely under his conduct. For this purpose he uses striking images and an earnestness of repetition naturally arising from the vehemence of his own emotion. And this mode of speech is truly forcible and affecting, altho' the words may be used without distinct ideas annexed to each, and heard without exciting such distinct ideas.

facit; an manus habere æque formidandas ac ignem?—4. An Hector vult dicere revera Achillem *οὐδὲ χαίρας ἐκὼ νέαι*, an vero quavis manibus ignem sequeretur, se non detrectaturum pugnam; nedum ut cum qualis erat fugeret? 5. *Μέγας αἰδῶν σιδήρεο* simile, quam in re est? an in gravitate ictuum, an in amoliendis illatis plagis, aut resistendo ictibus duritie armorum suorum? 6. Denique *αἰδῶν σιδήρεο*; estne splens gladius, aut quodlibet ferrum, adeo ut *αἰδῶν* sit epitheton otiosum; an vero est *splens ferrum*, cui similis sit aliqua in re Achilles? Quis dicet an Homerus omnes hasce *σχέσεις* in animo habuerit, an aliquot tantum, & quænam ex sint? *Ibid.*

Instances of the same kind are common in all languages. Shakespear represents king Henry enflamed with anger, and thus addressing himself to Hotspur.

Send me your prisoners with the speediest means,  
Or you shall hear in such a kind from me,  
As will displease you. —————

Here we have no distinct kind or degree of danger suggested by this threat: and the speaker himself might have been in the disposition of King Lear when he exclaims

————— I will do such things!  
What they are, yet, I know not. ———


His words signify the indignation and resentment in his mind: his intention is to inspire a proud subject with dread, and to prompt him to a ready compliance with the royal will, and at the same time to express a consciousness of his own dignity. And the force of his language in expressing this dignity of character, and in exciting terror and submission, is even encreased by repeating the menace with still less precision,

Send us your prisoners, or, *you'll hear of it.*

If then, passions and affections are naturally excited in the human breast, and have the principal influence on human actions; if they have their peculiar modes of speech, not invented for the purpose of pleasing, but arising from necessity, and of necessity,



cessity holding a distinguished place in every language; above all if we are conclude with the acute and philosophical Bishop of Cloyne, that \* “the communication of ideas is not the chief or only end of language, but that there are other ends, as the raising some passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an action, the putting the mind into some particular disposition, to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted.”——It follows that such modes of address as answer these latter, and (according to this author) the chief ends of language, that is, such modes as are generally called *eloquent*, cannot be deemed the artificial abuse of words, but are really congenial and essential to human speech.



## CHAP. II.

*Modes of Eloquence the most artificial and refined, arise from nature and necessity.*

WE may extend this enquiry still farther, and examine those forms of figurative language, which Rhetoricians point out as instances of most exquisite address and refinement in the Orator. A little attention will convince us that these, as they were not originally the inventions of artifice, but naturally and necessarily arose, in the natural and necessary progress of human speech, so they owe the principal

\* Principles of human Knowledge, Introd. Sect. 20.

part of their beauty, and their whole power of affecting, to their being conceived as the obvious, un-studied result of a mind labouring with violent emotions, and earnest to convey the whole force of it's conceptions.

One of the highest ornaments of Style is said to arise from a mixture and combination of Metaphor, Similitude and Allegory. Of this we have an instance in the following passage from Cicero, in his oration for Muræna.

“ Quod fretum, quem Euripum tot motus, tantas,  
 “ tam varias habere putatis agitationes. fluctuum,  
 “ quantas perturbationes, et quantos æstus habet  
 “ ratio Comitiorum ? Dies intermissus unus aut Nox  
 “ interposita sæpe perturbat omnia, et totam opini-  
 “ onem parva nonnunquam commutat aura rumoris.

Is the beauty of this admired passage derived wholly from the striking images and exactness of similitude ? These may be beautiful, or rather grand and affecting. But this grandeur, this power of affecting, is so closely connected with propriety and justness of application, that the very same combination of figures, used on a mean or unworthy subject, would displease, and even excite our ridicule. The effect would be nearly the same, were it so applied or introduced as to betray an affectation of ornament. — But this sense of propriety, and this disgust at affectation, plainly imply, that there are passions and sentiments to which the boldest and liveliest strains of Eloquence are peculiarly suited ; which cannot be justly expressed but by such glowing forms of speech as are here exemplified ; that these have their  
 genuine

genuine force and signification previous to all fictitious abuse : they are in themselves the real and natural effusions of the mind ; else, hypocrisy and affectation never would attempt to imitate them, and never could be detected by an injudicious imitation.

If one single violent emotion hath such an effect in warming and animating the expression, what may be expected from that conflict of passions, which oftentimes rages in the human breast ? It extorts from us all that boldness and affecting vehemence of diction, all those hardy figures, which Rhetoricians have so exactly analyzed, and marked by various names, as the most distinguished instances of the oratorical art. Epic and Dramatic writers of all languages have assigned such modes of expression, and such only, to Characters so circumstanced and affected. Let us consider the passionate speeches and soliloquies of Dido in that temper of mind which the poet thus describes upon another occasion.

Æstuat ingens

Imo in corde pudor, mixtoque *insania* luctu ;

Et furiis agitatus amor, et conscia virtus.

Perhaps there is no one species of figurative style, which we do not find in these speeches : the lively interrogation, the bitter irony, the passionate exclamation, Apostrophe, Prosopopœia ; in a word, all the powers and all the ornaments of Eloquence. The least feeling must determine us to pronounce them highly pleasing and affecting, and to admire the wonderful address of the poet. But why are these



these speeches pleasing and affecting ? Because they are exactly *natural* ; they are what we call *the language of the heart*. Their form and manner are the same in which such passions are ever expressed by all nations and languages in real life. And why do we admire the poet ? Because his observation hath been just, and his imitation not only lively but accurate. He hath described the real emotions of the human heart, and expressed them in their real and proper language. It is JUST : it is NATURAL. — This is the praise given to the poet ; and this is the test by which we try his performance.



## C H A P. III.

*Animated forms of Elocution the natural signs of sincere emotion.*

SO general is the conviction of Mankind, as to the real and natural signification of tender and impassioned, vehement and animated forms of elocution, that these are considered as marks of sincerity ; and every thing cold and unaffecting in words and action, where the subject is of an interesting nature, we sometimes find urged as a proof of hypocrisy and falsehood. The first thing we look for in any person, who professes to be affected, is the signs of passion, which nature herself hath impressed on the countenance.

countenance and voice, the glaring look of *anger*,  
the stern brow of *indignation*, the

— windy suspiration of forc'd breath,

—— the fruitful river in the eye,

Together with all forms, moods, shews of *grief*.

SHAK.

Altho' they are actions which, as the poet observes,  
*a man might play*, or counterfeit, like all the other  
marks of truth.

In the tragedy of Richard the Second, the Dut-  
chess of York thus impeaches the sincerity of her  
husband.

Pleads he in earnest? look upon his face.

His eyes do drop no tears; his pray'r's in jest.

His words come from his mouth: our's from our  
breast.

He prays but faintly, and would be deny'd:

We pray with heart and soul——

In like manner, Demosthenes pleads against his  
adversary in the famous cause relative to the Crown.

Πολλὰ τείνουν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἄλλα κατηγο-  
ρηκότῃ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατιψευσμένῃ, ἐν μάλιστα ἰθαύμασα  
ἀπαίτων· ὅτι τῶν συμβεβηκότων τότε τῇ πόλει ἀναμνησθῆναι  
οὐχ ὡς ἂν εὖνῃς ἢ δὲ δίκαιῃ πολιτῆς ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην,  
ἢ δ' ἰδάκρυσεν, ἢ δ' ἔπαθεν ἢ δὲν τοιοῦτον τῇ ψυχῇ· ἀλλ'  
ἔπαρας τὴν φωνὴν, καὶ γιγνῶνς, καὶ λαρυγίζων, ᾤετο  
μὴν ἑμὲ κατηγορεῖν δηλονότι, δαῖμα δὲ ἐξίφειρε καθ'  
ἑαυτῷ ὅτι τοῖς γιγνημένοις ἀνιστοῖς οὐδὲν ὁμοίως ἔσχε  
τοῖς ἄλλοις. DEMOST. Ed. Taylor, T. 2. p. 579.

“ Of

“ Of all the various instances of *falsehood* in this  
 “ his prosecution, one there is which most surprizes  
 “ me. In recalling the misfortunes of that fatal  
 “ period to our minds, he hath felt no part of that  
 “ sensibility, which bespeaks a zealous or an honest  
 “ citizen. He never dropped one tear ; never dis-  
 “ covered the least tender emotion. No! his voice  
 “ was elevated, he exulted, he strained and swelled,  
 “ with all the triumph of a man who had convicted  
 “ me of some notorious offence. But in this he  
 “ hath given evidence against himself, that he is  
 “ not affected by our public calamities in the same  
 “ manner with his Fellow-citizens.”

But it is not only from the countenance, the tones or inflections of the voice, that we judge of the sincerity of a speaker, but from his style and language. The story of the Athenian Orator and his Client is well known. The man explains the injuries he had received coldly and plainly. Demosthenes declares that he could not give credit to the tale. Thus provoked, the Client raises his voice, and his passion breaks forth in trope and figure. The orator instantly declares himself convinced.

Calidius the Roman Pleader was devoted to Atticism ; and never ventured to make the least excursion beyond the bounds of clearness and precision. He accused one Gallius of an attempt to poison him, and offered the fullest proofs of his guilt. But Cicero tells us, that when he came to answer him as advocate for the accused, he urged it as a proof of the falsehood of this charge, that Calidius had pleaded,



pleaded, (to use his own expressions) tam solute, tam leniter, tam oscitanter; that neither his action nor his style bespoke that violence of emotion, which such an event, had it really happened, must have excited in his mind.

Tu istuc, M. Calidi, nisi fingeres, sic ageres — ubi dolor? ubi ardor animi? *qui etiam ex infantium ingeniis elicere voces et querelas solet.* DE CLAR. ORAT. C. 80. Ed. OLIV.

It is by no means necessary for the present argument, that the proof here urged by these great masters, should be infallible and irrefragable. It is sufficient that it hath a foundation in reason, and is generally consonant to observation and experience. He, whose Elocution is not warmed and animated by an affecting subject, may give other proofs of his sincerity, tho' he fails in possessing his hearers with an immediate presumption in his favour. He who uses the language of passion to conceal falsehood, and misguide his hearers, may be still liable to detection, tho' he hath inspired them with sentiments favourable to his wicked purpose. The final prevalence of reason or information in either case is by no means an argument against what hath been advanced of the natural and generally received signification of such modes of speech as have been described. And in the case of falsehood and deception, it is to be observed, that the natural connexion, which every man feels in himself, and discovers in his fellows, between a sincere warmth and force of sentiment, and a lively and impassioned form of expression, is the very circumstance which renders eloquence so very dangerous.

gerous a weapon, when directed by a lively fancy joined with a fraudulent or malignant heart.

Tacitus gives us the history of a mutiny raised in a Roman army by some seditious harangues and cabals. The mutineers are joined by a party still more turbulent and licentious. The general interposes and endeavours to bring the chief leaders to justice; but their associates take the alarm, fly to their relief, and rescue them. In the midst of their tumultuous exultation, a common soldier raises himself upon their shoulders, is advanced before the general's pavilion, and addresses himself to the crowd in the following manner.\*

“ Yes, my fellow soldiers! You have restored  
 “ these our unoffending, our miserable companions,  
 “ to freedom and security. But say, who shall re-  
 “ store to my brother his dear life? Who shall give  
 “ my brother back to these arms? He was dispatch-  
 “ ed to us from the camp of Germanicus, upon  
 “ affairs which concern the interests of us all; and

\* Vos quidem inquit, his innocentibus et miserimis lucem et spiritum reddidistis: sed quis fratri meo vitam, quis fratrem mihi reddit? quem missum ad vos a Germanico exercitu de communibus commodis, nocte proxima jugulavit per gladiatores suos, quos in exitium militum habet atque armat. Responde, Blæse, ubi cadaver abjeceris? ne hostes quidem sepulture invident. Cum osculis, cum lacrymis dolorem meum implevero, me quoque trucidari jube; dum interfectos nullum obsecrus, sed quia utilitati legionum consulebamur, hi sepeliant.  
 TACIT. ANN. I.

“ last.

“ last night, did this man’s emissaries bury their  
 “ weapons in his throat ; those bloody ruffians,  
 “ whom he keeps prepared in arms, to wreak his  
 “ vengeance on the soldiers.——Tell me, Blæsus,  
 “ where have you cast out his corpse ?—Even the  
 “ enemies we fight against allow the rites of inter-  
 “ ment. Let me indulge my grief in kissing the re-  
 “ mains, and bathing them with my tears. Then,  
 “ issue forth your orders, and let me too be mur-  
 “ dered. And let these our companions consign us  
 “ to one grave ; two wretches who died for no  
 “ crime but that of zeal and affection for the army.”

The effect of this pathetic Eloquence was alarm-  
 ing and terrible ; and the consequences, we are told,  
 might have been fatal to the general, had not the  
 imposture been instantly detected. But it may be  
 said, that the persons, to whom this speech was ad-  
 dressed, were ignorant and turbulent ; ready of them-  
 selves to catch the flame of passion.——Let us then  
 suppose a person of the greatest refinement and most  
 consummate judgment, temperate, dispassionate, and  
 clear of all the popular infection, present in this as-  
 sembly. Would this speech, delivered with all the  
 affecting vehemence of action, have been heard by  
 such a man with absolute indifference ? Would he  
 have at once considered this manner of address, as a  
*persuasive turn given to the elocution, to supply the de-*  
*fect of an inward conscious persuasion in the speaker ?*  
 On the contrary, even on the first perusal of the nar-  
 rative, I presume it will be deemed no great argu-  
 ment of the reader’s sensibility, that he does not feel  
 a considerable degree of emotion, and an impatience



to be informed of the final event. A judicious observer might have recollected, that the grossest falsehood and hypocrisy have frequently assumed the strongest marks of truth, and hence might have suspended his opinion of this soldier's veracity; yet still he would have agreed with Quintilian, *Quid enim aliud est causæ ut lugentes utique in recenti dolore disertissime quædam exclamare videantur, et ira nonnunquam indoctis quoque eloquentiam faciat, quam quod illis inest vis mentis et veritas ipsa morum?* (L. 6. C. 2.) And far from grounding any suspicion of falsehood merely on the passionate style and manner of his harangue, I presume he would have concurred with the vulgar, in considering this as the immediate evidence given of his sincerity. And if he had proceeded to examine this evidence with more acuteness and penetration than the vulgar, it must have been by looking for something *unnatural* and *affected* in the speech and action; something which a man, really afflicted by the death of his brother, could not have expressed; something like the unnatural exclamations of *MACBETH*, and his affected distraction at the King's Murder,

— Here lay Duncan,  
His silver skin laced with his golden Blood, &c.

Which, as the learned commentator observes, “ discover the declaimer not to be affected in the manner he would represent himself.

C H A P. IV.

*Eloquent modes of speech the natural result of sincere and lively conviction, even in those who condemn them as the instruments of deceit.*

SO extensive is the figurative part of every language, so obvious to be adopted, so unavoidable, upon all occasions, that even strict and severe reasoning cannot always be supported without it's aid. We even frequently find grave philosophical writers warning their readers against the deceits of Eloquence, and at the same time not ashamed to make use of it's most refined arts. Even Mr. LOCKE, that enemy to figurative speech, slides imperceptibly into those paths, from whence he is so solicitous to divert mankind. — “The horizon between the enlightened and dark part of things \*.” — Eloquence, “like the fair sex, hath too prevailing beauties †.” — “Speech, the great bond which holds society together; the common conduit whereby men convey their knowledge — whose fountains cannot be corrupted, tho' the pipes may be stopped or broken ‡.” — Here are tropes and figures, which surely do not insinuate *wrong ideas*, do not mislead the judgment, are not perfect cheat §.

\* Essay on human understanding, B. 1. C. 1. † B. 3. C. 8.

‡ Ibid. C. 9.

§ Vide B. 3. C. 8.

The Lord Bishop of GLOUCESTER every where abounds with lively figures and animated forms of speech. In that very part of his discourse on the DOCTRINE OF GRACE, where he labours to expose the weakness of objecting the want of Eloquence in the Holy Scriptures, by condemning it as imaginary and fantastical, and at best the instrument of fraud and falsehood, he hath conveyed his argument in all the most striking forms of Eloquence, with the spirit and energy of an ancient Orator.

“ Should therefore the Eastern Eloquence be employed? But this would be too inflated and gigantic for the West. Should it be the Western? But this would be too cold and torpid for the East. Or suppose the generic Eloquence of the most polished nations was to be preferred, Which species of it was to be employed? The rich exuberance of the Asiatic Greeks? or the dry conciseness of the Spartans? The pure and poignant ease and flowing sweetness of the Attic modulation? or the strength and grave severity of the Roman tone? Or should all give way to that African torrent, which arose from the fermented mixture of the dregs of Greece and Italy, and soon overflowed the Church with Theological conceits, in a sparkling luxuriancy of thought, and a sombrous rankness of expression? Thus various are the species!.\*

Again — “ But it will be said, Are there not

\* Doct. of Grace, Lond. Ed. L. 1. C. 9. p. 56. Dub. Ed. p. 69,

“ some



“ Some more substantial principles of Eloquence  
 “ common to all ? ——— Without doubt there are.  
 “ Why then should not these have been employed  
 “ to do credit to the Apostolic inspiration ? For  
 “ good reasons respecting both the speaker and the  
 “ hearers. For what *is* Eloquence, but a persua-  
 “ sive turn given to the elocution to supply that in-  
 “ ward, that conscious persuasion of the speaker, so  
 “ necessary to gain a fair hearing ? But the first  
 “ preachers of the Gospel did not need a *succeda-*  
 “ *neum* to that inward conscious persuasion. And  
 “ what is the end of Eloquence, even when it ex-  
 “ tends no farther than to those more general prin-  
 “ ciples, but to stifle reason, and inflame the pas-  
 “ sions ? But the propagation of Christian truths in-  
 “ dispensably requires the aid of reason, &c.”

Can any thing be more brilliant, more enlivened,  
 more truly Rhetorical, than these passages ? What  
 then are we to think of the writer and his inteni-  
 ons ? Is he really sincere in this his reasoning ? Or  
 are these eloquent forms of speech so many marks  
 of falsehood ? Were they assumed as a *succedaneum*  
 to conscious persuasion ? And is the end and design of  
 them to *stifle reason, and to inflame the passions ?*  
 — The Right Reverend Author might fairly an-  
 swer, that the colouring here given to his argument  
 was not at all the effect of art, much less of any  
 insidious design ; that his conceptions were clear  
 and lively ; that the importance of the subject had  
 made the due impression upon his mind ; that his  
 style of consequence became naturally warm and  
 vehement ; and I presume his Lordship would not  
 allow

allow that the soundness of his reasoning was at all impaired by the boldness of his figures. The inference then is unavoidable, that such modes of eloquence, as he hath here assumed, are the necessary result of forcible impressions, and invigorated sentiments. Just as the most oratorical, nay, the finest poetical figures are the natural and proper language of tenderness, pity and affection \*. All these are therefore an essential part, not an accidental abuse, of human speech. Their natural power and tendency is not to betray or to deceive, but their primary and proper signification is the true and real sentiments, dispositions, and affections of the speaker, tho' like other marks of truth, they may be assumed by hypocrisy, and perverted to the purposes of fraud and deception.

The observation of these workings of nature, these unstudied expressions of her affections and feelings, first taught men to improve their powers, to arrange, direct, and discipline them. And in this there appears nothing *essentially* repugnant to un-

\* For this we have an authority more than human. HE is whose "mouth was NO GUILE," laments in this language, over the devoted city of Jerusalem.—He beheld the city and wept "over it, saying, If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this "thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace!—But "now they are hid from thine eyes." ST. LUKE xix. 41, 42.

"O Jerusalem, Jerusalem! which killest the prophets, and "stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I "have gathered thy children together as a hen doth gather her "brood under her wings, and ye would not!" ST. LUKE xiii. 34.

corrupted

corrupted nature, no more than in \* bracing the limbs, strengthening the body, and heightening the complexion by exercise. It is not indeed to be expected, that Man shall ever invariably employ his powers, either natural or acquired, to the purest purposes. A grave and wise tribunal might have observed and guarded against the inconveniencies of admitting insidious men to divert the attention from some important point of enquiry, or to inflame the passions, where the judgment only was to be informed: a babling Sophist might boast, that he could confound the distinctions between truth and falsehood, by the multitude of his words; or an eloquent pleader might triumph in concealing the weakness of his cause in the splendor of his harangue. Yet the obvious distinction between the legitimate application and the abuse of Eloquence still remains, as in the case of every other human accomplishment. The Rhetoricians themselves are perpetually inculcating this distinction. † They even pronounce, that none but the good man can attain to perfect Eloquence. If they direct that the Orator shall be ever careful to betray no appearance of artifice, it is not that they are conscious that Eloquence is in itself insidious, and its *end* immoral, but for another reason much more honourable to their profession, which they expressly specify. — ‡ Striking figures  
and

\* Nam & lacertos exercitatione constringere, & augere vires, et colorem trahere *naturale* est. Quint. L. 12. C. 10.

† Quint. Inst. Orat. L. 12. C. 1.

‡ Ego istud de figuris adjiciam breviter, sicut ornant orationem opportune



and graceful forms of elocution, have so great an effect, when introduced with judgment, that men of vanity and false taste are apt to consider these as the whole of Eloquence, and imagine that they are only to collect such graces, and to display them to the best advantage.

But critics inform them that in this they betray their want of real feeling, and therefore never can affect : that an ostentation of art is the mark of falsehood and deceit : but, that perfect Eloquence is, and must be, the expression of TRUTH : that if they would persuade and influence, their language must be that of nature ; and that whatever persuades and influences is the ELOQUENCE OF NATURE, and nothing else \*.

opportune positæ, ita ineptissimas esse cum immodice pētuntur. Sunt, qui neglecto rerum pondere & viribus sententiarum, si vel inania verba in hos modos depravarint, summos se judicent artifices, ideoque non desinunt eas nectere. Sed ne hæc quidem quæ recte fiunt densandæ sunt nimis. Nam et vultus mutatio, oculorumque conjectus multum in actu valet : sed si quis ducere os exquisitis modis, et frontis ac luminum inconstantia trepidare non desinat, rideatur. Et oratio habeat rectam quandam velut faciem : quæ ut stupore immobili rigere non debeat ; ita sæpius in ea, quam natura dedit, specie continenda est. Sciendum vero in primis, quid quisque in orando postulet locus, quid persona, quid tempus. Major enim pars harum figurarum posita est in delectatione. Ubi vero atrocitate, invidia, miseratione pugnandum est, quis ferat contrapositis, & pariter cadentibus, & consimilibus irascentem, flentem, rogantem ? cum in his rebus *cura verborum degeat affectibus fidem* : & ubicunque *ars ostentatur, veritas* abesse videatur. Quinct. L. 9. C. 3.

\* Quo quisque plus efficit dicendo, hoc magis secundum naturæ eloquentiam dicit. Quinct. L. 12. C. 10.

CHAP. V.

*Tropes and Figures not vicious, as a deviation from the Principles of Metaphysics and Logic.*

**B**UT here we are to take notice of that very severe censure, which the Right Reverend Author has passed on Tropes and Figures of composition. \* “As these,” saith his Lordship, “are a deviation from the principles of Metaphysics and Logic, they are frequently vicious. And this the great Master [Quintilian] freely confesseth.” — Let us consider these assertions separately.

In the first place it were to be wished that his Lordship had pleased to express his sentiment with a little more precision ; that we might have clearly and distinctly been informed, when, and whom, to condemn or to acquit : as all men, who have ever written or spoken, have frequently used this mode of elocution, which is said to be frequently vicious. The heathen poet speaks of a river † *spurning with indignation* at a bridge : the evangelist speaks of a ship not being able to ‡ *look a storm in the face*.

\* Doctr. of Grace, Lond. Ed. B. 1. C. 9. p. 53. Dub. Ed. p. 71.

† — Pontem indignatus Araxes. Aeneid. L. 8. l. 713.

‡ Συναρπασθείς δὲ τῷ πλοίῳ, καὶ μὴ δυναμένῳ ΑΝΤΟΨΘΑΜΕΙΝ τῷ ἀνέμῳ. — Act. 27. 15.

The deviation from Metaphysical principles is equal in both. In the poet we may allow it to be vicious : but we must be more cautious in deciding on the character either of the evangelist, or of his Style. We see then, that in a position so bold, and in it's application somewhat dangerous, bounds and distinctions should have been ascertained with exactness.

And what makes this position still more hardy is, that however the conclusion seems confined and restrained by the addition of that qualifying word [*frequently,*] yet the premises are general and unlimited. It is asserted without any restriction, that Figurative composition is a deviation from the principles of Metaphysics and Logic. If then it be vicious *as* it is, i. e. *because* [*quatenus*] it is such a deviation, it must be not only *frequently* but *always* vicious ; a very severe censure denounced against almost every speaker, and every writer, both sacred and profane, that ever appeared in the world.

But what is this deviation from the principles of Metaphysics, which is charged on figurative composition ? Perhaps the joining of attributes and subjects strictly and naturally incongruous ; the representing things inanimate as living and acting ; and such like. But it might deserve the attention of the most rigid Philosopher, that in all such cases

— More is meant than meets the ear. MILT.

And that the soberest good sense, and even a philosophical accuracy of thought, may be conveyed by  
the



the liveliest figures. To instance in those of poetry as most daring, and seemingly the most flagrant violations of Metaphysical truth. If a speaker were to tell us in simple forms of speech, that a melancholy state of mind was not natural to man, was shocking, and in some sort monstrous, that it was produced by dark and gloomy scenes, which are apt to affect the imagination, and to make us fancy frightful and dangerous objects near us, which have no real existence ;  
 ——— This would be readily allowed just and reasonable, consonant to experience and the nature of things. But the sentiment is the same, the proper signification of the poet's language precisely the same, when, to convey it in a manner more lively and affecting, he addresses himself to that imaginary personage ;

————— Loathed Melancholy !  
 Of Cerberus and blackest midnight born,  
 In Stygian cave forlorn ;  
 'Mongst horrid shapes, and shrieks, and sights  
 unholy. L'ALLEGRO.

And places her in

Some uncouth cell :

Where, if I may be allowed the expression, he makes darkness *visible*, by the bold creation of another personage, whose whole power in possessing the imagination with false fears and ideal dangers, he fully expresses by one happy epithet.

Where brooding darkness spreads her JEALOUS  
 wings.

The poet who thus gives a *local habitation* to Melancholy, in the like adventurous manner assigns to Mirth, parents, being, form, corporeal and mental qualities.

Zephyr with Aurora playing,  
As he met her once a maying,  
There on beds of violets blue,  
And fresh blown roses wash'd in dew,  
Fill'd her with thee a daughter fair ;  
So buxom, blithe, and debonair. L'ALLEG.

I remember to have somewhere found this passage analyzed, and examined with great severity, by some votary of science. — “ How absurd and irrational !  
“ A breath of a wind cohabits with an hour of the  
“ day, and begets a passion or a temper of the mind.  
“ Can any thing be really more wild and extravagant ? ” — But if such friends of unadorned truth, and severe exactness of thought and language, had not been so alarmed at these airy forms, but had ventured one step farther, they would have found themselves in a region of perfect security, and that the harmless poet was only conducting them by a pleasing path, to this just and natural sentiment, that vernal gales and fine mornings tend to inspire the mind with mirth and gaiety, which are very agreeable and pleasing affections.

That strict philosophical reasoning may be justly conveyed in the same manner, the celebrated ESSAY ON MAN is one continued proof. And the chief business of the learned Commentator has been to point out that real and solid knowledge, which is  
far

far from being disguised, perverted, or corrupted, by passing thro the medium of figurative language.

And if we consider the boldest Allegories, Metaphors, and other tropes and figures, as they really are, no more than comparisons and similitudes expressed in another form, it will appear that they are by no means such daring violations of Metaphysical truth, as they may be deemed by those who attend only to their immediate appearance, instead of tracing them to their real and final signification, with the judgment and penetration of the learned Commentator above-mentioned.

In like manner I might proceed to defend this species of tropical and figurative composition, against the general charge of deviating from the principles of Logic. It doth not indeed *define* with philosophical and logical precision; but it is not it's intention to *define*. It may not *divide* with such accuracy as may be necessary in calm speculation, and the investigation of truth: but this is not it's province. It's *reasoning* however, and it's *method*, may be strict and accurate.

When Turnus thus addresses himself to Drances,

Meque timoris  
Argue tu Drance, quando tot stragis acervos  
Teucrorum tua dextra dedit

ÆNEID. xi. l. 383.

The form of expression is directly contrary to the true intention of the speaker; and yet the reasoning is as just and accurate, as if he had proved in



mode and figure that it was not proper to accuse another of a fault which a man is guilty of himself.

The great Athenian derives a considerable part of his renown, from a strict attention to clearness of arrangement and strength of reasoning, even in the full career of his rapid Eloquence. I shall take the first instance which occurs, on looking into his remains.

In the pleading relative to the CROWN, in which his whole ministerial conduct was exposed to the severest examination, his adversary accuses him as the cause of the defeat at Chæronea, with all it's fatal consequences. The substance of his answer is as follows:

“ I am not accountable for the issue of a battle,  
 “ which is determined by Providence. I took every  
 “ necessary precaution, and recommended such mea-  
 “ sures as I thought honourable, and indeed neces-  
 “ sary ; and I was diligent and assiduous in con-  
 “ triving all human means of success. I have  
 “ therefore done my part, and am not to be ac-  
 “ countable for accidents, or for misconduct in other  
 “ men. And unfortunate as this event proved in  
 “ spight of all my efforts, it might have been still  
 “ more fatal had I omitted such efforts. For in-  
 “ stance, if I had neglected to gain the Thebans,  
 “ and they had joyned with the enemy, instead of  
 “ receiving a defeat at some distance, so as to have  
 “ a little respite for contriving means to prevent  
 “ our total destruction, we should have received  
 “ the blow under the very walls of Athens, and of  
 “ consequence have been irreparably ruined.”

The

The argument here seems to be urged clearly and justly ; but far from being impaired by those lively figures with which he hath invested it, such impassioned eloquence will appear equally accurate with the more simple and direct forms of speech, but infinitely more forcible and energetic. Subjects and attributes may not be accurately disposed, propositions formally stated, nor conclusions deduced with all the precision of the schools, but the essential principles of rational logic are not violated by the rich and noble colouring of the original \*, or by the following faint imitation in our own language.

\* Μὴ δὲ τὸτο ὡς ἀδύνατον ἐμὸν θῆς, εἰ καλῆσαι συνέη Φιλίππῳ τὴν μάχην· ἐν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ το τὸτο τέλος ἦν, οὐκ ἐν ἐμοί· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχ' ἀπαντα ἔσα ἐλῶ καὶ ἀνθρώπινον λογισμὸν ἐκλόμεν, καὶ δικαίως ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιμελῶς ἐπραξε, καὶ φιλοπόνως ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, ἢ ὡς ἔ' καλὰ καὶ πῆς πόλεως ἀξία παράμεινα ἐνεσησάμην καὶ ἀναβάντα. ταῦτά μοι δεῖξον, καὶ τοῖ' ἤδη κατηγορεῖ με. εἰ δ' ὁ θυμὸς σκηπτός ἢ κειμένων, μὴ μόνον ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων μῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων μείζων γέγονε, τίχρῃ ποιεῖν ; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ναύκληρον παντ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ παραβάντα, καὶ πᾶσι καλασκευάσαντα τὸ πλοῖον ἀφ' ὧν ὑπελάμβανε σωθήσεσθαι, ἔτα χειμῶνι χρησάμενον, καὶ ποτησάτων αὐτῷ τῶν σκευῶν, ἢ καὶ συνηρέσειαν ὅλως, τῆς ναυαγίας ἀλλήλοιο. ἀλλ' ὅτε ἐκυβέρων τὴν ναῦν, φάσειεν ἂν· ὥσπερ ὃδ' ἐστρατήγηεν ἐγὼ, ὅτε τῆς τύχης κύριος ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῶν πάντων. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο λογίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖν, εἰ μέγα θεοδαίων ἡμῶν ἀγρονιζομένοις, ὅπως ἐμάρτο πράξαι, τι χρεὶν προσδοκᾶν εἰ μὴδὲ τούτους ἔσχομεν συμμαχοῦς ἀλλὰ Φιλίππῳ προστίθεντο ; ὑπὲρ ἧς τότε ἐκείνος πάσας ἀφῆκε φανίας. καὶ εἰ νῦν τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς τῆς μάχης γεγεννημένης τοσούτος κίνδυνος καὶ φόβος περιέσθῃ τὴν πόλιν τί ἂν, εἴπερ τῆς χώρας ταυτὸ τὸτο πάθος συνέη, προσδοκῆσαι χρεὶν ; ἄρ' οἴεσθε, ὅτι νῦν ἐνὶν σῆναι, συνελθεῖν, ἀναπεῦσαι ; πολλὰ μέγα ἡμέρα καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ἴδουσιν τῶν εἰς σωτηρίαν τῇ πόλει. τότε δὲ ἂν ἀξιον εἰπεῖν, ἄγε μὴδὲ πείραν ἔδωκε θεῶν τινας εὐνοια, καὶ τὰ προβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν ταύτην τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἧς σὺ κατηγορεῖς. DEMOST.

περὶ Σεφ. p 545.

“ Impute it not as my offence, that PHILIP was  
 “ victorious in the battle. This is an event deter-  
 “ mined by God, not by me. Let it be proved,  
 “ that I did not take every precaution, which hu-  
 “ man prudence could suggest ; that I did not exert  
 “ myself with integrity, with assiduity, with toil even  
 “ greater than my strength ; that the conduct I  
 “ pursued was not noble, was not worthy of the  
 “ state, was not necessary. Prove this, I say, and  
 “ then accuse me. But if a sudden clap of thunder,  
 “ if a furious tempest burst at once upon us, and  
 “ laid prostrate not our state alone, but every state  
 “ in Greece ; — what then ? Am I to be ac-  
 “ cused ? With equal justice might the trader,  
 “ who sends out his vessel equipped and furnished  
 “ for a voyage, be deemed guilty of her wreck,  
 “ when she had encountered a storm so violent as to  
 “ endamage, nay to tear away her tackle. He  
 “ might plead thus, I was not pilot in this voyage.  
 “ — Nor was I commander of your army, nor was  
 “ I master of Fortune : she it is, who commands  
 “ the world. — And let this be duly weighed. If,  
 “ when the Thebans engaged on our side, we were  
 “ yet fated to this calamity, what were we to ex-  
 “ pect, if they had not only been detached from us,  
 “ but united with our enemy, in compliance with all  
 “ his urgent solicitations ? If, when the armies fought  
 “ at a distance of three days march from Attica, such  
 “ danger and consternation fell upon this city, what  
 “ if the defeat had happened in our own Territory ?  
 “ Think ye that we should have stood ? that we  
 “ should have assembled here ? that we should  
 “ have breathed ? The respite of one day, (at  
 least



“ least of two or three) is oftentimes of signal moment towards the preservation of a people.——  
 “ In the other case —— But I cannot bear to mention what we must have suffered, if this  
 “ state had not been protected by the favour of  
 “ some God, and the interposition of this alliance,  
 “ the constant subject, Æschines, of your clamorous malice.”

But altho' it were granted, that tropical and figurative speech is utterly unphilosophical, that it is nothing but a flagrant violation of metaphysical truth and logical accuracy, yet it still remains to be proved, that *for this reason*, it is vicious, whether by *vice* we are to understand immorality, or something erroneous and faulty in composition. Ask the moralist, whence it is that speech is criminal. He answers, from it's being used with a settled purpose of wrongfully deceiving or injuring, from exciting wicked passions or dishonest thoughts, or from some other cause of the same nature. Ask the critic, in what cases tropical and figurative expressions are faults in composition. He answers, when they are gross and indelicate; when they are obscure and unnatural; puerile or frigid; or when they are disproportioned and utterly unsuitable to the subject. He tells you, for instance, that if DEMOSTHENES really used such Metaphors as those which his adversary objects to him\*. “ The State is *packed up and matted*,” “ they *thread us like needles*, &c. he justly incurs the censure of adopting gross and il-

\* Æschin. in Ctesiph. p. 429.

liberal similitudes, on an occasion which required decency and gravity: that the Roman, who called \* *Glaucias Stercus Curiae*, was indecorous and offensive: and that nothing can be more really mean, and ridiculously affected and obscure, notwithstanding the awkward attempt at grandeur and elevation, than those tropes and figures which we find ascribed to QUERNO, in one of the Prolusions of STRADA.

Nox aderat tandem, & Coelum, ex *Cyclope diurne*,  
 Nocturnus tunc *Argus* erat. Cum Roma fenestris  
*Gaudia* disponens, velarat tecta domorum  
*Torque* lucernarum, & collo suspenderat alto  
 Versicoloratis contexta *monilia* flammis.  
 Quinetiam in triviis, *Cynici versatile tectum*,  
 Et *veteres Bacchi exuvias* damnaverat igni.

Neither the critic nor the moralist, I presume, would object to any one form of speech merely as it was a deviation from Metaphysical principles, tho' the manner or the occasion of such deviation might be condemned by either.

As to the charge of immorality in particular, if this be insisted on, let us take a general view of ELOQUENCE in it's antient and most extensive sense, as comprehending not only prosaic but poetical composition; and see what there is in it's nature distinct from all misapplication, which can warrant any suspicion of immorality. Numbers and tuneful periods afford an innocent delight at least: and that natural sense of harmony, to which they are addressed,

\* Quinet. L. 8. C. 6.

is the source of the most blameless and elegant enjoyments of human life. Our natural fondness for comparison of objects, observing resemblances, and forming similitudes, is also innocent: and a philosophical mind might perhaps discover some uses and advantages derived from hence. But these are the less valuable parts of Eloquence. It's great and principal powers are founded on the most noble, most aimable, and virtuous qualities in our nature. They are addressed to our pity and sympathy, and derive their influence from these lovely affections. They present to us exalted Characters and actions; they are addressed to our natural love of such characters and actions; and owe their power to this affection. If they are employed to deceive, it is by operating on our benevolence, our tenderness of affection, our virtuous indignation, our public spirit, or some other generous principle.- They have their great influence on the mind in which all generous principles remain yet unperverted. And if a popular assembly be said to be the peculiar sphere of the Orator, perhaps a reason might be assigned not very honourable to the more exalted part of mankind: That men of an inferior rank are less experienced in fraud, less corrupted, and of consequence less suspicious: less depraved by private views of interest, and therefore more susceptible of generous impressions; more attentive to the appearance of TRUTH.

But I shall not dwell longer on this *viciousness* which is charged on tropical and figurative speech, as the charge stands unsupported by any *argument*; and we might add, by any *authority*, if we consider the



the real purport of the passage quoted as the *confession* and *apology* of Quintilian.

The Right Reverend Author declares, “ as these  
 “ [i. e. Tropes and figures of composition] are a  
 “ deviation from those principles of Metaphysics  
 “ and Logic, they are frequently vicious. This the  
 “ great Master quoted above freely confesseth, where  
 “ speaking of that ornamented speech which he calls  
 “ Σχήματα Λίξεως, he makes the following confes-  
 “ sion and apology.—Eſſet enim omne ſchema  
 “ VITIUM, ſi non peteretur ſed accideret. Ve-  
 “ rum auctoritate, vetuſtate, conſuetudine plerum-  
 “ que defenditur, ſæpe etiam RATIONE quadam.  
 “ Ideoque cum ſit a ſimplici rectoque genere dicendi  
 “ deflexa, virtus eſt, ſi habet probabile, aliquid  
 “ quod ſequatur \*.”

The paſſage is taken from that chapter, in which  
 the author profeſſes to treat of VERBAL figures  
 [Σχήματα ΛΕΞΕΩΣ]; and thro’ this part of his  
 work he ſpeaks of theſe, and no others. He di-  
 vides them into two kinds, *grammatical* and *rhetori-  
 cal*. “ Of the firſt, ſaith he, “ there are as many ſorts,  
 “ as there are grammatical faults or ſolecisms in  
 “ ſpeech. [Prius ſit iſſdem generibus quibus vitia]  
 “ for every figure, (i. e. every ſuch figure, or every  
 “ grammatical figure) would be a *fault* in ſtyle,  
 “ if it were merely accidental [eſſet enim omne  
 “ ſchema VITIUM ſi non peteretur ſed accideret.]  
 “ However, the uſe of this ſpecies is warranted by  
 “ authority, by antient or preſent uſage, and fre-

\* Quintil. L. 9. C. 3.

“ quently”

“ quently by some reason \*. Wherefore, as it is a  
 “ deviation from the plain and direct form of speech  
 “ [i. e. as the definition of a figure agrees to it, we  
 “ rank it among the several sorts of figures, and]  
 “ it allowed as an excellence or ornament of style, if  
 “ there be something plausible to justify the intro-  
 “ ducing of it.”

I should by no means willingly misrepresent the argument of my Lord Bishop ; but upon repeated examination of the passage here quoted, I must state it thus.

“ Quintilian declares, that what are called gram-  
 “ matical figures are really no more than faulty vio-  
 “ lations of grammatical rules, unless when pur-  
 “ posedly introduced upon some reasonable or plau-  
 “ sible grounds.”

Therefore,

“ He confesses that Tropes and Figures of  
 “ composition, as they are a deviation from the  
 “ Principles of Metaphysics and Logic, are  
 “ frequently vitious.”

If this be a fair representation, it were to be wished that the learned Author had so far condescended to men of confined abilities, as to explain the connexion between these two propositions.

Of which he gives this instance. *Oculis capti Talpæ, et timidi  
 Damæ, dicuntur a Virgilio : sed subest RATIO quia sextus uter-  
 que ab altero significatur.*

## C H A P. VI.

*Of the constituent parts of Eloquence.—Purity not arbitrary and capricious.*

**H**ITHERTO we have considered Eloquence, in general, as that mode of speech which signifies emotion or passion in the speaker, and tends to excite them in the hearer. But it is necessary, as we advance in this inquiry, to be more particular : for the learned author, whose reasonings we take the liberty of examining, hath endeavoured to establish his position on the basis of strict philosophical argument. In order to demonstrate that Eloquence is not essential to human speech, but merely arbitrary, dependent on fashion and custom, he proceeds to a regular examination of it's constituent parts. “ ELOQUENCE is a compound of these three  
 “ qualities of speech, PURITY, ELEGANCE, and  
 “ SUBLIMITY. Purity is the use of such terms with  
 “ their multiplied combinations, as the interest, the  
 “ complexion, or the caprice of some writer or  
 “ speaker of authority hath preferred to it's equals.  
 “ Elegance is such a turn of idiom as a fashionable  
 “ fancy hath brought into repute. Sublimity is the  
 “ application of such images as arbitrary and casual  
 “ connexions, rather than their own native grandeur,  
 “ have dignified and ennobled. Since then the  
 “ constituent parts are arbitrary and capricious,  
 the



“ the compound must be equally nominal and unsub-  
 “ stantial.”

I freely confess that in considering this argument, I cannot so entirely divest myself of all prejudice, as is strictly proper in an enquiry after truth. I cannot help feeling a secret hope and an inclination to believe that his Lordship may have been here betrayed into some mistake. Particularly, as it appears from his definition of sublimity, that the censure is not confined to the *Style of Eloquence*, but extends to the things suggested, the objects presented to the mind, by such a style.

Poets and Orators have been ever the admiration of mankind. They have possessed their several stations in the Temple of Fame, for many ages, unmolested : and it is somewhat mortifying to be now at length awakened from an agreeable dream, and to find this august temple dissolve,

Like the baseless fabrick of a vision :

to find, I say, whatever ages have admired as elegant or grand, stripped of its imaginary value, and resolved into chance, caprice, and fashion.— So that the Poet of the piping Winds, and the twisted curls of flame, whom \* Longinus quotes with so much disrespect, possessed as great *intrinsic* excellence, was as elegant in his diction, in his images as sublime, as the author of the Iliad, however the fickleness of fashion hath been pleased to consign the very name of one to oblivion, and to cast such a

\* Sect. 3. Ed. Pearce.

blaze of glory round the other, as time hath never yet been able to extinguish — GORGAS, AMPHICRATES, and MATRIS, have then their appeal to the tribunal of reason and philosophy, against the *arbitrary* determinations of mankind, in favour of the nominal and unsubstantial merit of DEMOSTHENES. And to come nearer home. — How cruel is the contempt which the author of the Bathos has expressed for poor BLACKMORE, when MILTON hath no superiority but what is capricious, arbitrary and casual? And the Commentator on POPE, who discovers the five kinds of sublimity mentioned by Longinus, in the concluding verses of the Essay on Man, hath done no more honour to his poet, than to inform the world, that he was fortunate in setting the fashion, or nice and exact in following the fashion; and that it is the casual pleasure of the world, to confer so great a degree of authority and reputation on his writings, while those of JOSHUA SYLVESTER are as capriciously neglected.

Upon the first view of his Lordship's division, (which, as hath been already noted, seems not confined to style or diction) it is observable that PATHOS, the very soul and life of eloquence is intirely omitted. If it was considered, as included in the last member of the division, sublimity, I answer in the words of Longinus. *Αλλ' εἰ μὲν ὡς ἐν τῇ ταύτ' ἄμφω, τὸ τε ὑψὺ καὶ τὸ παθητικόν, καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ πάντῃ συνυπάρχειν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμπεφυκέναι, διαμαρτάνει; καὶ γὰρ πάθη τινὰ διεγῶτα ὑψὺς καὶ ταπεινά εὐρίσκειται, καθάπερ οἰκτοί, λυπαι, φόβοι καὶ ἔμπαλιν πολλά ὑψηλὰ διχα πάθος.* Sect. 8.

“ If the omission proceeded from imagining the  
“ sublime and the pathetic to be one and the same,

“ or

“ or that they are inseparably united and co-existent; this is a mistake. There are passions not only “ distinct from sublimity, but of a direct contrary “ nature, low and depressed. Again there are “ instances of the sublime without any mixture of “ Pathos.”

PURITY of language, tho’ properly belonging to the grammatical art, is indeed ranked by antient Critics among the excellences of Rhetorical composition. But by their confession, it is the lowest, least honourable and least valuable part of eloquence. This is the sentiment of the great Roman. *Ipsū latine loqui, est illud quidem, ut paulo ante dixi, in magna laude ponendum, sed non tam sua sponte, quam quod est a plerisque neglectum; non enim tam præclarum est scire latine, quam turpe nescire; neque tamen id mihi oratoris boni, quam civis Romani proprium videtur.* CICER. de CLARIS ORAT. C. 37.—And again; *Nemo enim unquam est Oratorem, quod latine loqueretur, admiratus.* De ORAT. L. 3. C. 14.

But as purity of diction, however in itself of little value, is yet a part of perfect and consummate Eloquence, let us examine whether it be truly defined as consisting in the “ use of such terms with “ their combinations, as the interest, the complexi- “ on, or the caprice of some writer or speaker of “ authority hath preferred to its equals.”

We are not to be informed that words, as they signify our Ideas, are indeed arbitrary, and that as to their primary and original value, all articulate sounds are indeed strictly equals. But when once they are chosen,



chosen, and established with their several connexions and modifications so as to form a language, there are then rules and principles, to which men must accommodate themselves in the use and application of words, so as to convey their thoughts with clearness. And no speaker or writer can become a speaker or writer of *authority*, I mean of authority for *pure* diction, but by conforming to these rules. He may invent new, or revive antiquated terms, and this, either from caprice or judgment. His countrymen may adopt the innovation; which they may consider as a proof of elegance, copiousness, or such like, but not of purity, unless so far as it is conformable to the analogy or etymology of his Language.

If we may listen to the antient Critics, who have written on this subject, they tell us; that PURITY of language \* consists in this conformity to analogy and etymology, in an adherence to antient usage, the practice of such writers or speakers, who have themselves been thus directed, and above all to *custom*, that is, as they themselves † explain it, the general consent of men of sense and erudition.

Quem penes *arbitrium* est & *jus* & *norma* loquendi.  
HOR.

And these are principles of PURE diction, which, we see, are neither vague nor local: but, like all the other general precepts of composition, founded

\* Sermo constat ratione; vetustate, auctoritate, consuetudine. Rationem præstat præcipue analogia; nonnunquam et Etymologia.

— Consuetudo vero certissima loquendi magistra. Quinæst. L. 1. C. 4.

† Consuetudinem sermonis vocabo consensum eruditorum, sicut vivendi, consensum bonorum. Ibid.

on reason, and applicable to all languages : in which custom however decisive, is yet not guided capriciously or wantonly ; but in all cases

USE will father what's begot by SENSE. POPE.

He who would write *pure* English, must proceed by the same general directions, with him who would write *pure* French. The Roman and the Greek followed the same rules, and prescribed the same rules, to their respective countrymen. The writer or speaker who transgresses such rules, may fairly plead, that the transgression is not so great as to obscure his sense ; that his circumstances made it necessary ; or that it is mean and disingenuous to cavil at a trifling fault, more than compensated by the importance of his subject, or the superior excellencies of his composition. But should he tell us that his words are as well sounding, and no more arbitrary, than those which we call *pure* ; that both are equally indebted for their origin to chance or caprice ; I fear we should do no great honour to his philosophy. Words are frequently called (and properly) the *Dress* of our thoughts. Suppose then a man were to appear publicly, in a garb partly clerical, partly laical ; partly French, partly Turkish. If he pleaded necessity for this motley mixture, we should accept the apology ; if he discovered excellent qualities thro' this disgusting appearance, we should respect him. But if he were to tell us, that dress was no more than fashion, that all fashions were equal, and that his served the purposes of cloathing as well as our's ; what judgment should we form of his mind and understanding ?



## C H A P. VII.

*Elegance, no arbitrary or capricious quality of Speech.*

IT might be observed, that the Right Reverend Author who passes so severe a censure on every thing in composition, which deviates from the principles of logic, hath himself been betrayed into a most illogical division of Eloquence into it's constituent parts or qualities. For he hath not only enumerated them imperfectly ; but of the three qualities which he hath exhibited, the first is included in the second, and the third is not necessarily and universally a part of Eloquence. For that a speaker may be exquisitely eloquent without sublimity, we may be convinced by reading the speech of the seditious soldier, already quoted from Tacitus. — But, without dwelling on this objection, let us proceed to consider the second member of his Lordship's division, ELEGANCE.

This, saith he, “ is such a turn of idiom as a fashionable fancy hath brought into repute.” — To understand this definition, we must, in the first place, endeavour to divest it of that figurative disguise which is, of all things most unsuitable to a definition. — By *fancy* then, are we to understand a man of wild and ungoverned imagination ; and, by *fashion*, that temporary favour and applause which are sometimes injudiciously bestowed on such characters ? In this case,



case, the explanation of Elegance amounts only to this, that it is the effect of caprice, that it is variable and unstable. But this is the very point to be proved. If, on the other side, we are to understand by a *fashionable fancy*, a writer or speaker of wit and ingenuity, generally approved and admired for his correct and accurate, lively, apposite, and expressive turn of phrase; then, we have Elegance thus defined, "such a turn of phrase as is admired in elegant speakers or writers.—In this difficulty we must have recourse to critics who have given more accurate descriptions of an elegant style.

They sometimes define it, generally, to be a union of purity and clearness. Thus the author of the books of Rhetoric to Herennius. *Elegantia est quæ facit ut unumquodque pure & aperte dici videatur.* L. 4. C. 12.

Cicero describes it more particularly, as consisting in the use of such *proper* terms, as are not only pure and correct, but well adapted, and most expressive, —and of such *metaphorical* phrases, as exhibit a just and striking similitude, —with a due regard both to propriety and delicacy: so as to observe a proportion to the subject, and to betray nothing disrespectful or brutal. Let us hear the great Roman himself.

Quoniam Eloquentia constat ex verbis & sententiis, perficiendum est, ut pure & emendate loquentes, verborum præterea & propriorum, & translatorum ELEGANTIAM persequamur. In propriis, ut aptissima eligamus; in translatis, ut similitudinem secuti, verecunde utamur alienis. De OPT. GEN. ORAT. C. 2.

In

In like manner, tho' with still greater extent, Aristotle, in his treatise of Rhetoric (L. 3. C. 10, 11,) describes ΤΑ ΑΣΤΕΙΑ & ΤΑ ΕΥΔΟΚΙΜΟΥΝΤΑ. And in such descriptions, we may fairly ask what can be discovered fantastical, local, or capricious? Elegance among the Greeks we find to be exactly the same as elegance among the Romans. And when we examine their accurate descriptions of this quality of speech, it appears that there is good reason for this conformity; and that it *must* be invariably the same in all nations and languages: founded on good sense, and therefore neither local nor accidental.

Or if we venture to pass the bounds prescribed by these great masters; and include in our idea of elegance, not only the choice of phraseology, but the graceful structure and harmonious disposition of period: what are the precepts by which these are regulated?—\* That words should be so ranged and connected, as to convey the sentiment with ease and perspicuity; relieving the voice and ear, with intervals and pauses duely disposed and varied, so as to adorn and harmonize, without weakening the composition: that all this should be conducted with a due regard to propriety, without discovering a minute and affected solicitude, or diverting the attention from the more important parts of eloquence. —In these again we find nothing capricious or

\* Compositio—debet esse honesta, jucunda, varia. — Usus, pro natura rerum quas dicimus. Cura, magna, ut sentiendi atque loquendi prior sit. Dissimulatio curæ præcipua, ut numeri sponte fluxisse, non accessiti & coacti esse videantur. Quint. L. 9. C. 4. in fine.


variable. They are the maxims which have been approved and recommended by all polished ages and nations. They have their foundation in truth and nature ; in that love of order and harmony, that aversion to confusion and dissonance, which are congenial and essential to the human mind.

In like manner we might proceed to consider decorum, propriety, or *fitness*, a constituent part or quality of Eloquence, which the Right Reverend Author hath omitted : but which other writers on this subject, and those of great authority, have treated largely.——That the language should be proportioned to the subject, is equally reasonable at this day, in France and Britain, as it was in Greece, when Aristotle wrote, or in Rome, when Quintilian first inculcated the precept. It is no capricious or arbitrary direction, (nor is it a direction calculated for enabling the speaker to deceive) \* that his language should not betray pride and supercilious contempt, brutal insolence, or self-conceit : that he should consider his own character, the character of his auditors or readers ; that he should consider the occasion of his address, the time, the place, and other like circumstances : and be directed in his style and composition by these considerations. Such principles, and indeed all the rules and principles of elocution, can abide the strictest scrutiny. They are received by every polished nation upon earth, not implicitly, nor from prejudice, not upon the authority of Greek or Roman critics ; but because they are the result of a careful and accurate observation

\* Vide Quint. Lib. 9. C. 1. Cicero de Orat. L. 3. C. 24. Arist. Rhet. L. 3. C. 7.



of human nature, and the means by which it is moved and influenced. And as our nature, in its general frame and constitution, is uniform and invariable, so must be the means of operating on that frame; so, in general, must those methods and forms of address be found, which engage the attention, conciliate the affections, inform the understanding, and inflame the passions, so as to prompt and rouse us to action, the final scope and object of eloquence.



## C H A P. VIII.

*Sublimity doth not necessarily consist in the application  
of Images according to the B. of G.*

**B**UT I now return to consider the last and great member of his Lordship's division of Eloquence, **SUBLIMITY**; which he asserts to be nothing more than "the application of such images as arbitrary and casual connexions, rather than their own native grandeur, have dignified and ennobled." And here I take the liberty of observing in the first place, that it might fairly be questioned, whether Sublimity doth necessarily consist in the *application of images*, or always affect and elevate the mind by exciting images. It is a point extremely well known to critics, both ancient and modern, that the enthusiasm of passion elevates the hearer by the mere force of communication and sympathy. Demosthenes swears by the brave souls who fought at Marathon and Platæa. The grandeur of this figure is particularly explained

explained by Longinus \*. But no part of it is attributed to any particular image or picture impressed on the fancy.

The concluding periods of his oration on the Crown must be allowed to be exceedingly sublime. He seems transported at the mention of those men whom he marks out as the enemies of his country, and at their flagitious designs; and he thus exclaims, with all the grandeur of pathetic emotion.

Μὴ δὴ τ' ὧ πάντες Θεοὶ, μηδεὶς ταῖθ' ὑμῶν ἐπιτύσκειν·  
ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μιν καὶ τούτοις βελτίω τινὰ νοῦν καὶ φρένας  
ἐνθείητε. Ἐἰδ' ἄρα ἔχουσιν οὕτως ἀνιάτως, τοὺς μιν  
αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸς, ἐξώλεις καὶ πρῶλεις ἐν γῇ καὶ θαλάττῃ  
ποιήσαί τε, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς, τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλα-  
γὴν τῶν ἐπηρεζομένων φόβον δέτε, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

“ Hear me, ye immortal Gods ! and let not  
“ these their desires be ratified in heaven ! Infuse a  
“ better spirit into these men ! Inspire even their  
“ minds with purer sentiments. — This is my first  
“ prayer. — Or, if their natures are not to be  
“ reformed ; on them, on them only discharge  
“ your vengeance ! Pursue them both by land and  
“ sea ; pursue them even to destruction ! But to us,  
“ display your goodness, in a speedy deliverance  
“ from impending evils, and all the blessings of pro-  
“ tection and tranquillity !”

\* But the sublimity of this conclusion seems not to

\* Sect. 16.

D

confist

consist in the application of images, but in that noble pathos which leaves the hearer no leisure to attend to images or their effects ; but transports and elevates at once, by spreading the contagion of enthusiasm.


There is also another source of the sublime in what the Greeks called Τὸ ΘΕΙΚΟΝ, where no particular images are applied to the fancy, but the sentiment and expression are therefore grand, because they indicate an extraordinary dignity of character. As in the well-known \* answer of Alexander to Parmenio. Nor are we thus affected only by greatness, but by exalted goodness and benevolence of character : as in that exclamation of Saint Paul before Agrippa. “ Would to God, that not “ only thou, but that all hear me this day, were both “ almost, and altogether such as I am, except these “ bonds !” Acts xxvi. 29. The effect of these, and many other like instances which might be produced, consists entirely in the violent impression made upon our natural sense of what is great, noble, and aimable in human conduct : nor are they at all addressed to the imagination.

The following passage from the Apostle is also allowed to be highly elevated. — “ All things are “ yours ; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, “ or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or “ things to come ; all are yours, and ye are Christ’s, “ and Christ is God’s.” 1 Cor. iii. 22, 23. — But

\* Vid. Longin. Sect. 9.



if we are to credit Longinus \*, the sublimity of such passages arises from the *number* of great sentiments, and what he calls ΕΠΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ, the *management*, and disposition of them, the gradual ascent, even to the very summit of greatness. And it is generally acknowledged that there may be sublimity in the very composition of a period, by which the mind is affected without the help of images, or even of sentiments ; for common experience confirms the observation of the † great Critic, that even musical sounds may have a similar effect.



## C H A P. IX.

*Sublimity not local, casual, or arbitrary.—The authority of Longinus opposed to that of the Lord B. of G.*

**B**UT whatever may be the manner in which sublime compositions act upon the mind ; it is of more especial moment to the present question to consider, whether the effect be owing to something truly great, or, as the Right Reverend Author hath asserted, to an imaginary dignity arising from arbitrary and casual connexions. And first of all, I shall take the liberty of confronting this assertion

\* Sect. 11.

† Longin. Sect. 39.

with a noted passage from Longinus, which I quote at large, as one respectable authority in direct opposition to another.

\* “ You are to know then,” saith that elegant Critic, addressing himself to his friend, “ that, as “ in common life, those things never can be great, “ which it is greatness to despise; as riches, honours, fame, power, and all those acquisitions “ which are surrounded with a vast external pomp, “ but can have no intrinsic excellence in the eyes

\* Εἶδεναι χρῆ, φίλτατε, διότι, καθάπερ καὶ τῷ κοινῷ βίῳ ὁδὸν ὑπάρχει μέγα, ἢ τό καταφρονεῖν ἐστὶ μέγα· ὅσον πλεῖστοι, τιμαί, δοξαί, τρυφαιδές, καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα ἔχει πολὺ τὸ ἐξωθεν προσηραγδύμενον, ἐκ ἂν τῷ γε φρονίμῳ δοξείεν ἀγαθὰ ὑπερβαλλόντα, ὧν αὐτὸ τὸ περιφρονεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ μέτσειν θαυμάζουσι γυν τῶν ἔχόντων αὐτὰ μᾶλλον τὰς δυναμένους ἔχειν, καὶ δὲ μεγαλοφυχίαν ὑπερορῶντας. Τῇ δὲ πρὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δηρμένων ἐν ποιήμασι καὶ λόγοις ἐπισκεπτόμενοι, μὴ τίνα μεγέθους φανησίου ἔχοι τε ταύτην, (ἢ πολὺ πρόσκειται τὸ εἰκῇ προσαναπλατίζμενον), ἀναπυσσόμενα δὲ ἄλλως εὐρίσκοντο χαῦνα, ὧν τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ περιφρονεῖν εὐγενέστερον. Οὕτω γὰρ πως ὑπὸ τάλῃθους ὕψους ἐπαιρεται ἡ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ, καὶ γαῦρόν τι ἀνάστημα λαμβάνουσα πληρῆται χαρᾶς καὶ μεγαλαυχίας, ὥς αὐτὴ γενήσασα ὥστε ἤκυσεν. Ὅταν ὦν ὑπὸ ἀνδρὸς ἑμφρονος καὶ ἐμπεῖρου λόγων πολλὰκις ἀκρόμενον τι πρὸς μεγαλοφροσύνην τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ συνδιατιθῇ μηδ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ πλεῖον τῷ λεγομένῳ τὸ ἀναθεωρούμενον, πῶς δὲ, ἂν τό συνεχές ἐπισκοπῇ, εἰς ἀπαύτησιν· ἐκ ἂν εἴτ' ἀληθὲς ὕψος εἴη, μέχρι μέγας τῆς ἀκοῆς σφάζομενον. Τῷτο γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μέγα, ἢ πολλὴ μὲν ἡ ἀνακρίσις, δύσκολος δὲ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀδύνατος ἢ κατεξαναγκασίς· ἰσχυρὰ δὲ ἡ μνήμη, καὶ δυστέλειπτος. Ὅλως δὲ καλὰ νόμιζε ὕψη καὶ ἀληθινὰ, τὰ διαπαῖδος ἀρέσκειν καὶ πᾶσιν· ὅταν γὰρ τοῖς ἀπὸ διαφόρων ἐπιτηδεύματων, βίων, ζήλων, ἡλικιών, λόγων ἐν τι καὶ ταυτοῦ ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἅπασιν δοκῇ, τότ' ἢ ἐξ ἀσυμφάνων ὡς κρείσσις καὶ συγκατάθεσις τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ θαυμαζομένῳ πίστιν ἰχυρὰν λαμβάνει καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον. Long. S. 7. Ed. Pearce.

of

“ of men of sense, who know that it is rather  
 “ an excellence to despise them ; and that the pos-  
 “ sessors are by no means so justly the objects of  
 “ admiration, as those who might acquire them,  
 “ but have such dignity of soul, as to look down  
 “ upon them with indifference. — So are we to  
 “ judge, of grandeur in poetry and eloquence, and  
 “ whether there may not here be found a certain  
 “ outward shew of greatness, supported by a pro-  
 “ fusion of false and injudicious ornament, but  
 “ such, as when accurately examined, proves  
 “ devoid of solidity, and what it is much more  
 “ noble to condemn than to admire. —

“ It is from NATURE that the soul is in some sort  
 “ elevated by the true sublime, that it feels the  
 “ generous transport, and swells with delight and  
 “ exultation, as if, what is heard, had been a con-  
 “ ception of it's own. But when the same thing,  
 “ frequently repeated to a man of sense, and one  
 “ conversant in works of genius, doth not raise his  
 “ mind to generous sentiments, doth not leave it  
 “ filled with something greater than the import of  
 “ the bare expression, but sinks on repeated exami-  
 “ nation, and lessens into meanness ; such, we  
 “ may be assured, can never be the true sublime,  
 “ whose effects remain no longer than the words  
 “ are pronounced. But the characters of real and  
 “ genuine sublimity are these. It fills the mind with  
 “ conceptions ; it is difficult, nay impossible to bear  
 “ up against the force of its impression ; and the  
 “ remembrance of it is strong, scarcely ever to be ef-  
 “ faced. In a word, you are to esteem that really



“ beautiful and sublime, which approves itself to  
 “ *all times and all persons.* For when *men* of such  
 “ *various occupations, ages, manners, and pursuits,*  
 “ *unite* in one and the same judgment upon any per-  
 “ formance, this harmonious combination of opinions  
 “ forms the real and indisputable criterion of what  
 “ is truly marvellous and sublime.”

We find then, that whatever is local or accidental, whatever is *dignified and ennobled* by arbitrary or casual connexions, is not that sublime of which the Critic speaks ; is not that wonderful and affecting quality, which the man of judgment and experience in works of genius, [ΑΝΗΡ ΕΜΦΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΜΠΕΙΡΟΣ ΔΟΓΩΝ] pronounces truly grand and transporting. He distinguishes between external pomp, and intrinsic greatness ; between the momentary impression, and that which is permanent and indelible, which reason and reflection confirm and enforce ; which stands the shock of time ; prevails over all accidental changes of manners ; nor is impaired by the alteration of languages ; but however, and whenever it is proposed to those who are qualified for judging, must always be approved and admired.



## CHAP X.

*Sublimity not local or arbitrary.*

**B**UT not to rest solely upon authority however venerable, let us now proceed to consider, whether this opinion of the *local* and *casual* nature of sublimity can abide the test of reason.

It can scarcely be controverted, I presume, that some subjects are in themselves intrinsically and essentially greater and more elevated than others: and that whenever they are proposed to the mind, they must be received with superior emotion, reverence, awe, or terror, naturally and instinctively, or at least independant of any casual association of ideas. We call the ocean a grander object than a rivulet, because it strikes the senses and imagination more forcibly. The serious actions and engagements of human life, are really greater objects than its amusements. A battle is still a more awful subject than any of the calmer occupations of social life. And the works and dispensations of the Deity, still more august and awful than the most striking actions of the Creature.

There is also an essential difference between the sentiments and conceptions of different men, when employed on grand subjects, according to their different degrees of judgment, knowledge, refinement, liveliness of fancy, and such like. He who conceived that the end of conquest was to eat and drink, thought but meanly upon a magnificent subject. The sentiment of Parmenio, on the same subject, was more exalted : that of Alexander, greater still, yet perhaps, without rising to the utmost pitch of true dignity, or being entirely divested of *ΤΟ ΕΧΘΕΝ ΠΡΟΣΤΡΑΤΩΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ*.

There is no grander and more awful subject, on which a writer or speaker can be employed, than that of the Deity executing his justice publicly and sensibly upon his offending creatures. Let it then be considered, whether there be not a real and intrinsic difference, as to the dignity of sentiment and conception, between two different writers, furnished with the same grandeur of subject,——The Commentators on the Alcoran, it seems, relate how the Lord defeated the Ethiopians, who came mounted on elephants to destroy the temple of Mecca, by sending birds against them, which threw down stones upon their heads. We are informed that each of these birds carried three stones, one in the mouth, and the other two in their talons : that these stones, tho' not much larger than pease, were yet of such weight that they pierced the soldiers thro' their armour, and that on each of them was written the name of him who was to be slain by it.



I presume, we can make no scruple to declare, that the sentiments here expressed, of the agency and instruments of the Deity, are not sufficiently exalted for the subject ; but rather mean and minute, and devoid of real dignity. At least we may appeal to the feelings of any man in any nation, not intirely savage, and brutally ignorant, whether the following short account of the sacred historian, be not infinitely more affecting and elevating.

“ And it came to pass that night, that the ANGEL  
 “ OF THE LORD went out and *smote* in the camp  
 “ of the Assyrians an hundred fourscore and five  
 “ thousand ; and when they arose early in the morn-  
 “ ing, *behold ! they were all dead corpses !*” 2 Kings,  
 19. 35.

In their account of Mahomet's journey into heaven, we meet with scarcely any circumstance, that is not disgusting by it's meanness and puerility. — His beast so vicious, that nothing but a promise of a place in paradise could prevail on him to suffer the prophet to mount him. — His angels in the shape of birds and beasts. — His cock as white as snow, with his feet on the first heaven, and his head rising to the distance of five hundred years journey ; crowing so loud, that all hear it that are in heaven and earth, except men and fairies — Surely there is an intrinsic difference in point of sublime sentiment, between this motley mixture of the great and the ri-

diculous, \* and that noble and awful obscurity with which the Apostle speaks on the same subject.

“ I knew a man in Christ, about fourteen years ago, whether in the body, I cannot tell, or whether out of the body, I cannot tell : God knoweth : Such a one *caught up* to the third heaven. And I knew such a man, whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell ; God knoweth ; how that he was caught up into Paradise, and heard *unspeakable* words, *which is not lawful for a man to utter.*” 1 Cor. xii. 2, 3, 4.

It should seem then, that we are warranted to proceed one step farther, and to affirm, that *proper expressions* of these more exalted sentiments, and

\* Here it may be observed, that if a just dignity and elevation of sentiment be the first and most valuable part of sublime composition, and if sublimity be so essential an ingredient of Eloquence, it follows, that no composition, in which are found such coldness, meanness, and puerility of sentiment, upon the noblest subjects, though delivered in the purest and most elegant language, can be *as real and substantial a pattern of eloquence, as any whatever* ; The Alcoran for instance, cannot merit that exalted character which the Lord Bishop of Gloucester hath been pleased to bestow upon it, merely by the purity or elegance of it's style : much less, can it acquire this character, in the way which his Lordship hath pointed out, from the prejudices and opinions of those who are said to regulate their notions of what is grand and elegant, by this very composition. To them it may be a pattern of eloquence : that is, they know no better pattern. But even in them it would be rashness to conclude that there is therefore really no better : (what is attempted to be proved with respect to sublimity, being equally applicable to eloquence in general.)

images

images more truly ennobled, must form a composition of real and intrinsic superiority in point of grandeur ; and that an Arabian must acknowledge this, if such sentiments or images were once conveyed to his mind by the purity and elegance of his Alcoran, or any other composition which he regarded as the model of a refined diction.——“ No : for he “ has already formed his idea of sublimity ; and must “ judge of every new object by the standard to “ which he has been accustomed.”—— If this be truth and nature, it must hold in all possible cases and instances which can be devised.

Let us then suppose the Mantuan Shepherd, who had conceived that Rome was no more than a vast collection of cottages, entertaining his fellow swains with an eloquent or poetical description of this city, according to his and their confined ideas. He describes the vast number of it's shepherd-inhabitants, and the extensive range of their dwellings, the crowds of Galateas and Amaryllis's, all cloathed in the best and finest weeds that his village had ever seen, the number of flocks and herds, and all the circumstances of rural magnificence. His hearers are delighted and surprized by this description, which they call grand ; and, in speaking on the same subject, they borrow the sentiments and expressions of their favourite orator or bard. But is this habit of thinking and speaking never to be altered ? or can such habit make the harangue of this shepherd as truly sublime as any whatever ? Suppose an Orator, more refined and better informed, could represent  
to



to the minds of these villagers, the richness, the lustre, the gorgeous palaces, the stupendous temples of this great Capital of the world ;

Statues, and Trophies, and triumphal Arcs ;

\* \* \*

————— The Capitol —————

Above the rest, lifting his stately head,

On the Tarpeian Rock : —————

\* \* \*

Th' imperial Palace, compass huge, and high

The structure, skill of noblest Architects,

With gilded battlements, conspicuous far ;

Turrets and Terraces, and glitt'ring Spires.

As also, the

————— Conflux issuing forth, or ent'ring in ;

Prætors, Proconsuls to their provinces

Hast'ning, or on return, in Robes of state ;

Lictors and rods, the ensigns of their pow'r ;

Legions, and Cohorts, turms of horse, and wings ;

PARAD. REG.

In a word, all the pomp and glory of the city and it's inhabitants, in a manner suitable to the subject : or (if words could not as yet convey these grand ideas to their minds) should he first lead them to this magnificent city, and then renew the impression of those august scenes which they had visited, by his lively and animated description, could they still persevere in thinking and pronouncing, that such description was not really more sublime than that of the

the rustic ? Or could the most rigid philosophical spirit venture to affirm that the one had no superiority over the other, but what was arbitrary and casual, what was derived from chance or caprice ?—The ideas of the one, are, clearly, more striking and affecting than these of the other. And the modes of speech which convey those more striking ideas in their full force, and describe their full impression upon the fancy or the passions, must have the same real and intrinsic superiority ; for they have the greater power in raising transport and surprize ; and what is called sublimity of composition is nothing more than this power of transporting and surprizing.

If then different men form different opinions of sublimity in composition, so do they form different opinions of the magnitude and dimensions of external bodies, upon confined and imperfect views ; and yet the nature of quantity is not for that reason vague and capricious : So do they form various opinions of virtue and vice ; and yet the nature of virtue and vice is not casual and arbitrary. The improvement of reason and reflection, the enlargement of observation and experience, have the same effect in correcting their prejudices, and ennobling their sentiments, both in *Morals* and in *Literature*.—

An Asiatic is born in a country of despotism. He has from his infancy been taught, that the sum of his duty is to pay an unlimited obedience to his Master. His sentiments are those of abject slavery ; and they are expressed in all the pomp of flattery  
and

and submission. These sentiments he calls heroic, and these expressions sublime and elevated. But let him be once instructed in the rights of man, in the duties of social life, in the laws of justice and benevolence; let him be a witness of the noble effects of civil liberty; and his sentiments and language shall be totally changed. He shall now look on with cold indifference, if not with pity and contempt, while

—————The gorgeous East with richest hand  
Show'rs on her Kings barbaric pearl and gold.


MILT.

And when he beholds the mighty monarch receiving the adoration of ten thousand prostrate vassals, he shall turn away with scorn and indignation; he shall regard LEONIDAS at the head of his little band of Spartans, as an object more truly admirable, grand and magnificent: and his style must now become more *sublime*, as it is the effusion of nobler sentiments and more generous passions. — So that what the poet observes of good writing in general, is peculiarly applicable to sublime composition.

—————SAPERE, est principium & fons. HOR.

C H A P.





## C H A P. XI.

*Difference of sentiment with respect to what is sublime or eloquent ; no argument to prove that sublimity, or Eloquence in general, is local and arbitrary.*

**B**UT it is observed still farther, that there is also a diversity of opinion with respect to what is called *sublime* in composition, even among men of extensive knowledge and refinement : that “ this “ species of Eloquence changed it’s nature, with the “ change of clime and language ; and the same expression, which in one place had the utmost *simplicity*, had in another, the utmost *sublime* \*.”— Here one might be tempted to answer that this might well be ; and even in the same place. For it is a point known to every smatterer in Criticism, that these two qualities are so far from being inconsistent with each other, that they are frequently united by a natural and inseparable union. But as men of deep and extensive learning, when they descend to treat of those inferior matters of taste and composition, do not confine themselves to the maxims and modes of speech used by mere critics and rhetorici-

\* Doct. of Grace. p. 53. Dub. Ed. p. 66.

ans, it would seem disrespectful, not to be more distinct and explicit upon this point.

That a grand and pompous diction is the direct contrary to a *simple* style cannot be denied : but grand and pompous diction is not necessarily the same with true dignity and sublimity of composition. It may be employed on a mean occasion ; and then, instead of elevating the subject, it sets the meanness of it in the strongest light, so as to excite ridicule. It may be employed upon a subject, tho' not quite ridiculous, yet disproportioned to such a style ; and then it excites contempt and disgust : or it may be used on more exalted subjects, but such as may not at once strike the imagination with their full force, but require some effort or artifice, to engage his attention, and to impress them upon his mind ; but even here, the effect may be defeated, if this effort, or this artifice be apparent ; and if it does not seem the natural result of real feeling and sensibility. Again, when employed on subjects of greatest dignity, and to convey sentiments of themselves highly elevated and affecting ; it dissipates the mind and attention of the hearer, which should be concentrated in one important point. It betrays an unworthy attention in the speaker to the inferior excellencies of style ; when he had an object which should totally possess him, and leave him no leisure for any artificial selection or arrangement of his phrases. It shews that he is not himself sincerely affected with the noble emotion, when he has recourse to artifice and ornament ; and therefore he cannot propagate it.

it. Hence a simplicity of style, that is such an energetic mode of expression as conveys the thought compleatly, without appearance of art, labour or affectation, is the true and proper garb of sublime sentiments. And hence, in all works of genius, simplicity and sublimity are so far from being considered as two opposite qualities, that no terms are more frequent and familiar, than those of a *noble simplicity*, and a *natural, unaffected, simple grandeur*.

But when it is asserted that simple modes of speech are oftentimes most truly ennobled and sublime, no more is meant than this, that they are best fitted to convey sublime conceptions, and to give them their full impression upon the mind. And this is an incontestable truth, however we may sometimes be perplexed with distinctions, between Sublimity of *Subject* or *Sentiment*, and Sublimity of *Style*. HUET, bishop of *Avanches*, censured Longinus for quoting the famous passage of Genesis [AND GOD SAID LET THERE BE LIGHT: AND THERE WAS LIGHT] as an example of true Sublimity \*. "It is true," saith he, "Moses relates a matter which is grand, but expresses it in a manner by no means grand." Boileau supported the opinion of his favourite author: the Bishop, with his learned co-adjutor M. Le Clerc, replied with sharpness; which was again retorted by the Satyrist.

\* Il est vrai que Moïse rapporte une Chose qui est grande: mais il exprime d'une façon qui ne l'est nullement. *Oeuvres de Boileau*, Vol. 2. Fol. Edit. Amst.



The learned Bishop of Gloucester, when he comes to account for this difference of opinion, far from recurring to any minute verbal distinctions, justly and ingenuously considers the ideas suggested by any mode of expression, and the sensations excited in the mind, in order to determine whether such expression be sublime or no. He observes† that “nothing  
 “but the simplicity of the controverted passage could  
 “be seen or felt by a Jewish reader, to whom the  
 “ideas arising from the knowledge of the true God  
 “and his attributes were familiar; and whenever ideas  
 “are familiar, they raise no emotion: but that the  
 “mind of a Greek must have been warmed and enlarged by the same passage; as it conveys ideas of Theology to him novel and unfamiliar: and of consequence he would naturally esteem it to be infinitely  
 “sublime.” — But not to mention that ideas, rendered familiar to the mind, may yet raise emotion; that altho’ false pomp and outward greatness lose their effect by familiarity, yet real and intrinsic grandeur (as the Greek critic observes in the passage above quoted) supports it’s dignity even after repeated examination; and the more accurate and exact, the more refined and enlarged the sentiments of the hearer may be, the more he is affected and transported by the instances of such grandeur; — Not to insist on this, I say; may it not be questioned, without presumption, whether his Lordship hath not left the controversy yet undecided? For it still remains to be explained how and whence

† Doct. of Grace. p. 54 & 55.

it is, that many Christian readers, as well as the Poet Boileau, are affected by this passage with grand emotions, altho' the *ideas arising from the Knowledge of God and his attributes, be familiar to them, and altho' they can raise themselves with as little pain as any ordinary Jew whatever,*

To the first good, first perfect, and first fair.

A late writer of less eminence than my Lord Bishop, hath proposed a different decision of this noted controversy. I quote his observation at large, not from an opinion of it's intrinsic value, but as an instance (for such I conceive it to be) of the great danger of refining in Criticism.

———"In describing superior beings," saith the author of a Book called *Elements of Criticism*\*, "the reader's imagination, unable to support itself in a strained elevation, falls often as from an height, and sinks even below it's ordinary tone. The following instance comes luckily in view, for a better illustration cannot be given; *God said, let there be light, and there was light.* Longinus cites this passage from Moses, as a shining example of the sublime; and it is scarce possible, in fewer words, to convey so clear an image of the infinite power of the Deity. But then it belongs to the present subject to remark, that the emotion of sublimity raised by this image is but momenta-

" ry ; and that the mind, unable to support itself  
 " in an elevation so much above nature, immediately  
 " sinks down into humility and veneration, for a  
 " being so far exalted above us grovelling mortals.  
 " Every one is acquainted with a dispute about this  
 " passage betwixt two French Critics, the one posi-  
 " tively affirming, the other as positively denying it  
 " to be sublime. What I have opened, shews that  
 " both of them have reached the truth, but neither  
 " of them the whole truth. Every one of taste  
 " must be sensible, that the primary effect of this  
 " passage is an emotion of grandeur. This so far  
 " justifies Boileau. But then every one of taste  
 " must be equally sensible, that the emotion is  
 " merely a flash, which vanisheth instantly, and gives  
 " way to the deepest humility and veneration.  
 " This indirect effect of Sublimity justifies Huet  
 " on the other hand, who being a man of true  
 " piety, and perhaps of inferior imagination, felt the  
 " humbling passions more sensibly than his antago-  
 " nist. And even laying aside any peculiarity of  
 " character, Huet's opinion may, I think, be de-  
 " fended as the more solid ; upon the following ac-  
 " count, that in such images, the depressing emoti-  
 " ons are the more sensibly felt, and have the longer  
 " endurance."

This, I must confess, seems such a justification  
 of the Bishop of Avranches, as he himself, I pre-  
 sume, never would have subscribed to,—— Awe  
 and veneration arise, from a sense of power, and  
 greatness and dignity. He felt this awe and veneration,  
 from the expression of God's omnipotence  
 above.



above quoted, more forcibly than Boileau. And therefore he could not feel their efficient causes so forcibly, or rather, he did not feel them at all. In other words, the passage before us was so transporting, so noble an expression of almighty power, that it at once determined the Bishop to adore that power in all piety and humility. — And therefore, to him, it had nothing noble or transporting. — The question is entirely about the immediate impressions made by any object or description, not the actions, passions, or affections, arising from such impressions. These, how quickly soever they may arise, are not excited without their proper cause; and their existence proves the existence of that cause. And the more powerfully the consequent affections are excited, the more forcibly the first impressions must have operated. — A man finds a vast hidden treasure: he is seized with a sudden joy, which is too violent for his frame, and he faints away. But this depression surely proves not only that he felt this passion of joy, but that he felt it in excess. He is proud of his acquisition, and careful to deposite it in a place of security. But this pride, and this caution, seem but a bad proof that he first received the acquisition with little more than indifference, and was scarcely conscious of its value. — But, instead of dwelling on this pretended solution, it may possibly be of some use in throwing light upon the present subject, to listen for a while to the contending parties themselves.

The Bishop of Avranches insists that the passage in dispute owes its grandeur intirely to the dignity of  
the

the subject \*, which supports itself without the aid of ornament : That they who contend that the sentence in question is sublime, make the sacred historian transgress the well-known rule, that the beginnings of the grandest compositions should be simple † : That if a man, in relating a surprizing event, should in the midst of it, all at once apostrophize to the principal actor : such an apostrophe would pass for an instance of extravagance : and yet such is the extravagance imputed to Moses, by those who maintain that he has raised his style above the ordinary pitch of language, in relating the creation of light ‡ : That the mode of expression which he uses on this occasion was common and familiar to the Jews : That it is impious to suppose that *human* weakness can describe the *divine* operations sublimely : and that it is dishonourable to the sacred historian to declare, that he had recourse to the false colouring of the schools ; to degrade him into a base Rhetorician, and to assert that he employed useless figures, and disguised a subject so noble in itself by superfluous ornaments ||.

Boileau, on the other hand, contends §, that, besides the dignity of subject, there is also a grandeur and elevation of sentiment in this passage, together with a choice and turn of phrase, best fitted to convey that

\* Qui se fait assez sentir étant rapportée nuement, sans avoir besoin d'être relevée par des ornemens recherchez. Oeuvres de Boileau. V. 2. p. 136.

† Ibid. p. 140.

‡ P. 138.

|| P. 150.

§ Vide Reflexion X. sur quelques passages de Longin ou Refutation ; &c.

grandeur both of sentiment and subject, in such a manner as to impress the mind with the most lively and exalted emotion : That, in this consists the sublimity, not in pompous words, or *ambitiosa ornamenta* : That, neither did Longinus insinuate, nor did he himself assert, that, in the disputed passage, there was any thing of what is called a grand style ; but that *extraordinary*, that *marvellous* which are sometimes found in the most simple forms of speech : and where that very simplicity often constitutes the sublimity : That the sacred historian has not then transgressed the rules of composition, as the beginning of his work, tho' a just and grand description of a noble subject, is yet simple and unaffected : That the form of speech may have been common and familiar to the Jews ; but it is not only the form of speech which critics are to consider, but the manner, and occasion, and application, as the meanness or greatness of the composition depends on these : and the same form may be unassuming, or low, trivial, and puerile, when used to describe an ordinary or trivial action, which, on a more ennobled occasion, may be grand and striking \*. And, as to the argument from the ineffable grandeur

\* Qui est-ce en effet qui peut nier qu'une chose dite en un endroit paroîtra basse & petite ; & que la même chose dite en un autre endroit deviendra grande, noble, sublime, & plus que sublime ? Qu'un homme, par exemple, qui montre à danser, dise à un jeune garçon qu'il instruit, *Allez par là, revenez, détournez, arrêtez* : cela est très-puérile, & paroît même ridicule à raconter. Mais que le Soleil, voyant son fils Phaëton qui s'égare dans les Cieux sur un char qu'il a eu la folle témérité de vouloir conduire, crie de loin  
à ces



grandeur of the deity and his operations, he reminds his antagonists, that *Sublimity* is a relative term ; and that all critics speak of it with respect to human conceptions and understandings.

This general view of the controversy may be sufficient to shew, that we are not from thence warranted to conclude, that the same composition may, or may not, be sublime, just as accidental connexions have, or have not ennobled the ideas or images which it raises ; for the true ground of dispute, we find, in no more than the different senses affixed by the contending parties to the term *Sublimity*. Huet very justly contends that any Rhetorical artifice was unworthy of the sacred historian. Boileau, with equal justness, shews, that such artifice must have weakened and destroyed his sublimity. The one proves that his language is plain and unaffected ; the other, that such plain and unaffected language is best suited to his subject : the one, that he has no false pomp ; the other, that he has the greatest native dignity. Huet and Le Clerc, however superior to Boileau in point of biblical learning, were less attentive to the true meaning of Longinus.

à ces fils, a peu près les mêmes, ou de semblables paroles, cela devient très-noble, & très-sublime, comme on peut le reconnoître dans ces vers d'Euripide rapportés par Longin.

Le pere cependant plein d'un trouble funeste,  
Le voit rouler de loin sur la plaine celeste ;  
Lui montre encore sa route, & du plus haut de Cieux,  
Le suit autant qu'il peut de la voix, & des yeux.  
Va par là, lui dit il. Reviens. Détourne. Arrête. *ibid.*  
Not

Not but that men of erudition may differ from each other in point of real feeling, and sentiment, on some particular instances of composition. The passions and imagination have not exactly the same force in every individual, nor are they equally susceptible of emotion. He who hath been long habituated to a calm examination of the metaphysical nature of things, hath sensations quite different from his, who hath been ever conversant in works of genius, the fine arts, and the pleasures of the imagination. The enthusiastic emotion which the latter indulges with such delight, seldom warms his breast. He possibly regards it as dangerous and extravagant. Even among those who are most conversant in works of imagination, there is the same variety of Taste and degrees of Sensibility : and, of consequence, there must be a difference of Sentiment upon subjects of taste and feeling.


Some may find it reputable to have a sense of what is excellent in composition, and may affect to discover grandeur, where the most distinguishing real taste cannot perceive it. Others will acknowledge themselves unaffected, but impute a coldness, which really proceeds from a want of sensibility, to the correctness of their judgment. Some, from custom or temper, acquire a partiality for one particular species of composition and are indifferent to others of equal or greater value. They have been accustomed, for instance, to delight in neatness, fluent ease, and elegance ; and attend with reluctance to those objects which are not distinguished by their favourite qualities, and, of consequence, are less affected by them. Other men

E

acquire

acquire a fondness for whatever is ridiculous and burlesque, and may be indifferent to such performances as do not gratify their mirth or their malignity. But in these and all such cases, the real grandeur of composition is by no means altered. Just as in the external senses, the taste, the hearing, the sight may be vitiated or impaired, or lost. But the qualities fitted to affect them, cannot be lost or changed, but with the nature and properties of bodies. The eye may be long habituated to minute objects, and may deem those *great* which exceed them but a little: or, upon a general survey of the works of nature, may dwell with most pleasure on those to which it hath been most accustomed. Philosophy may proceed to the important discovery, that nothing is great or small, but by comparison. But this discovery doth not at all effect the differences of magnitude or quantity. The Mathematician still proceeds to measure and determine these. In the case of metaphorical greatness, indeed, or the sublimity of composition, there are not such accurate methods of ascertaining every precise degree of excess or difference. Yet there are striking differences and distinctions at once perceptible, so as to warrant an appeal against the most positive decisions of fashion, custom, or prejudice, and to establish general principles of RATIONAL CRITICISM.





## C H A P. XIII.

*Remarks on an observation of Dr. Browne. Of the gradual progress of Eloquence at Athens and Rome. The same general modes of Eloquence universally acknowledged as fit and proper, by all polished nations.*

**I**F then PURITY and ELEGANCE of composition have their settled rules and principles, by which all ages and nations have been, and must be invariably directed; if SUBLIMITY be not capricious, vague, and casual, either in the form of expression, or in the images, sentiments, or affections conveyed to the mind; and if all the several constituent qualities of Eloquence have a real and intrinsic value independent on fashion or custom: in a word, if not only *some* but *all* the substantial principles of Eloquence are common to all languages; it seems to follow, that the compound of these qualities, the forms of speech framed and directed by these principles, cannot be variable, capricious, or fantastical; nor can all the various modes of elocution, which have ever prevailed, be so intirely indifferent, that reason can give no preference; or so exactly equal in point of real value, that any one may be as good and perfect a model as any other whatsoever.

Different degrees of understanding and judgment, different passions, habits, tempers, and occupations must of necessity prevail among men, and must produce different forms and manners of Elocution. The value of these, that is, their influence and persuasive power, or (which is the same thing) their difference with respect to eloquence, depends on the information which they convey, and the clearness and strength with which it is enforced, the characters and moral qualities which they display, and the passions which they tend to excite : this difference then can be no more nominal or local, than the distinction between these mental and intellectual qualities.

An ingenious writer, who, in treating this subject, sometimes concurs in sentiment with the Bishop of G. ascribes the various modes of elocution, which have prevailed in different countries, to another cause ; the *arbitrary* nature of words as signs of our ideas. “ Language,” saith Doctor BROWNE, being the “ voluntary application of *arbitrary* signs, according “ to the consent of different men and nations, there “ is no *single uniform model of nature* to be followed. “ HENCE, *Gracefulness* or *Strength* of Style, Harmony “ or *Softness*, *copious* expression, *terse* brevity, or “ *contrasted* periods, have by turns gained the ap- “ probation of particular countries \*.” — Had then mankind formed their speech by one universal model, and the same ideas were every where invariably expressed by the same sounds, clearness of apprehension, extent of knowledge, warmth of conception,

\* On the Characteristics, Essay 3. p. 376. Ed. L<sup>nd</sup> 1741.

elegance of manners, could have no distinction of style or language. The poetic genius and the severe philosopher, the recluse and the politician, the modest Spartan and the conceited sophist of Athens, the lively French and the Saturnine English, men of letters and men of business, must have all spoken and written exactly in the same manner.

LETTERS are also the *arbitrary* signs of *words* : and different nations shape them differently, without copying from one universal model. HENCE it is, (according to the reasoning of this author) that the unpractised hand writes with most difficulty and least exactness ; the man of business with less scrupulous care, than he who means to display the beauty of his performance ; that in epistolary correspondence, with our equals, we are less attentive to fair writing ; with our superiors, more respectfully exact : that the idle monk traced every single character in his missal with such nicety, and emblazoned it with so much adventitious ornament ; while we, of this age, have no leisure for acquiring such frivolous skill, but are contented with writing *legibly*.

But we must remind this author (for I am confident he is not to be informed) that this variety of elocution, which he affects to deduce from the difference of languages, prevailed at different periods, among those who spoke the very same language. It may not be useless or impertinent, to produce some instances of this : as they shew, how faulty, or imperfect modes of elocution are necessarily corrected and improved by experience and judgment : and that reason and good



sense have always prevailed over fashion, however generally adopted and established. Here then let us take a short review of the gradual process of Eloquence among the Athenians and Romans, the only two people who acquired the reputation of it in the antient world. I say, the only two people. For however a writer may be pleased to distinguish this mode of speech into various genera and species, Cicero is much more confined in his division. \* He acknowledges no other species of Grecian Eloquence, but that of Athens. He never heard of a Spartan Orator: scarcely of one in any other of the Grecian states. Of Indian Eloquence he is absolutely silent; and as to the Asiatic, he † explicitly declares, that it was imported from the Piræus, and adulterated by the manners of the people thro' whom it passed.

The most antient speakers of Athens ‡, we are informed, were pompous in their diction, sententious, concise, and somewhat obscure.

\* Hoc autem studium [sci *Dicendi*.] non erat commune Græciæ, sed proprium Athenarum. Quis enim aut Argivum Oratorem, aut Corinthium, aut Thebanum scit temporibus illis? nisi quid de Epaminonda, docto homine, suspicari libet. Lacedæmonium vero usque ad hoc tempus audiivi fuisse neminem. Menelaum ipsum, dulcem illum quidem tradit Homerus, sed pauca dicentem. Brevitas autem, laus est interdum in aliqua parte dicendi, in universa eloquentia, laudem non habet. DE CLAR. ORATOR. C. 13.

† Ut semel a Piræeo Eloquentia evecta est, omnes peragravit insulas, atque ita peregrinata tota Asia est, ut se externis oblinirit moribus, omnemque illam salubritatem Atticæ dictionis, quasi sanitatem perderet, ac loqui pene dedisceret. IBID.

‡ Ibid. C. 7.

These

These immediate successors of the poets copied from their elevation of style. Their liveliness and vanity hurried them into general conclusions from their own observation and experience: Their quickness and conception produced and warranted conciseness; and the obscurity which arose from thence, seems to have been increased by that boldness of figure which they still retained from their state of rudeness, and which oftentimes gave an enigmatical appearance to their language and observations. ||

These antient orators, with a kind of rude untutored violence, applied themselves to rouse, to terrify, and inflame, till the gradual refinement of their hearers taught them to guard against this dangerous power: and obliged the Orators to reduce their eloquence within stricter bounds. Thus it became the next care of this people to give their style a greater elegance and neatness; to prune the luxuriance of the antient diction, to render it more open and explicit, and to range it into such well-adjusted periods, as might relieve the voice, and come with due force and pleasure to the ear. And thus plainness, neatness, elegance and harmony became the distinguishing characters of Attic Eloquence.

And this we should readily pronounce the most perfect mode, if mankind could be always influenced by the mere force of *instruction* conveyed with ease and grace. But these were found too feeble instru-

|| Thus Stesichorus advised the Locrians to restrain their insolence, lest *their Grasshoppers should chirp upon the ground*. ARIST. Rhet. L. 2. C. 21.

ments for operating on public assemblies. And genius, observation, and good sense conspired to produce another necessary alteration in the eloquence of Athens, which rendered it more powerful, and more the object of wonder and delight. DEMOSTHENES had the glory of *uniting* the grandeur, pathos, and impetuosity of the antient speakers, with the clearness, elegance, and simplicity of their immediate successors; ornament with propriety; correctness with elevation. He found the happy art of harmonizing the period, without enervating the language, and without the appearance of studied refinement. His animated warmth was justly proportioned to the importance of his subject; the boldness of his figures to the majesty of his sentiments. This union of great qualities has ever been regarded as forming the most perfect species of Grecian eloquence. If it be asserted, that this is an arbitrary and fantastical determination, and that this species hath no *real* superiority over any of those modes which preceded or succeeded it: We must appeal to the effects. Can pomp or brevity of style, can elegance or neatness, or harmony of language, can any one or more of these qualities prove equally effectual, not only in informing the understanding, but in reconciling the affections, and influencing the will? Powerful conviction, elevation of sentiment, and a flame of generous passion, are the greatest and noblest effects produced by any species of human eloquence: and the Eloquence best fitted to produce them, must be of the greatest and noblest kind: must have a superiority something more than *nominal* or *local*.

When



When the Romans first began to attend to elocution, they might have copied from the very best models in Greece. And yet they did not attain to their greatest perfection, but by a gradual progress and improvement, similar to that of Athens.

There prevailed in the days of the elder Cato, what Cicero calls “*unctior quædam ac splendidior consuetudo loquendi.*” This fullness and magnificence of expression was rude and undirected; yet vehement and impetuous.——Aemilius Lepidus had the honour of first introducing the——*lenitas Græcorum, verborum comprehensio, & artifex stylus* §——Antonius and Crassus are compared by Cicero to Demosthenes and Hyperides; yet seem, from his † description to have been more indebted for their fame to art and exercise, than to any extraordinary elevation of genius. The style of the former, tho’ not elegant or correct, was forcible and harmonious, his action graceful and affecting. And these, together with promptness and memory, are the qualities to which his influence is principally ascribed. The abilities of Crassus were chiefly confined to explaining and instructing. Their immediate Successors studied the Attic elegance, and imitated it even to a degree of ridiculous affectation ||: ’till Cæsar taught them a more judicious application of this mode to their own language. Hortensius indeed adopted somewhat of the *Asiatic* manner †. But ATTICISM, or what was

\* De CLARIS ORAT. C. 20.

† C. 37, 38, 39.

|| C. 74, 75.

E. 5.

§ *IBID.* C. 25.

† C. 95.

102

so deemed, still continued most generally fashionable, till the great Master arose, and gave life and energy to the Roman Eloquence, by such a union of great qualities as obtained the palm in Greece.

Thus we find these two people gradually advancing by the same steps, to the same point of excellence. At Athens, this was the pure result of good sense and observation which corrected or improved established fashions. At Rome, the effect was partly produced by an imitation of Grecian Models. But these models were not imitated merely because they were Grecian ; because they had been admired by others, or had once been fashionable in the country of Eloquence. Nor were former or present fashions ever regarded as the standard of eloquence. Even in the periods of refinement, the great Roman speakers formed higher ideas of this accomplishment than had ever been suggested by their own observation. It was the saying of Antonius the orator, \* *disertos se vidisse multos, eloquentem omnino neminem*. And Cicero thus addresses himself to his friend,—— † *Investigamus hunc igitur, Brute, si possumus, quem nunquam vidit Antonius, aut qui omnino nullus nunquam fuit*.


These Romans, then, studied and admired the same general excellencies of speech which had been studied and admired in Greece, but not blindly or implicitly, but with a just regard to their own national character, their own occasions, and the temper of

\* ORATOR. C. 5.

† Ibid. C. 6.

their

their hearers. They discovered the imperfections both of their co-temporaries and their predecessors, whether in Greece or Rome, thro' all the mists which prejudice or fashion could oppose to their penetration. They were not, then, entirely guided by imitation. As, in general, they pursued the same means of influencing their hearers ; and as the same means are still approved by all polished and lettered Nations, as most fit and proper, It follows, that this *fitness* and *propriety* cannot be merely *nominal* and *local*.



#### CHAP. XIV.

*Summary of the Argument. Inconveniences attending the Theory of the Lord B. of G.*

AND now to sum up all that hath been offered upon this subject. A considerable part of human speech is addressed solely or principally to the passions and affections. Each of these hath its peculiar mode of expression, in all languages, the same in kind, tho' sometimes differing in the degree of boldness and vehemence, according to the different strength or liveliness of the inward emotion. These different modes are indeed marked by Rhetoricians, and ranged into different classes of *Tropes* and *Figures* ; but they derive their origin neither from artifice nor refinement. They are in themselves, the *real, natural* and *necessary* result of *real* passion and emotion. tho', like other signs of truth,



truth, they may be perverted to the purposes of deceit. — The particular qualities of speech, which give it influence and persuasion, and which Critics enumerate as the parts of perfect Elocution, are all regulated by the same laws, and founded on the same principles, in all nations and languages, and have their several degrees of excellence independent on caprice or fashion. — Various modes of elocution may prevail at different periods, or among different nations; but reason, judgment, and experience, as they are gradually enlarged, correct, refine, and improve these modes: and, on a general survey of them all, distinguish some, as better adapted to convey ideas clearly, pleasingly, and forcibly, to impress the mind with sentiments of dignity, to display qualities more engaging or exalted, passions more noble and generous: so as to reconcile, affect, and influence, more powerfully. Hence it follows, that

ELOQUENCE,

1. Is not merely the abuse of human Speech.
2. Is not necessarily the instrument of Fraud.
3. \* Is not merely arbitrary, and dependent on fashion and custom.

The

\* There is an observation of Dr. Browne in his ingenious Essay on Ridicule, which deserves to be considered before this subject be dismissed.

“As eloquence,” saith he, “is of a vague unsteady nature, merely relative to the imaginations and passions of mankind, so there must be several orders and degrees of it, subordinate to each other in dignity, yet each perfect in their kind. The common end of each is persuasion: the means are different according

The Principles which I have thus endeavoured to support, in concurrence with the general sense of all the most distinguished critics, have the additional advantage

“ to the various capacities, fancies and affections of those whom  
 “ the artist attempts to persuade. The pathetic orator, who  
 “ throws a congregation of enthusiasts into tears and groans, would  
 “ raise affections of a very different nature, should he attempt to  
 “ proselyte an English Parliament: as on the other hand, the  
 “ finest speaker that ever commanded *the House*, would in vain  
 “ point the thunder of his eloquence on a *Quaker-meeting*.” [Sect.  
 3. p. 32.]

This is plausibly and ingeniously urged. But the whole argument is founded on the supposition, that Eloquence and persuasion are one and the same, and that to be denominated an orator, no more is necessary than to influence and move the hearer. A supposition which cannot be admitted, however witty men have sometimes spoken of the eloquence of *silence*, or the eloquence of *nonsense*. “*Per-suadent enim dicendo,*” saith Quintilian, “*vel ducunt in id quod volunt, alii quoque, ut meretrices, adulatores, corruptores.*” [L. 2. l. 16.] The alluring accents of an Harlot move the sensualist; the abject and extravagant praises of a flatterer influence the vain man; and the plain promise of a large reward, expressed without trope or figure, may have the greatest power over the conduct of a traitor or assassin. But hence it by no means follows, that the harlot, the flatterer, or the suborner is *eloquent*. To merit this praise, a man must persuade (if he does persuade) by the real excellencies, the engaging and conciliating qualities of speech. Accordingly, Aristotle tells us, that it is the office of Rhetoric, *ὅν τὸ ΠΕΙΣΕΑΙ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰσχύ τὰ ὑπαρχόντα ΠΙΘΑΝΑ ἀντιπαραστήσειν*. [Rhet. L. 1. C. 1.] So that the Doctor’s orator, who throws a congregation of enthusiasts into tears and groans, is in reality no orator at all: because he owes his influence not to clearness and strength of reasoning, not to dignity of sentiment, force or elegance of expression, and the like; but to senseless exclamation, unmeaning rhapsody, or to grimace, to a sigh, to a rueful countenance. And if he would in vain endeavour to proselyte an English Parlia-

ment

vantage of standing clear of some perplexities in which those of the learned Bishop of Gloucester seem to be involved, when his Lordship comes to apply them to the defence of the Apostolical Composition.

Thus, for instance, while we are obliged to acknowledge that the Old Testament abounds in *ornament* of style, we are not embarrassed with a position which it might require some pains to reconcile with such acknowledged knowledge, "that *Ornament* of Style is the effect of fraud, and the substitute to sincerity†."

Nor

ment, it is for this very reason, because he is no Orator. On the other hand, it must be allowed, that "the finest speaker that ever commanded the *House*, would in vain point the thunder of his eloquence on a *Quaker-meeting*." Nor could he inform the idiot, nor could his thunder pierce a deaf ear, nor could he affect a foreigner who understood not his language. They who hear and understand him, who are interested in his subject, who have sense, knowledge and refinement, if yet their minds be prepossessed by interest or ambition, may listen unmoved to the strongest motives of virtue and public spirit, urged with the utmost clearness and energy. These and such like instances amount to no more than this, that a speaker may persuade without being eloquent, and may be eloquent, without persuading. Nor can any man who persuades without any one of *Τὰ Πιθὰν*, the *rational* excellencies, and engaging qualities of speech, be said to possess a degree of Eloquence *perfect in it's kind*. No, not with half the propriety of Goodman VERGES's thanksgiving, "that he is as honest as any man living, that — is no honefter than himself."

† It must be acknowledged, that the learned Bishop does not always state his positions in the same manner. For instance, when he is to form an argument to prove, that no one mode of Eloquence could have been followed by the sacred Writers, he asserts in general, that all it's various modes are nominal and fantastical, p. 52-58. But when he has once drawn his conclusion, and there is no farther



Nor do we pronounce every excellence of speech, *Clearness* only excepted, to be *altogether unsuitable to the genius of the GOSPEL*, which yet abounds with *various excellencies of style*; and is frequently addressed not only to the understanding, but to the affections and passions, in all the conciliating, moving, and enlivening forms of eloquence.

But it is now time to proceed to an important part of his Lordship's *disquisition*, I mean his CHARACTER of an INSPIRED LANGUAGE.

farther occasion for the premises, then he is pleased to speak more cautiously. — "The various modes of eloquence being MOSTLY fantastical." — Again, he at first asserts without any limitation, that "the end of Eloquence is to stifle reason, and inflame the passions." p. 36. But when he comes to quote this observation, he hath changed it into a quite different proposition. — "The principal end of Eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to mislead reason, and to cajole the fancy and affections." p. 66. — If no notice has been taken of these qualifying expressions, it is, because his Lordship hath omitted them, where he states his argument in due form; and because it seemed necessary to take his positions in that *extent*, which the use, and application, and the conclusions deduced from them, evidently require.



## C H A P. XV.

*Of the B. of G's. Character of an inspired Language,  
and the arguments brought to establish it.*

**T**HE enemies of our holy faith, as well as some imprudent friends, have sometimes asserted, that an inspired language should be a language of *perfect* eloquence. With regard to this proposition, his Lordship affirms on the contrary, that *rudeness* and *barbarousness* form the character of an inspired language: and that, supposing the Style of the New Testament to abound in every fault that can possibly deform a language, this is one CERTAIN MARK of it's DIVINE ORIGINAL.——This, as the author seems to acknowledge, is a bold assertion: and the bolder it appears, the stronger and more forcible should be the arguments brought to support it. These I shall endeavour to collect fairly and fully.

“ Language,” saith the learned Bishop, “ consists of  
 “ two parts, 1. Single terms, which are arbitrary.  
 “ 2. Phrases and Idioms, which arise insensibly from  
 “ the manners, customs, and tempers of those to  
 “ whom the language is vernacular. When illiterate  
 “ men would acquire the knowledge of a foreign  
 “ tongue; they make it at first their only study to  
 “ treasure

“ treasure up in their memory the signification of the  
 “ terms : and when they come to talk or write in  
 “ the speech thus acquired, their language is full of  
 “ their own native idioms. If we suppose this fo-  
 “ reign tongue to be instantaneously infused, the  
 “ effect must be the same. Divine inspiration can  
 “ only convey the terms and single words of one  
 “ language corresponding to those of another. For,  
 “ an impression of phraseology or idiom, requires a  
 “ previous one of the tempers, fashions and opinions  
 “ of the people to whom the language is native, upon  
 “ the minds of them to whom it is imparted. But  
 “ this would be a waste of miracles without sufficient  
 “ cause. For, the terms of one language adapted to  
 “ the idiom of another, abundantly serve the purpose  
 “ of giving CLEAR INTELLIGENCE.”

Here, there are some things assumed as evident and  
 incontestable, which yet may be controverted, I pre-  
 sume, without any breach of candor.——We are  
 told, that in order to convey clear intelligence to a  
 foreigner, nothing more is necessary, than to use the  
*words* of his language adapted to the *idiom* of our  
 own.

But shall we always find correspondent words in  
 his language ? It is a point well known to philologers  
 and critics, that every language hath not only it's  
 own idiom, but also many terms peculiar to itself. It  
 is equally well known, and generally acknowledged,

\* Doct. Gr. p. 42, 43, 44. Dub. Ed. p. 56, 57.

that



that the real purport of almost every sentence in every language, is not to be learned from the signification of detached words, and their grammatical congruity, even where their signification may be expressed by corresponding words in another language. Cicero writes thus to Cato. “*Quem ego currum aut quam lauream cum tua laudatione conferam?*” Adapt English words to this Phraseology, and say whether the sentiment will be conveyed to a meer unlettered English reader. I open accidentally on the following short epistle, which is not encumbered with political or forensic terms, but written on a plain familiar subject.

## CICERO SERVIO S.

“Hagesaretus Larissæus magnis meis beneficiis  
 “ornatus in consulatu meo, memor et gratus fuit;  
 “meque postea diligentissime coluit. Eum tibi magno-  
 “pere commendo, ut et hospitem meum, & familia-  
 “rem, et gratum hominem, & virum bonum, &  
 “principem civitatis suæ, & tua necessitudine dignis-  
 “simum. Pergratum mihi feceris, si dederis operam,  
 “ut is intelligat hanc meam commendationem apud  
 “te pondus habuisse. Vale.”

Let any man try to express the sense of these few lines in English words, without deviating from the Roman Idiom.—The figurative phrase in the conclusion [pondus habuisse] may possibly have been rendered familiar to an illiterate reader. But I suspect that one intirely unacquainted with Latin writers,

or

or who never conversed with those that copied from them, must find some difficulty in comprehending “*magnis meis beneficiis ornatus ; meque diligentissime coluit ;*” and such like, when translated into—— “by my great benefits *adorned ;*” and—— “me he most diligently *cultivated.*” And where are the corresponding English words, to render “*gratum hominem,*” and “*virum bonum,*” with sufficient distinction ? Not to mention “*hospitem, familiarem, tuam necessitudine dignissimum, si dederis operam,*” and such like terms and phrases, which it is impossible to translate, but according to the rule prescribed by Cicero.——*Verba persequens eatenus, ut ea non abhorreant a more nostro.*

\* A great genius of the country where I now write, was betrayed by his passion for trifling, into the hands of Editors, who have transmitted to the world an idle and unworthy amusement of his private life, that of adapting Latin words to English Phraseology, so as to form a whimsical style, which he called, for some reason not worth remembering, *LATINITAS GRATTANIANA*. According to his Lordship's position, this species of Latinity would be perfectly intelligible to an old Roman, were he to revisit this world. And yet the design of it was to puzzle and confound those who were acquainted both with the Roman and English languages. Nor is it understood without more attention than it deserves.

The author of the Minute Philosopher tells us,  
that

\* Doctor SWIFT.

\* that the English Gentleman who informed his foreign guests, that, " *Les Chevaux sont tombez en-semble par les Oreilles,*" made them stare ; what expressed a *very plain sense in the original English, being incomprehensible when rendered, word for word, into French.*

The learned SELDEN speaking of a translation of the Bible *word for word*, condemns it as an attempt never known. " If," saith he, " I translate a French Book into English, I turn it into English *Phrase*, not into *French-English* ; [*il fait froid*]. " I say 'tis cold, not it makes cold : But the Bible " is rather translated into *English words*, than into *English Phrase* †." Mr. LEWIS, justly observes upon such a translation, that " it seems an odd way " to convince an Englishman, that *the Scripture is the best interpreter of itself*, to translate it into " such English, AS HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND. †" And to shew the absurdity of such an attempt, he quotes the ninety-fifth Psalm from *Canne's* literal translation. But, instead of recurring to the figurative and poetical parts of scripture, let us make the experiment in a plain historical narrative.—— The following is a translation from the Hebrew, precisely in that manner which my Lord Bishop hath asserted to be *abundantly* sufficient for conveying *clear intelligence* to a person acquainted only with the Latin tongue : The words being rendered by

\* Dialogue 6.

† Table-Talk.

‡ History of the English Translations of the Bible, p. 352. 8vo. 1739.



*corresponding terms, and the original phraseology strictly preserved.*

2 SAM. 18. 5, &c.

Et præcepit Rex Joabo, Abischaio, & Ittaio, dicendo, leniter mihi ipsi puero Abschalomo. Et omnis populus audiverunt in præcipere Regem omnibus principibus super verbum Abschalomi; et egressus est populus in agrum in occursum Israelis; & fuit proelium in sylva Ephraimi; et cæsi sunt ibi populus Israel, ad facies servorum Davidis. Et fuit ibi plaga magna in die illa viginti millium; et fuit proelium sparsum super facies omnis terræ; et multiplicavit sylva peredere in populo præ quibus peredit gladius in die illa. Et occurrit Abschalomus ad facies servorum Davidis. Et Abschalomus equitans super mulum; et intravit mulus subter densitatem quercus magnæ; et invaluit caput ejus in quercu, et datus est inter cælos & inter terram, & mulus, qui sub eo, transivit. Et vidit vir unus, et indicavit Joabo, & dixit, ecce vidi Abschalomum suspensum in quercu. Et dixit Joabus viro indicanti illi, & ecce vidistin', & cur non percussisti eum ibi in terram? et, super me dare tibi decem argenteos & cingulum unum. Dixitque vir ad Joabum, et si ego appendens super volas meas mille argenteos non mitterem manum meam in filium Regis. Etenim in auribus nostris præcepit Rex tibi et Abischaio, et Ittaio, dicendo, obseryate quis in puerum ipsum in Abschalomum; vel fecissem in animam meam mendacium, et omne verbum non absconditum erit a Rege, & tu statueres te ex adverso. Dixitque Joabus, non sic expectabo ad facies tuas, et cepit tria spiracula

cula in vola sua, it infixit ea in corde Abschalomi  
adhuc ipso vivente in corde quercus: Et circunda-  
runt decem pueri ferentes vasa Joabi, & percusserunt  
Abschalomum, & occiderunt eum.

By this time, I presume, it hath appeared that one  
part of the argument advanced by the right reverend  
author, in support of his bold assertion, is by no  
means, universally and incontestably evident. And  
that when he would *demonstrate the natural condition*  
of an *inspired* Language, his first and grand prin-  
ciple is such as no critic or grammarian can admit.

And perhaps it is no less hazardous to affirm, that  
“ a knowledge of the idiom or phraseology of any  
“ language, *always* implies a previous knowledge  
“ of the customs and manners of those to whom it  
“ is vernacular.”——Some phrases indeed there are  
in every language, obviously deduced from customs  
and manners. Yet the general import even of those  
(tho’ not always their whole force and beauty) may  
be acquired without a previous knowledge of these  
customs or manners. Thus in the instance already  
quoted, “ quem ego *currum*, aut quam *lauream*  
“ cum tua *laudatione* conferam?” A foreigner  
might be taught that this signifies in general, “ what  
“ *public honours* can I put in competition with your  
“ *applause*?” altho’ he had never heard of a Roman  
“ Triumph, &c.——Again, there are other in-  
stances of Phraseology abounding in every language,  
as arbitrary as the detached terms themselves, at  
least equally inexplicable from manners or customs.  
They may arise from accidental associations, from  
similitudes

similitudes casually observed, metaphorical or figurative expressions formed by accident, approved, adopted, and transmitted. But no Philologer attempts the vain labour of tracing them to their origin, or minutely explaining the causes which introduced them. He never tells us what there is in the temper or manners of an Englishman that leads him to say, "it is cold," instead of "it MAKES cold," or, "let us make an experiment," instead of let us "make *a danger*, according to the Latin idiom." And he would find it difficult, I presume, to explain that difference of manners or customs of the Hebrews and the Romans, which led them to observe different effects of *anger* on the human aspect, and to form different figurative expressions of this passion: So that if the Psalmist were to use Latin words, he would say—"Tunc loquetur ad eos in "NASO suo \*;" while the Satyrist uses a different phraseology, on the same occasion;

————— Quin Jupiter ambas

Inflaret BUCCAS.

Hor. Sat. 1.

I recollect two short lines from the last quoted author, which exemplify the two species of phraseology above mentioned.

Cujus octavum *trepidavit* Ætas

*Claudere* LUSTRUM.

*Trepidavit*, and, *claudere*, are instances of Roman idiom, not to be explained from manners or

\* Psal. 2. v. 4.

customs,



customs, and requiring no previous knowledge of these, in order to be understood. *Lustrum*, on the contrary, is a particular elegance of phrase derived from a particular custom. And yet a foreigner might easily comprehend that the word signifies a *space of five years*, altho' he is not *previously* made acquainted with a long detail of registers, taxations, &c.

True it is, that an accurate observer of nature may account for the peculiar idiom of a language, in many instances, from manners, &c. even where the expression is not merely technical or political; for the glowing figurative phrases of the East, (for instance) compared with the more corrected elegance of the West. But how are the manners, characters, and tempers of any people first discovered? I presume, from conversing with them; from their language, from their characteristic phrases. A Critic may tell us, whence it is that one nation uses a bolder and more figurative phrase, to express a particular action or sentiment, than another. But first he must learn, that it is a bolder and more figurative phrase, and know the action or sentiment expressed by it. Or, in other words, the knowledge of idiom is so far from requiring, or implying a previous one of tempers, manners, &c. that the very converse of this seems to be the safer principle; and that tempers and manners are not to be learned, without some degree of previous acquaintance with the peculiarities of a language.


 C H A P. XVI.

*That an inspired language is not to be a perfect model of human Eloquence, proved from other principles. The objection of want of Eloquence, &c. in the Apostolical writings, unreasonably and ignorantly urged.*

**I**NSTEAD, therefore, of accepting that proof of the divine Inspiration of the Apostolical writings, "*the utmost rudeness and barbarousness of Style, which the most exaggerated accounts can represent;*" a proof, deduced from principles at least precarious and controvertible, if not absolutely erroneous; a proof, which these writings do not need, and which, if rejected, cannot in the least impair their authority; it seems more prudent to confine ourselves to a proposition, which, I am confident, admits of the clearest evidence; that "*all the rudeness of style which the most accurate Critic can discover in the writings of the New Testament, affords neither PROOF nor PRESUMPTION, that the authors were NOT divinely inspired.*"

For while I deny that clear intelligence is conveyed to foreigners, by using the *terms* of their language,

F

and

and preserving the *idiom* of our own, I cannot think it necessary to accept of the alternative offered by the learned Bishop, [p. 44.] and to admit, as a necessary consequence, that, in order to be clearly understood in any language, our knowledge of it must extend to ALL it's peculiarities or elegancies. This is indeed an *ignorant fancy*, and *repugnant to reason and experience*. The vulgar in every nation converse intelligibly with their countrymen, without knowing or conforming to the elegancies of their own language. The person of greatest refinement, who addresses himself to this order of men, must accommodate his language to his hearers ; in order to be understood, in order to make an impression upon their minds, his speech, far from being polite and elegant, must be strictly plain, and sometimes even rude and coarse. An Englishman who can speak the French tongue with tolerable ease and fluency, tho' not with accurate purity, not without *some* mixture of his native idiom, may yet inform a Parisian of matters of fact ; may instruct him in some important rule of conduct ; may give clear and satisfactory evidence in his courts of justice. And unhappy it would be for mankind, indeed, if no intelligence could be clearly conveyed, but by the strictest accuracy and nicest elegance of language.

Let us then proceed to the case of a foreign language instantaneously communicated by divine power. The GIFT of TONGUES, in it's nature, manner, and extent, must have been such as is WORTHY of God. Granted ! But in this *worthiness* nothing more



more can be implied, than that it must be *abundantly sufficient* for the purposes of his wisdom and goodness.

One purpose was, to manifest the divine agency by this miracle.—And surely, a Rhetorician who had been witness of this effusion of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles, must have justly exposed himself to the ridicule of all sensible men, had he attempted to efface the impression of this stupendous event, by observing that, altho' these men were in a moment enabled to speak intelligibly in strange languages, yet they did not speak them exactly with the same elegance and correctness as the most admired orators or writers in each language, nor without such a mixture of their own idiom as distinguished them from those to whom the languages were vernacular.

Another purpose was, to convey truths of the utmost, general importance to mankind, either by no means discoverable to human reason, or imperfectly and difficultly discoverable by the most improved reasons.—And to convey them, not in such a manner as to prevent all possibility of the least ignorance or mistake even in the most inattentive hearer ; to subdue the most inveterate perverseness, or obstinate supineness, but so as to satisfy the ingenuous and diligent enquirer : and, in some cases, to afford an opportunity for the display of candor and humility.

It is not NECESSARY, that the language, in which *such* truths are *thus* conveyed, should be absolutely clear of any foreign mixture, even tho' some degree

of obscurity or difficulty should arise merely from such mixture. Because, it was intended that an occasion should be left for inquiry and examination, and a diligent exercise of the mental powers ; and attention and ingenuofness are encouraged by the promise of acceptance and reward.

It is not POSSIBLE, that the language in which *such* truths are *thus* conveyed, should be exactly conformable to any approved model of human composition. Because, it is to express sentiments and ideas which never were conceived by the Orator or Philosopher, and for which, of consequence, they afford no terms of speech.

It is not PROPER, that the language in which *such* truths are *thus* conveyed, should be exquisitely *refined* and *elegant*. Because, it is addressed to the ignorant and vulgar, to whom refinement oftentimes creates unnecessary obscurity ; as well as to the wise and exalted, to whom a plain and even rude Style may be as *intelligible*, as the utmost elegance of Schools or Courts.

So that if we are precisely to ascertain the *natural* character or condition of an *inspired* language, we may perhaps with greatest safety define it in the words of ORIGEN \* : Χαράλιν? ΚΟΙΝΩΦΕΛΗΣ, καὶ διευαμίν? ΠΑΣΑΝ ἰσαγαγίσθαι ἀκρόν. Such a Style as may be of most extensive use, and universally adapted to all hearers of all conditions. Thus, while, we exclude on one hand *the utmost rudeness* and bar-

\* Contra Cel' urb, L. 6 Init.

*barousness, every fault that can possibly deform a language, that is, such a mode of speech as is insufficient for clear intelligence ; while we do not pretend to determine what qualities of speech the divine impression can or cannot convey, without a waste of miracles ; so, on the other hand, we are warranted to affirm, that this KOINΩΦΕΛΕΙΑ, this quality which indicates the most extensive benevolence in the divine INSPIRER, is not to be found in the polished style of the elaborate writer or elegant Philosopher, who can be of use, if they are at all of use, only to their few literate admirers : as the author above-quoted observes \*.*

We are not, then, to look for exquisite purity and elegance in the Apostolical writings, even supposing that the authors acquired their language by miraculous infusion. And these are qualities of speech which even in the little affairs of human life and human knowledge, are accounted but of an inferior value ; are sacrificed to the higher and more essential excellencies of style ; are in many instances insufficient for operating upon the human mind : and sometimes become contemptible and ridiculous, if too scrupulously and minutely regarded. —† When Brutus had harangued the Romans in the Capitol,

\* Ο' ΑΙΓΟΥΣ μὲν ὥντισεν (εἴ γε ὥντισεν) ἡ περικαλλὴς καὶ ὑπερβολὴ μὲν ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ, καὶ τῶν παραπλησίως φρασάδων, ΛΕΞΙΣ. ΠΛΕΙΟΝΑΣ δὲ ἢ τῶν εὐτελέστερον ἅμα καὶ πραγματικῶς καὶ ἱστοχασμένως τῶν πολλῶν διδασκάντων καὶ γραφάντων. Ἔστι γὰρ ἰδίῳ τὸν μὲν ΠΛΑΤΩΝΑ ἐν χερσὶ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι φιλολόγων μόνον. Origen contra Celsum L. 6. Init.

† Vid. Epist. ad Atticum. L. 15. E. 1.

after



after the death of Cæsar, he sent a copy of his speech to Cicero, with a request that he would offer his corrections freely. The orator found that, instead of breathing that freedom, that ardor, that vehemence of spirit which the great occasion required, it was nice, elaborate, and elegant. He therefore declined the vain attempt of amending it, because it was *altogether* wrong, (as he plainly tho' civilly, insinuates to Atticus) because the general Character of it was injudicious, the whole colouring improper for the Speaker, the Subject, and the Audience.

And let those men who are so little affected by the *truths* contained in the Apostolical writings, as to have leisure to examine the niceties of composition, and to be offended at their supposed defects in elegance and classical refinement; let them, I say, remember that in every work of *human* genius, the judicious Critic never fails to distinguish between the merit of diction, and that of the subject-matter or information which it contains. Trifles and absurdities he rejects with scorn, tho' tricked out in all the gaiety of language. Solid sense and useful knowledge command his attention. He discovers them, tho' disgraced, or even disguised, by rude language; and would look down with pity and contempt on that BEMBO who should reject them, because not expressed agreeably to his finical and pedantic notions of refinement. If NEWTON had written his invaluable *Principia*, not in his own neat Latinity, but in a Style somewhat incorrect and corrupted, yet still sufficiently intelligible; what should

we think of that man who, tho' capable of following the divine Philosopher through all his stupendous discoveries, should yet sit down in wilful ignorance, lest his ear should be shocked with phrases not exactly *Ciceronian*? — But in the case of truths intimately connected with our immediate interest or happiness, a fastidious attention to the manner in which they are conveyed, becomes infinitely more unreasonable and extravagant. If we were assured upon the fullest evidence, that a man could teach us a speedy and infallible method of becoming rich, or powerful, or great; should we weigh his phrases, and measure his periods? should we not receive his directions with attention and respect; far from cavilling at his expressions? should we not stretch all our faculties to comprehend them, were they even delivered with an oracular obscurity, far from murmuring, or rejecting them, because, in some less important instances it might not be, at once, easy to comprehend their full force and import? Or to borrow another allusion no less apposite to the point before us; should the wretch, long wasted, afflicted, and tormented with sickness, reject the charitable assistance of his physician, because his directions were inelegantly expressed, or not in a manner consonant to his notions of critical perfection; should he find leisure to entertain a doubt of his well-approved skill, for this reason; could we believe him in his sound mind? could we acquit him of infatuation and absurdity? — And can it be deemed reasonable and judicious to indulge such fantastical scruples when we are visited by the *PHYSICIAN* of SOULS.

And what adds to the unreasonableness of these delicate readers, and what some of them may perhaps account still more shameful, is, that their objections are oftentimes *ignorantly* and *erroneously* alleged. However \* an eminent Philosopher may have spoken of the Apostolical composition in strong and general terms, as made up of Greek terms and Hebrew or Syriac idioms ; yet it has been † proved, that such expressions are not to be understood without great limitation : as many of those instances of phraseology which are noted as Hebraisms or Syriacisms, are found to be not all peculiar to these languages, but warranted by the authority of the most approved Greek writers :——that, in other instances, even where the subject-matter doth not make it *necessary* to recur to Hebrew phraseology, the mode of expression is beautiful, forcible, and universally intelligible :——that, as to the charge of impurity or barbarousness of particular terms, XENOPHON himself, when writing of the affairs and customs of Persia, adopts the terms of that country uncensured by the severest critic : that the like liberty is equally justifiable in speaking of Roman customs and transactions ; that Κῆρος, Κουρίδις, Κισσουργία, are no more barbarous than Καρδὸς, Ἀνιάνης, Παρασάγνης :——That, Cicero (that model of elocution by which some men would try

\* Mr. LOCK. *Vid.* Preface to the Paraphrase on St. Paul's Epistles.

† *Vid.* BLACKWALL'S Sacred Classics.



the merit of the sacred writings) found it necessary to invent words and phrases in order to explain the Greek philosophy to his countrymen :——And that, as to those forms of expression in the New Testament, which men of affected accuracy have condemned as rude Solecisms, they are in numberless instances exactly paralleled in the Classical Writers of Greece ; they are justified by the rules of liberal Criticism ; and however they may offend the cold pedantic grammarian, they are no other than those free figurative modes of speech, which naturally occur to the animated writer ; and, in human composition, are oftentimes regarded as proofs of superior genius.

Nor can I venture to pronounce so severe a sentence on those writers who have endeavoured to defend the purity of Scripture-Greek, as that their labours have been idly employed, or that they are *false zealots*, who have shewed themselves *foolish*. For although we may not think it necessary to join issue with our adversaries, upon this point of purity : yet the learned researches of those who esteem it a point of moment, are not without their advantages. They detect the presumption of affected Critics and commentators : They shew that such men have objected rashly and unwarrantably ; have dared to fix their mark of reprobation upon phrases and expressions, supported by the most indisputable authorities. So far therefore, they contribute to put to silence the *ignorance* of foolish men. And if

there be those, who concur in such precipitate censures, in order to render the authority of the divine writings suspected, while we endeavour to support their authority against the whole force of such censures, even upon the supposition that they are fairly founded, it must reflect double shame upon such adversaries, if it be proved in any instances that their objection is groundless; and that \* *they betray as small a gust of the elegancies of expression, as of the sacredness of the matter, in these divine writings.*

• D. C. SOUTHERN.

CHAP.



## C H A P. XVII.

*What qualities we may reasonably expect to find in the Apostolical Composition. All these eminently discoverable in the New Testament.*

C RITICS inform us, that, in order to determine of what kind the Composition of any work should be, we are to consider the author and his character, the subject, occasion, and design, and the persons to whom his work is addressed. Such are the rules prescribed by \* QUINCTILIAN, for writing with propriety; and by such we may safely try the writings of the Evangelists and Apostles.

Classical elegance and politeness of Style, we have seen, are utterly inconsistent with their subject, and their purpose, unsuited to their readers, and we must add (what is too evident to require a proof) to their own characters and conditions. It is also evident, that any studied Rhetorical ornament, any false or artificial eloquence, must have utterly disgraced both the authors and their cause; as these are indeed the *succedaneum* to conscious persuasion, the marks of fraud or affectation, and the effects of

\* Inst. L. 11. C. 1.



an attention to matters of much less moment than the general happiness of mankind.

Plainness and ingenuous simplicity, that language of noble sentiments and unspotted integrity, we may justly expect to form the general character of their elocution. We may reasonably look for elevation and greatness in the exposition of their sublime doctrines ; warmth, tenderness, and earnestness in their exhortations ; and all those qualities of *native genuine* Eloquence which are revered and admired, not because adopted by any admired writers or speakers, but because they are in themselves venerable, as the indications of exalted manners, and clear and noble conceptions ; those qualities, I say, which captivate the heart, and delight the true genius who soars above the minutiae of words and particles : that *real and substantial* Eloquence which no particularities of diction can impair, which does not depend on a nice conformity to the rules of any language, but can abide the severe test of LONGINUS, and must approve itself to all nations, tongues, and ages.

Men of the most exquisite taste in literature have given honourable testimony to that *SIMPLICITY*, by which the Historical parts of the New Testament are distinguished. And indeed there is nothing so pleasing to the human mind, as to contemplate great and glorious objects thro' the medium of a Style un sullied by any false and artificial colouring. But in this simplicity there is, at the same time, something so lively and affecting, so delightful to the

the imagination, so conciliating and endearing, as, I am bold to say, cannot be equalled in the whole circle of human composition. Attempts have been sometimes made to imitate it. But these only shew the feeble and ineffectual efforts of human genius, aspiring to an unaffected native dignity of composition truly *inimitable*. The Abbé de SAINT REAL was a writer of taste and elegance; his language is a language of elegance; he lived in an age of refinement; he was eminent as a polished historian; and, in his Life of CHRIST, he hath strictly attended to the natural and simple manner of the Evangelists. But how utterly cold and languid, and even mean doth his narrative appear to one conversant in the Gospels? I shall detain the reader but with a single instance, and this, not the most striking in his work. And it is exhibited, under the same disadvantage with the original, that of a literal translation. — The polite Frenchman relates the miraculous appearance of Angels to the Shepherds in the following manner.

“ Shepherds who passed the night by their flocks  
 “ in the adjacent fields, saw, at the same time, an  
 “ angel, who affrighted them at first, by a light in-  
 “ tirely unusual, with which he surrounded them.  
 “ But he immediately quieted their fears, by inform-  
 “ ing them of the news which was the occasion of  
 “ this prodigy. He even told them by what marks  
 “ they might know the Saviour that was born to  
 “ them. And, at that instant they heard in the air  
 “ a concert of many voices like that of the angel,  
 “ celebrating

“ celebrating the glory of God in the heavens, and  
 “ the Peace which he had now given to men upon  
 “ earth.” \*

The same particulars are thus related by the E-  
 vangelist.

“ And there were, in the same country, shepherds  
 “ abiding in the fields, keeping watch over their  
 “ flock by night. And lo ! the Angel of the Lord  
 “ came upon them ; and the Glory of the Lord  
 “ shone round about them, and they were *fore a-  
 “ afraid.* And the Angel said to them, Fear not, for  
 “ behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy,  
 “ which shall be to all people. For to you is born  
 “ this day, in the city of David, a Saviour, which is  
 “ Christ the Lord. And this shall be a sign to you,  
 “ ye shall find the Babe wrapped in swaddling-  
 “ cloaths, lying in a manger. And suddenly there  
 “ was with the Angel a multitude of the heavenly  
 “ host, praising God, and saying, Glory be to God.

\* Des Bergers qui passaient la nuit auprès de leurs Troupeaux dans les Champs d'alentour, virent en même tems un Ange qui les effraya d'abord par une Lumière tout extraordinaire dont il les environna ; mais il les rassura incontinent, en leur apprenant la Nouvelle qui étoit l'occasion de ce prodige. Il leur dit même à quelles marques ils pourroient reconnoître le Sauveur qui leur étoit né, & ils entendirent aussi tôt, dans les airs un concert de plusieurs Voix comme de l'Ange, qui célébroient la gloire de Dieu dans les Cieux, et la Paix qu'il venoit de donner aux hommes sur la Terre. *La Vie de Jesus-Christ, p. 23. Tom. 1. Edit. Paris, 1757.*



"in the highest, and on earth peace, good will to-  
wards men." St. Luke ii. 8, &c.

Here, the whole solemn scene is in a manner presented to our view, by the liveliness and natural grandeur of the description. We see the terror of the shepherds in the very words which describe the approach of the Angel [*he came upon them, in a sudden*]. And the effect of this appearance is expressed in the original, by one of those instances of *paraleology*, common both to Greeks and Hebrews, but too bold and forcible for the weakness of modern language to support. [*ἰσοβριθσαν φόβον μνησται*].——We are almost witnesses of the awe and reverence with which the divine message is received. And then, the sudden appearance of the heavenly choir compleats the grandeur of the scene, a circumstance omitted by the French writer, who only takes notice that their voices were heard in the air.

One might proceed in multiplying instances of lively and beautiful narration in the sacred writers. But the Eloquence which is addressed to the taste and refinement of the Critic, is still of an inferior kind. There is another more valuable and exalted species, as hath been already observed, which is admired, as it indicates exalted moral qualities in the speaker, and from hence derives it's influence. This it is which determines the superiority of any one among the renowned speakers and writers of antiquity, not the

the delicate choice of phrases, lively images, or flowing periods. FENELON pronounces sentence in favour of DEMOSTHENES against the pretensions of the great Roman. And why? Not from the greater excellence of his language; not from the superior accuracy of his style, the brilliancy or propriety of his figures, or such like inferior qualifications: but because he hath an enthusiasm of generous passion which warms the heart of a reader even at this distant period: because he displays an exalted regard to his country; a noble indignation against treachery and corruption; from which we catch the flame at once, and are ready to take arms against an imaginary tyrant and invader; while, in studying the Eloquence of CICERO, we are only delighted and surprised with his consummate address. In like manner the historical writer will be studied with the greatest pleasure, and most extensive approbation, who displays the most excellent moral qualities of an Historian in the most striking and pleasing light. In this sense a writer divinely directed or inspired must indeed be a model of perfect Eloquence.——And such is that strength of character in which this species of perfection is expressed by all the Evangelists, that he who runs may read it. The events which they relate, were of all others most susceptible of ornament and amplification. And had they written to one refined and volatile people, had they been to recite their history at the national assembly of such a people, and looked for the honour paid to an elegant literary entertainment, it is possibly we might

might find the stupendous actions they recorded, set out in all the glittering decorations that art and genius could supply. The birth, the life, the actions, the discourses of their master might then have been displayed and ornamented to the utmost. The circumstances of every miracle, the impressions made on those who were the objects, or the witnesses of it, the virulence of their enemies, the unwearied goodness of our Lord, his patience and humility, the tortures he endured, his expiring agonies, the awful darkness which overspread the whole world at his dissolution, and innumerable grand and affecting particulars, might have all afforded occasions for the most refined, most august, and most pathetic descriptions. But the Evangelists stood before the great Tribunal of Mankind to give EVIDENCE of facts which concerned the happiness of the whole world. Here was no place for the refined and neat language of a philosopher ; or the free excursions, the artful exaggerations, the enflamed elocution of a political Orator. These would be disgustful and suspicious. Far from such injudicious and dishonest affectation, they give their Evidence with the most ingenuous plainness, with the utmost clearness and precision ; qualities, which Critics account the perfection of speech on such an occasion, and which the sound reasoner must regard as strong internal proof of truth and sincerity. To these we may add, (what judicious readers have frequently noted with wonder and satisfaction) the openness and impartiality, with which these sacred historians have recorded



recorded the errors and infirmities of themselves, or their companions ; the abasement and humility with which they speak of their own wonderful powers ; the meekness they express in relating the transactions of those who persecuted, condemned, or betrayed their master, without rancour, bitterness or exaggeration.\* The candid enquirer who looks for the proper fruits of divine inspirations in the Evangelical style, may find them in such instances as these ; for these are the FRUITS of the SPIRIT.

Or if the imagination must be impressed with something awful, majestic, and affecting, not only in the subject, but the manner of narration, we need but recur to any one account of any one miracle of our Saviour. We are told that he *rebuked* the winds, and they were still ; that he *laid* his hands on the sick, and they were restored ; that he *commanded* the

\* The observation of Monsieur PASCAL is lively and judicious. — Le Style de l'Evangile est admirable en une infinité de manieres, et entre autres en ce qu'il n'y a aucune invective de la part des Historiens contre Judas ou Pilate, ni contre aucun des ennemis ou des bourreaux de JESUS CHRIST. — Si cette modestie des historiens évangéliques avoit été affectée, aussi-bien que tant d'autres traits d'un si beau caractère, et qu'il ne l'eussent affectée que pour la faire remarquer ; s'ils n'avoient osé la remarquer eux-mêmes, ils n'auroient pas manqué de se procurer des amis, qui eussent fait ces remarques à leur avantage. Mais comme ils ont agi de la sorte sans affectation, & par un mouvement tout désintéressé, ils ne l'ont fait remarquer par personne : je ne sai même, si cela a été remarqué jusque ici : et c'est ce qui témoigne la naïveté avec laquelle la chose a été faite.

Pensées. C. 16.

Parlytic

Paralytic to take up his bed; and he obeyed; that he pronounced the word, \* *be opened*, and the blind was restored to sight, that he said, *maiden, arise*, and the dead arose to life. — If we are to be transported with exalted doctrines and sentiments of excellence and dignity, we need but turn to his precepts; if we are delighted with ease and familiarity, lively images and apposite allusions, we find them in his parables and illustrations; if we admire address and delicacy, pathos and energy, we are amply gratified by the speeches of Saint PAUL, his discourse on the Resurrection, and indeed by numberless passages in the Epistolary part of the New Testament. I might here proceed to consider this part more particularly, to account for the obscurity sometimes objected to it, to point out the instances of energy, zeal, benevolence, nobleness of sentiment, tenderness, severity, dignity, condescension, and all the other parts of great and exalted eloquence, with which it abounds. But all

\* There is something awful in the particular relation of the very Syriac words, which CHRIST pronounced on some of those occasions. Without searching for the propriety of it, in the particular customs of his nation, it seems to command all the attention of the Reader, and to prepare him for something wonderful and extraordinary. It is indeed, we suppose that the absurd notion of the magical power of sounds had prevailed so early as the time of the Apostles, and that even then it had been suggested, that our Lord had performed his miracles, by means of one or more magical words; in that case, the particularity here mentioned, must appear highly proper, and, by obviating all such vain imaginations, discovers a most amiable condescension to the ignorance and superstition of gainers.

these

these points have been frequently and fully treated by writers of great authority.

I shall therefore content myself with observing, that as the Scriptures afford an incontestable proof that there is a species of Eloquence independent on caprice or fashion, not barely nominal, not directed to the purpose of deceit; that there is a real distinction between this natural and genuine Eloquence, the effect of exalted and enlightened thoughts, noble passions, and generous principles; and the rhetorical ornaments of style, the result of artifice and imitation:

———So the Apostle PAUL is an illustrious instance to prove the superior force and efficacy of the former species. He disclaimed the enticing words of man's Wisdom, the refinements of pretended Philosophers, and the arts of the Orator: nor was the rudeness of his speech, or the weakness of his bodily presence fitted for the Academy, the Forum, or the Court. And yet the LYSTRIANS would have sacrificed to him, as to the God of Eloquence: And his speech had the power to throw the Roman Governour into an agony of terror.

CICERO is said to have wrought a like effect on CÆSAR; and by artfully mentioning the Battle of Pharsalia, and the danger he there encountered, to have made him turn pale and tremble. But in this I can discover nothing extraordinary, no more than I can perceive any thing derogatory to the good sense of CÆSAR, in supposing that his emotion was real  
and



and unaffected. The Battle of Pharsalia was an object which he could not recollect with indifference, were he actuated with any degree of sensibility or passion. The bare remembrance of his enterprize, his danger, or his success, was sufficient to raise the most violent agitations in a mind like his. When any of those interesting objects had been suddenly presented to his imagination, no wonder if the impression was too quick and violent to be dissembled. The combustible lay ready prepared ; and a small spark of eloquence was sufficient to raise the flame.

But the Apostle had every difficulty to contend with, every circumstance that might prevent the effect of his discourse. He stood before a Tribunal, where he was accused of heinous offences, surrounded by his persecutors ; he stood before a judge rendered obdurate and insensible by his corruptions : Who was cruel and libidinous, who, as Tacitus informs us, "*jus regium SERVILI INGENIO exercuit.*"\* And the power with which he was invested, joined with this servility and brutality of temper, was a circumstance, which, of all others, must have rendered him most averse from the sacred truths urged by the Apostle, and made his noble freedom appear in the highest degree insolent and provoking. Or if the hopes of a bribe softened the resentment of Felix, the associate of his crime attended him ; and her presence, and possibly that of the ministers of his pleasures and corruptions, we may reasonably conclude, must have inspired him with a vitious shame ; so as to make

\* Historiar. L. 5.

him affect an indifference and unconcern at what he heard : and these his attendants no doubt were not backward in casting ridicule and contempt on the despised prisoner. Yet, thro' all these obstacles, the Eloquence of the Spirit pierced the heart of this tordid, stupid, sensual, proud, and cruel Governor.

The speech of the Apostle might not have been so pure, so polished, so elegant, as the Rhetoric of TERTULLUS, but it had powers and excellencies, compared with which, purity, politeness, and elegance are less than nothing. It displayed that character which God hath plainly impressed upon the Word, whether preached or written by his inspired teachers.

—IT IS LIVELY AND MIGHTY IN OPERATION, AND SHARPER THAN ANY TWO-EDGED SWORD, AND ENTERETH THOROUGH, EVEN UNTO THE DIVIDING ASUNDER OF THE SOUL AND SPIRIT, AND OF THE JOINTS, AND THE MARROW, AND IS A DISCERNER OF THE THOUGHTS AND INTENTS OF THE HEART. HEB. iv. 21.

He who cannot feel this wonderful power in the Apostolical writings, is fit for the piddling employment of culling Rhetorical flowers, weighing words, and rounding periods. He may call this literature ; but while the pious Christian pities his folly, the Critic of true taste and sensibility must despise his mean notions of PERFECT ELOQUENCE.


The E N D.

he  
not  
the  
the  
lid,

so  
of  
ies,  
nce  
fter  
ord,  
ers.  
ON,  
ND  
ING  
THE  
NER  
RT.

the  
ment  
and  
but  
ritic  
no-





A  
L E T T E R

T O T H E

Rev. Dr. THOMAS LELAND,

Fellow of TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN:

I N W H I C H

His late DISSERTATION *on the Principles of  
Human Eloquence* is criticized;

A N D

The Bishop of GLOUCESTER's *Idea of the nature  
and character of an inspired language*, as delivered  
in his Lordship's *Doctrine of Grace*,

I S V I N D I C A T E D

From ALL the objections of the learned Author of the  
DISSERTATION.

---

D U B L I N :

Printed for A. LEATHLEY, Bookseller in Dame-street.

M,DCC,LXV.

LETTER

TO THE

REV. DR. THOMAS LELAND

Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin



His late Dissertation on the Principles of  
Human Nature

The Bishop of Clogher's list of the ratings  
and character of his subjects as delivered  
in the 1. ordinary

46.  
10. 10.

12.

From all the objections of the learned Author of the  
Dissertation

DUBLIN

Printed for A. L. T. in Lane Street

MDCCLXV



# LETTER

TO

The Rev. Dr. LELAND.

Rev. SIR,

I HAVE read your *DISSERTATION on the principles of human Eloquence*, and shall very readily, I dare say, be indulged in the liberty, I am going to take, of giving you my free thoughts upon it. I shall do it, with all the regard that is due from one scholar to another; and even with all the civility which may be required of ONE, who hath his reasons for addressing you, in this public manner, without a name.

You entitle your work *A Dissertation on the principles of Eloquence*: but the real subject of it, is an *Opinion*, or *Paradox*, as you chuse to term it, delivered by the Bishop of Gloucester in his late discourse on *Grace*. This opinion, indeed, concerns, or rather, in your ideas, subverts, *the very principles of*

Eloquence, which your office, it seems, in a learned society obliged you to maintain: so that you cannot be blamed for giving some attention to the ingenious prelate's paradox, which so incommodiously came in your way. Only the more intelligent of your hearers might possibly think it strange that, in a set of rhetorical Lectures, addressed to them, the *Controversial* part should so much take the head of the *Didactic*; or rather, that the *Didactic* part should stand quite still, while the *Controversial* keeps pacing it, with much alacrity, from one end of your Dissertation to the other.

Yet neither, on second thoughts, can you be blamed for this conduct, which one way or other might serve to the instruction of your young auditory; if not in the principles of *Rhetoric*, yet in a better thing, the principles of *Logic*. It might, further, serve to another purpose, not unworthy the Regard of a Rhetoric-Lecturer. The subject of eloquence has been so exhausted in the fine writings of antiquity, and, what is worse, has been so hackneyed in modern Compilations from them, that your discourse wanted to be enlivened by the poignant controversial air you have given to it, and to be made important, by bringing an illustrious character into the scene.

All this I am ready to say in your vindication, if your conduct may be thought to require any. Having, therefore, nothing to object to the general design, or mode of your dissertation, I shall confine myself entirely to the MATTER of it, after acquainting

acquainting the reader, in few words, with the occasion and subject of this debate.

The Bp. of Gloucester, in a late theological treatise on the doctrine of Grace, which required him to speak fully to the subject of *inspiration*, found it necessary to obviate an objection to what he conceived to be the right notion of *inspired scripture*, which had been supported by some ingenious men, and very lately by Dr. MIDDLETON. The objection is delivered by the learned Doctor, in these words.

“ If we allow the gift [of inspired languages] to  
 “ be lasting, we must conclude that some at least of  
 “ the books of scripture were in this inspired Greek.  
 “ But we should naturally expect to find an inspired  
 “ language to be such as is worthy of God ; that is,  
 “ pure, clear, noble and affecting, even beyond the  
 “ force of common speech ; since nothing can come  
 “ from God but what is perfect in its kind. In  
 “ short, the purity of PLATO, and the eloquence of  
 “ CICERO. Now, if we try the apostolic language  
 “ by this rule, we shall be so far from ascribing it to  
 “ God, that we shall scarcely think it worthy of man,  
 “ that is, of the liberal and polite ; it being utterly  
 “ rude and barbarous, and abounding with every  
 “ fault that can possibly deform a language. And  
 “ though some writers, prompted by a false zeal,  
 “ have attempted to defend the purity of the Scrip-  
 “ ture-Greek, their labour has been idly employed  
 “ [a]. ” Thus far, the learned DOCTOR.

[a] Essay on the Gift of Tongues, Works, vol. ii. p. 91.



‘ These triumphant observations, says the Bishop, are founded on two propositions, both of which he takes for granted, and yet neither of them is true :

‘ The one, That an inspired language must needs be a language of perfect eloquence ;

‘ The other, That eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech [h].’

The BISHOP then undertakes to shew the falshood of these two propositions. You, Sir, contend for the truth of them. That the reader may be enabled to judge for himself between you, I shall quote his Lordship’s own words, paragraph by paragraph, so far as any thing said by him is controverted by you ; and shall then endeavour, with all care, to pick up the loose ends of your argument, as I find them any where *come up* in the several chapters of your Dissertation ; intermixing, as I go along, such reflexions of my own, as the occasion may suggest.

‘ With regard to the FIRST proposition (resumes the Bishop) I will be bold to affirm, that were the STYLE of the New Testament exactly such as his [Dr. MIDDLETON’S] very exaggerated account of it would persuade us to believe, namely, that it is *utterly rude and barbarous, and abounding with*

[h] Doctrine of Grace, p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 54.

‘every fault that can possibly deform a language, this is so far from proving such language not divinely inspired, that it is one certain mark of this original [c].’

By the manner, in which the learned Bishop introduces this *affirmation*, one sees that he foresaw very clearly it would be esteemed a *bold* one. Nay, in another place [d], he even takes to himself the shame, with which some readers, he well knew, would be forward enough to cover him, and in one word confesses his general notion of eloquence to be a PARADOX: *which yet, says he, like so many others, I have had the odd fortune to advance, will be seen to be only another name, for TRUTH.* After this confession, it had been more generous in you to have omitted some invidious passages; such as that where you say, *the Bishop in his reply to this objection* [of Dr. MIDDLETON] *seems to have displayed that BOLD OPPOSITION TO THE GENERAL OPINIONS OF MANKIND; by which his learned labours are distinguished;* Intr. p. ii. And again in p. vii. where you speak of his principles as *paradoxical*, and implying AN HARDY OPPOSITION TO THE GENERAL SENSE OF MANKIND.

But let the *boldness* of the Bishop's principles be what it will, there is small hurt done, provided they turn out, what he seems persuaded they will, only *truths*. Let us attend his Lordship, then, in the proof of his FIRST Paradox.

[c] Ib.

[d] D. G. p. 51. Dub. Ed. p. 64.

‘ I will not pretend, says he, to point out which  
 ‘ books of the N. T. were, or were not, composed by  
 ‘ those who had the Greek tongue thus miraculously  
 ‘ infused into them ; but this I will venture to say,  
 ‘ that the style of a writer so inspired, who had not  
 ‘ (as these writers had not) afterwards cultivated his  
 ‘ knowledge of the language on the principles of Gre-  
 ‘ cian eloquence, would be precisely such as we find  
 ‘ it in the books of the New Testament.

‘ For, if this only be allowed, which no one, I  
 ‘ think, will contest with me, that a strange language  
 ‘ acquired by illiterate men, in the ordinary way,  
 ‘ would be full of the idioms of their native tongue,  
 ‘ just as the Scripture-Greek is observed to be full of  
 ‘ Syriaisms, and Hebraisms ; how can it be pretend-  
 ‘ ed, by those who reflect upon the nature of lan-  
 ‘ guage, that a strange tongue divinely infused into il-  
 ‘ literate men, like that at the day of Pentecost, could  
 ‘ have any other properties and conditions [e].’

Here, the features of this bold paradox begin to  
 soften a little. We are something reconciled to it,  
 1. by being told, what the *rudeness and barbarity* is,  
 which is affirmed to be *one certain mark* of an inspir-  
 ed language, namely *its being full of the idioms of the*  
*native tongue* of the inspired writer : And 2. by be-  
 ing told, that these idioms are equally to be expected  
 whether the new language be infused by divine in-  
 spiration, or acquired by illiterate men in the ordi-  
 nary way. In the *latter* case, it is presumed, and surely

[e] P. 41, 42. Dub. Ed. p. 55.



with reason enough (because experience uniformly attests the fact), that a strange language, so learnt, would abound in the native idioms of the learner: All that remains is to shew that the event would be the same, in the *former*. The Bishop then applies himself, in order, to this task.

‘ Let us weigh these cases impartially. Every language consists of two distinct parts; the single terms, and the phrases and idioms. The first, as far as concerns appellatives especially, is of mere arbitrary imposition, though on artificial principles common to all men: The second arises insensibly, but constantly, from the manners, customs, and tempers of those to whom the language is vernacular; and so becomes, though much less arbitrary (as what the Grammarians call *congruity* is more concerned in this part than in the other), yet various and different as the several tribes and nations of mankind. The first therefore is unrelated to every thing but to the genius of language in general; the second hath an intimate connexion with the fashions, notions, and opinions of that people only, to whom the language is native.

‘ Let us consider then the constant way which illiterate men take to acquire the knowledge of a foreign tongue. Do they not make it their principal, and, at first, their only study, to treasure up in their memory the signification of the terms? Hence, when they come to talk or write in the speech thus acquired, their language is found to be full of their own native idioms. And thus it will continue,

\* till by long use of the strange tongue, and especially by long acquaintance with the owners of it, they have imbibed the particular genius of the language.

\* Suppose then this foreign tongue, instead of being thus gradually introduced into the minds of these illiterate men, was instantaneously infused into them; the operation (though not the very mode of operating) being the same, must not the effect be the same, let the cause be never so different? Without question. The divine impression must be made either by fixing the terms or single words only and their signification in the memory; as for instance, Greek terms corresponding to the Syriac or Hebrew; or else, together with that simple impression, another must be made, to enrich the mind with all the ideas which go towards the composing the phrases and idioms of the language so inspired: But this latter impression seems to require, or rather indeed implies, a previous one, of the tempers, fashions, and opinions of the people to whom the language is native; upon the minds of them to whom the language is thus imparted; because the phrase and idiom arises from, and is dependent on, those manners: and therefore the force of expression can be understood only in proportion to the knowledge of the manners: and understood they were to be; the Recipients of this spiritual gift being not organical canals, but rational Dispensers. So that this would be a waste of miracles without a sufficient cause; the Syriac or Hebrew idiom, to which the Disciples were enabled of themselves to adapt

' adapt the words of the Greek, or any other lan-  
 ' guage, abundantly serving every useful purpose, all  
 ' which centered in giving CLEAR INTELLIGENCE.  
 ' We conclude, therefore, that what was thus in-  
 ' spired was the TERMS, together with that gram-  
 ' matic congruity, which is dependant thereon. In  
 ' a word, to suppose such kind of inspired knowledge  
 ' of *strange tongues* as includes all the native pecu-  
 ' liarities, which, if you will, you may call their *ele-*  
 ' *gancies*; (for the more a language is coloured by  
 ' the character and manners of the native users, the  
 ' more elegant it is esteemed) to suppose this, is, as  
 ' I have said, an ignorant fancy, and repugnant to  
 ' reason and experience.

' Now, from what has been observed, it follows,  
 ' that if the style of the N. T. were indeed derived  
 ' from a language divinely infused as on the day of  
 ' Pentecost, it must be just such, with regard to its  
 ' style, as in fact, we find it to be; that is to say,  
 ' Greek words very frequently delivered in Syriac  
 ' and Hebrew idiom.

' The conclusion from the whole is this, that a *no-*  
 ' *minal* or *local* barbarity of style (for that this attri-  
 ' bute, when applied to style, is no more than *no-*  
 ' *minal* or *local*, will be clearly shewn under our  
 ' next head) is so far from being an objection to its  
 ' miraculous acquisition, that it is one mark of such  
 ' extraordinary original [f].

I have given this long quotation together, that the  
 reader may comprehend at one view the drift and co-

[f] From p. 42. to p. 45. Dub. Ed. from p. 55. to 58.



herence of the Bishop's argument ; which is so clearly explained that what force it hath, can receive no addition from any comment of mine upon it.

It is true, this force appears to you no mighty matter---“ We are told, you say, that, in order to convey clear intelligence to a foreigner, nothing more is necessary, than to use the words of his language adapted to the *idiom* of our own. But shall we always find correspondent words in his language [g] ?”

Shall we always find correspondent words ?--- Not always, perfectly correspondent. Where does the Bishop say, we shall ? Or, how was it to his purpose to say it ? He does indeed speak of *such a correspondency of terms*, and chiefly of *such an adaptation of the terms of one language to the idiom of another*, as shall abundantly serve to give clear intelligence. And this is all he had occasion to say.

Well, but an exact correspondency of terms is material. To what ? To give *clear intelligence* ? But if this be true, no clear intelligence can possibly be given in any translation from one language into another ; for, in all translations whatever, it is necessary to render some words by others, that are not perfectly correspondent. You will scarcely deny that our English translation of the Gospels conveys, in general, *clear intelligence* to the English reader,

though many terms are used in it, and were of necessity to be used, that do not perfectly and adequately correspond to the Greek terms, employed by the sacred writers. Without doubt it was your purpose to convey *clear intelligence* to your English reader in the elegant translations, they say, you have made of DEMOSTHENES: and yet doubtless you will acknowledge that many words of the Athenian orator are not perfectly correspondent to those employed by you in your version of them.

What follows from this? Why, either that all translations must be exploded and set aside as insufficient to give clear intelligence, or that we must accept them, with all their unavoidable imperfections, as, in general, sufficiently representative of the sense of their originals, though in some particulars that sense be inadequately conveyed to us.

But how then, you will say, shall we gain a clear and perfect intelligence of such particulars? Why in the way, which common sense suggests; by inquiring, if we are able, what the precise meaning is of those terms of the original language, to which the translated terms are thus imperfectly correspondent. And if this be an inconvenience, 'tis an inconvenience necessarily attending every translation in the world, in which a writer would express the mixed modes denoted by the words of any other. For supposing the Greek tongue, infused by divine inspiration into the sacred writers, to have been that of PLATO or DEMOSTHENES himself, you will hardly pretend  
that

that it could have furnished them with Greek terms perfectly expressive of such compound ideas as certain Syriac or Hebrew terms expressed, and of which their subject obliged them to give, as far as the nature of the case would permit; *clear intelligence*. So that I cannot for my life comprehend the drift of that short question, *Shall we always find correspondent terms in a foreign language?* or, the pertinence of your learned comment on the text of CICERO's letter to SERVIUS.

I am sensible indeed, that if the *terms* only of the new language were divinely infused, *these*, whether perfectly correspondent or not, would be insufficient of themselves to give clear intelligence. But the Bishop supposes more than this to be infused; for *what was inspired*, he tells us, *was the terms, TOGETHER with that Grammatic congruity, which is dependent thereon*. Now this knowledge of the *grammatic congruity* of any tongue, superadded to a knowledge of its *terms*, would methinks enable a writer to express himself in it, for the most part, *intelligibly*.

I confess, the Bishop speaks---of *fixing the terms or single words ONLY and their signification in the memory*---But then he does not mean to exclude the *grammatic congruity* in the use of them, which, as we have seen, he expressly requires in the very same paragraph, but merely to expose the notion of the *phrases and idioms* being required, too. His Lordship speaks of the *terms, or single words ONLY, in*



opposition to *phrases and idioms* : you seem to speak of terms or single words ONLY, in opposition to *systematic congruity*.

I say, you *seem* so to speak: for otherwise I know not what to make of all you say concerning the insufficiency of the *terms only* of any language to give intelligence. And yet, in what follows, you *seem* to do justice to the Bishop, and to admit that, besides the *terms*, a *grammatic congruity in the use of them* was divinely inspired. For you go on to observe, " That the real purport of almost every sentence in every language, is not to be learned from the signification of detached words, and their *grammatical congruity*, even where their signification may be expressed by correspondent words in another language [*b*]." *[b]*

And here, Sir, your learning expatiates through several pages : the purpose of all which is to shew, that, if the *terms* of one language, though *congruously used*, be strictly adapted to the *idiom* of another, still they would give no intelligence, or at least a very obscure one ; as you endeavour to prove by a *decent* instance taken from your countryman, SWIFT, in his dotages ; and another, given by yourself in a literal version of a long passage of a sacred writer. It is true, in this last instance, you do not confine yourself to the strict observance of *grammatic congruity*. If you had done this, it would have appeared, from your own instance, that *intelligence*

[*b*] Dissert. p. 32. Dub. Ed. p. 89.

might have been given, and with tolerable *clearness* too, even in a literal version.

But be it allowed, that, if the terms of one language, even though a congruous construction be observed, be constantly and strictly adapted to the *idioms* of another, the expression will still, many times, be very dark and obscure: how is this *obscurity* to be prevented? Take what language you will for the conveyance of instruction, it will be necessary for the reader or hearer to gain a competent knowledge of its idioms and phraseology, before he can receive the full benefit of it. So that, unless there had been a language in the world, native to all nations, and in the strictest sense of the word, *universal*, I see not how inspiration itself could remedy this inconvenience. Suppose, as I said before, that the inspired language, in which the Apostles wrote, had been the purest Greek, still its *idiomatic phraseology* had been as strange and obscure to all such to whom that language was not native, as the Syriac or Hebrew idioms, by which the Apostolic Greek is now supposed to be so much darkened.

I conclude upon the whole, that nothing you have said, overturns, or so much as affects, the learned Prelate's notion of divine inspiration, *as conveying only the terms and single words of one language, corresponding to those of another, together with that grammatic congruity in the use of them, which is dependant thereon.* This first and grand principle, as you call it, of the Bp's new theory, is such, you say,

as.

as no critic or grammarian can admit [1]. On the contrary, I must presume to think, because I have now shewn, that no critic or grammarian, who deserves the name, can reasonably object to this principle, as it allows all that is necessary to be supposed of an inspired language, its sufficiency to give clear intelligence: so clear, that, had the idioms of the new language been inspired too, it could not, in the general view of providence, who intended this intelligence for the use of all people and languages, have been clearer.

But your unfavorable sentiment of the Bishop's principle arises from your misconception of the *circumstances, abilities, and qualifications* of the Apostles, when they addressed themselves to the work of their ministry, and especially to the work of composing books for the instruction of the faithful in this originally inspired language.

When the Greek language was first infused, it would, no doubt, be full of their native phrases, or rather it would be wholly and entirely adapted to the Hebrew or Syriac idioms. This would render their expression somewhat dark and obscure to their Grecian hearers. But then it would be intelligible enough to those, to whom they first and principally addressed themselves, the *Hellenistic Jews*, who, though they understood Greek best, were generally no strangers to the Hebrew idiom.

[1] Dissert. p. 86. Dub. Ed. p. 94.



Further still, though this Hebrew-Greek language was all that was originally infused into the Apostles, nothing hinders but that they might, in the ordinary way, improve themselves in the Greek tongue, and superadd to their inspired knowledge whatever they could acquire, besides, by their conversation with the native Greeks, and the study of their language. For, though it can hardly be imagined, as the Bishop says, *that the inspired writers had cultivated their knowledge of the language on the principles of the Grecian eloquence* [k], that is, had formed and perfected their style by an anxious and critical attention to the rules and practice of the Greek rhetors, yet we need not conclude that they wholly neglected to improve themselves in the knowledge and use of this new language. So that by the time they turned themselves to the Gentiles, and still more by the time they applied themselves to pen the books of the N. T. they might be tolerable masters even of the peculiar phraseology of the Greek tongue, and might be able to adapt it, in a good measure, to the Greek idioms.

All this, I say, is very *supposable*; because their turning to the Gentiles was not till near TEN years, after the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles; and the date of their earliest writings, penned for the edification of the Church, was not till near TWENTY years after that period: In all which time, they had full leisure and opportunity to acquire a

[k] Doct. of Grace, p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 55.

competent knowledge of the native idiomatic Greek, abundantly sufficient to answer all ends of clearness and instruction.

But I go further and say, It is not only very *supposable*, and perfectly consistent with all the Bishop has advanced on the subject of inspiration, that the sacred writers *might* thus improve themselves, but it is, likewise, very *clear* and *certain*, that they *DID*. How else are we to account for that difference of style, observable in the sacred writers, whose expression is more or less coloured by their native Hebrew idioms, according as their acquaintance with the Greek tongue was more or less perfect? There were still, no doubt, very many of their own native idioms, interspersed in their most improved Greek : As must ever be the case of writers who compose in a foreign tongue, whether acquired in the ordinary way, or supernaturally infused into them : But these barbarisms, as they are called, I mean these Syriacisms or Hebraisms, are not so constant and perpetual as to prevent their writings from giving *clear intelligence*. In short, the style of the inspired writers is just that which we should naturally expect it to be, on this supposition of its being somewhat improved by use and exercise, and which the learned Bishop *accurately* (and in perfect consistency with his main principle, *of the terms only being inspired, with the congruous use of them*) defines it to be, "*Greek words VERY FREQUENTLY delivered in Syriac and Hebrew idiom* [1]."

[1] Doct. of Grace, p. 45. Dub. Ed. p. 58.

Thus,

Thus, in every view, the Bishop's *grand* principle may be safely admitted. All that we *need* suppose, and therefore all that is *reasonable* to be supposed, is, *That the terms of the Greek language, and a grammatical congruity in the use of them*, was miraculously infused: The rest would be competently and sufficiently obtained by the application of ordinary means, without a miracle.

After saying so little, or rather after saying indeed *nothing*, that affects the Bishop's principle, I cannot but think it is with an ill grace you turn yourself to cavil at the *following incidental observation* of his Lordship, which yet will be found as true and as just as any other he has made on this subject.

To those, who might expect, *that, besides the simple impression of the Greek terms only, and their signification* on the minds of the inspired linguists, *another should have been made to enrich the mind with all the ideas which go towards the composing the phrases and idioms of the language so inspired* (all which had been necessary, if the inspired language had been intended for a perfect model of Grecian eloquence) the Bishop replies——‘ This latter impression seems to require, or rather indeed implies, a previous one, of the tempers, fashions, and opinions of the people to whom the language is native, upon the minds of them to whom the language is thus imparted; because the phrase and idiom arises from and is dependent on those manners [m].’ But such an

[m] Doct. of Grace, p. 43. Dub. Ed. p. 57.



impression, as this, he goes on to shew, was not to be expected.

It is clear from this passage, that the Bishop is speaking of *an impression*, necessary to be made on the minds of the Apostles, if the inspired language had been so complete as to extend to all its native phrases and idioms. If the Apostles were instantly to possess the inspired Greek in this perfection, it is necessary to suppose that this *last* impression must, as well as that of the terms, be made upon them. Can any thing be more certain and undeniable, than this *affirmation*? Yet, in p. 86. of your book, you have this strange passage.

After having shewn, as you suppose, that the Bishop's grand principle, of the inspiration of the TERMS only, stands on a very insecure foundation, "Perhaps, you say, it is no less HAZARDOUS to affirm, that a knowledge of the idiom or phraseology of any language, *always* implies a previous knowledge of the customs and manners of those to whom it is vernacular."

You intended, no doubt, in your censure of this hazardous position, to oppose something which the Bishop had affirmed. Be pleased now to cast your eye on the passage you criticize, and tell me where the Bishop asserts, *that a KNOWLEDGE of the idiom or phraseology of any language ALWAYS implies a previous knowledge of the customs and manners of those to whom it is vernacular.* What the Bishop asserts is,

That

That an IMPRESSION of the phrases and idioms of an inspired language implies a previous IMPRESSION of the tempers, fashions, and opinions of the people to whom the language is native, upon the minds of them to whom the language is THUS imparted: that is, if a knowledge of the idioms had been impressed, a knowledge of the customs and manners, from which those idioms arise, and without a knowledge of which they could not be understood (as they were to be, by the recipients of this spiritual gift) must have been impressed, likewise. No, you say: a knowledge of the idiom of a language does not *always* imply a previous knowledge of the manners. Who says it does? We may come to know the idioms of languages, without a divine impression: and without such impression, for any thing appears to the contrary, the Bishop might suppose the sacred writers came by their knowledge, so far as they possessed it, of the Greek idioms. But the impression of such idioms could only come from another and previous impression of the customs and manners: because in this case, without a previous impression of the *customs and manners*, the idioms themselves, when impressed, could not have been understood, nor consequently put to use, by the persons, on whom this impression was made. They had no time to recur to Lexicons, Grammars, and Commentaries to know the meaning of the impressed idioms. How then were they, on the instant, to know their meaning at all, but by a previous impression of the manners, from which they arose, and which would put them into a capacity of understanding these impressed idioms?

In a word, the Bishop is speaking of SUPERNATURAL IMPRESSION: you, of NATURAL KNOWLEDGE. No wonder, then, your reasoning and your learning, in the concluding pages of this chapter, should look entirely *beside* the matter in hand, or, at best, should look so *askew* on the Bishop's *hazardous* position. It is certain, you are far enough out of all danger of encountering it, when you entrench yourself, at length, behind this distant and secure conclusion—"that the knowledge of idiom is so far from requiring, or implying a previous one of tempers, manners, &c. that the very CONVERSE of this seems to be the safer principle; and that tempers and manners are not to be learned, without some degree of previous acquaintance with the peculiarities of a language [n]:" a proposition, which though exceptionable enough, as you put it, and even suggesting some pleasant ideas, I am in no humour, at present, to contest with you.

This, Sir, is THE WHOLE of what I find advanced by you, that hath any shew or appearance of being intended as a Confutation of the argument by which the Bishop supports his FIRST PARADOX; in opposition to Dr. MIDDLETON's opinion, *That an inspired language must needs be a language of perfect eloquence*. The Bishop has told us in very accurate terms what he conceives the character of an inspired language must needs be: and I have at least shewn, that the character he gives of it may be a just one,



notwithstanding any thing you have objected to it in your learned Dissertation.

I now proceed to the Bishop's SECOND PARADOX; which opposes Dr. MIDDLETON's *second Proposition*, *That eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech, and inherent in the constitution of things.*

This supposes, says the Bishop, that there is some certain ARCHETYPE in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is to be formed and modelled. And, indeed, admitting this to be the case, one should be apt enough to conclude, that when the Author of nature condescended to inspire one of these plastic performances of human art, he would make it by the exactest pattern of the *Archetype*.

But the proposition is fanciful and false. Eloquence is not congenial or essential to human speech, nor is there any Archetype in nature to which that quality refers. It is accidental and arbitrary, and depends on custom and fashion: it is a mode of human communication which changes with the changing climates of the Earth, and is as various and unstable as the genius, temper, and manners of its diversified inhabitants. For what is PURITY but the use of such terms, with their multiplied combinations, as the interest, the complexion, or the caprice of a writer or speaker of authority hath preferred to its equals? What is

ELEGANCE

'ELEGANCE but such a turn of idiom as a fashiona-  
 'ble fancy hath brought into repute? And what is  
 'SUBLIMITY but the application of such images,  
 'as arbitrary or casual connexions, rather than their  
 'own native grandeur, have dignified and ennobled?  
 'Now ELOQUENCE is a compound of these three  
 'qualities of speech, and consequently must be as  
 'nominal and unsubstantial as its constituent parts.  
 'So that, that mode of composition, which is a  
 'model of *perfect eloquence* to one nation or people,  
 'must appear extravagant or mean to another. And  
 'thus in fact it was. Indian and Asiatic eloquence  
 'were esteemed hyperbolic, unnatural, abrupt and  
 'puerile to the more phlegmatic inhabitants of  
 'Rome and Athens. And the western eloquence, in  
 'its turn, appeared nerveless and effeminate, frigid  
 'or insipid, to the hardy and inflamed imaginations  
 'of the East. Nay, what is more, each species, even  
 'of the most approved genus, changed its nature  
 'with the change of clime and language; and the  
 'same expression, which, in one place, had the  
 'utmost *simplicity*, had, in another, the utmost *sub-*  
 'lime [o].

The Bishop then proceeds to illustrate this last  
 observation by a famous instance, taken from the  
 first chapter of *Genesis*, and then recapitulates and  
 enforces his general argument in the following  
 manner.

'Apply all this to the books of the N. T. an  
 'authorized collection, professedly designed for the

[o] D. A. of Grace, p. 52, 53. Dub. Ed. p. 65. 66.

' rule and direction of mankind. Now such a rule  
 ' demanded that it should be inspired of God. But  
 ' inspired writing, the objectors say, implies the most  
 ' *perfect eloquence*. What human model then was  
 ' the Holy Ghost to follow? And a human model, of  
 ' arbitrary construction, it must needs be, because  
 ' there was no other: Or, if there were another, it  
 ' would never suit the purpose, which was to make  
 ' an impression on the minds and affections; and this  
 ' impression, such an eloquence only as that which  
 ' had gained the popular ear, could effect: Should  
 ' therefore the *eastern* eloquence be employed? But  
 ' this would be too inflated and gigantic for the *West*.  
 ' Should it be the *western*? But this would be too  
 ' cold and torpid for the *East*. Or, suppose the  
 ' *generic* eloquence of the more polished nations was  
 ' to be preferred, which *species* of it was to be em-  
 ' ployed? The rich exuberance of the Asiatic Greeks,  
 ' or the dry conciseness of the Spartans? The pure  
 ' and poignant ease and flowing sweetness of the  
 ' Attic modulation, or the strength and grave seve-  
 ' rity of the Roman tone? Or should all give way to  
 ' that African torrent, which arose from the fermen-  
 ' ted mixture of the dregs of *Greece* and *Italy*, and  
 ' soon after overflowed the church with theological  
 ' conceits in a sparkling luxuriancy of thought, and  
 ' a sombrous rankness of expression? Thus various  
 ' were the species's! all as much decried by a diffe-  
 ' rent genus, and each as much disliked by a different  
 ' species, as the eloquence of the remotest East and  
 ' West, by one another [p].

[p] Doct. of Grace, p. 55, 56. Dub. Ed. p. 67, 68.



Thus far the learned Bishop, *with the spirit and energy*, as you well observe, *of an antient orator* [9]; and, let me add, with a justness and force of reasoning, which would have done honour to the best antient Philosopher. But here we separate again. You maintain, with Dr. MIDDLETON, *that eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech*: While I, convinced by the Bishop's reasoning in these paragraphs, maintain that it assuredly is not.

The subject, indeed, affords great scope to your rhetorical faculties; and the cause, you maintain, being that, as you conceive, of the antient orators, and even of eloquence itself, you suffer your enthusiasm to bear you away, without controul; and, as is the natural effect of enthusiasm, with so little method and precision of argument, that a cool examiner of your work hardly knows how to follow you, or where to take aim at you, in your aery and uncertain flight. However, I shall do my best to reduce your Rhetoric to Reason; I mean, to represent the substance of what you seem to intend by way of argument against the Bishop's principle, leaving your eloquence to make what impression on the gentle reader it may.

And, FIRST, in opposition, as you suppose, to the Bishop's tenet, "*That eloquence is NOT something congenial and essential to human speech*," you apply yourself to shew, through several chapters, that tropes, metaphors, allegories, and universally what

[9] Dissert. p. 19 Dub. Ed. p. 20.

are called by Rhetoricians *figures of speech*, are natural and necessary expressions of the passions, and have their birth in the very reason and constitution of things. To make out this important point is the sole drift of your I, II, III, and IVth Chapters; in which you seem to me to be contending for that which nobody denies, and to be disputing without an opponent. At least, you can hardly believe that the Bishop of Gloucester is to be told, that metaphors, allegories, and similitudes are the offspring of nature and necessity, He, who has, *with the utmost justness and elegance of reasoning*, as you well observe [r], explained this very point, himself, in the DIVINE LEGATION.

WHAT then are we to conclude from these elaborate chapters? Why, that by some unlucky mistake or other, let us call it only by the softer name, of *inattention*, you have entirely misrepresented the scope and purpose of all the Bishop has said on the subject of eloquence. And that this is no hasty or groundless charge, but the very truth of the case, will clearly be seen from a brief examination of the Bishop's theory, compared with your reasonings upon it.

The position, *that eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech*, supposes, says the Bishop, *that there is some certain Archetype in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is to be formed and modelled.*

[r] Dissert. p. 4. Dub. Ed. p. 4.

The Bishop, you see, requires an *Archetype* to be pointed out to him of that consummate eloquence, which is said to be *congenial and essential to human speech*. The demand is surely reasonable; and not difficult to be complied with, if such an Archetype do, in fact, subsist. But do you know of any such? Do you refer him to any such? Do you specify that *composition*? or do you so much as delineate that *sort* of composition, which will pass upon all men under the idea of an Archetype? Nothing of all this. Permit us then to attend to the Bishop's reasoning, by which he undertakes to prove that no such Archetype does or can exist.

'The proposition [that asserts, there is such an Archetype] is fanciful and false. Eloquence is not congenial or essential to human speech, nor is there any Archetype in nature to which that quality refers. It is accidental and arbitrary, and depends on custom and fashion: It is a mode of human communication which changes with the changing climates of the earth; and is as various and unstable as the genius, temper, and manners of its diversified inhabitants [s].'

The Bishop asserts *there is no Archetype*, because eloquence is a variable thing, depending on custom and fashion; is nothing absolute in itself, but relative to the fancies and prejudices of men, and changeable, as the different climes they inhabit. This *general*

[s] Doct. of Grace, p. 65.



reason seems convincing: it appeals to fact, to experience, to the evidence of sense. But the learned Prelate goes further. He analyzes the complex idea of eloquence: he examines the qualities of speech, of which it is made up; and he shews that they are nominal and unsubstantial. Hence it follows, again, That there is no Archetype in nature of perfect eloquence; its very constituent parts, as they are deemed, having no substance or reality in them.

But why should the Bishop condescend to this analysis, when his *general argument* seemed decisive of the question? For a good reason. When the Bishop asked for an ARCHETYPE, though you are shy of producing any, he well knew that the masters of Eloquence, those I mean who are accounted such in these parts of the world, had pretended to give one. He knew the authority of these masters of human speech with the sort of men, he had to deal with: he therefore takes the Archetype, they have given, and shews, upon their own ideas of eloquence, it is a mere phantom.

It is not to be supposed that the Bishop, in touching incidentally the question of Eloquence in a theological treatise, should follow the Greek and Latin rhetors through all the niceties and distinctions of their Art, or should amuse himself or us with a minute detail of all the particulars which go to the making up of this mighty compound, their ARCHETYPAL IDEA of human eloquence. If he had been so pleased, and had had no better business on his hands,

hands, it is likely he could have told us *news*, as you have done, out of ARISTOTLE, LONGINUS, and CICERO. But his manner is to say no more on a subject, than the occasion makes necessary; which, in the present case, was no more than to acquaint his reader, in very general terms, with the constituent parts of eloquence; which he resolves into these three, PURITY, ELEGANCE, and SUBLIMITY.

But this you call a *most illogical division of Eloquence*; for that the Bishop hath not only enumerated the constituent parts imperfectly; but, of the three qualities which he hath exhibited, the first is included in the second, and the third is not necessarily and universally a part of eloquence [1].

The enumeration, you say, is imperfect. Yet Purity, I think, denotes whatever comes under the idea of PROPRIETY, that is, of approved custom, as well as grammatical use, in any language: Elegance, expresses all those embellishments of composition, which are the effect of ART: and I know no fitter term than Sublimity, to stand for those qualities of eloquence, which are derived from the efforts of Genius, or NATURAL PARTS. Now what else can be required to complete the idea of Eloquence, and what defect of logic can there be in comprehending the various properties of human speech under these three generic names? The division is surely so natural and so intelligible, that few readers, I believe, will be disposed to object with you, *that the first of the*

[1] Dissert. p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 44.

*three qualities is included in the second, and that the third is not necessarily and universally a part of eloquence.*

But let the Bishop's enumeration be ever so *logical*, you further quarrel with his *idea* of these three constituent parts of eloquence, and his reasoning upon them.

‘What, says his Lordship, is PURITY but the use  
‘of such terms with their multiplied combinations,  
‘as the interest, the complexion, or the caprice of a  
‘writer or speaker of authority hath preferred to its  
‘equals?’

This idea of purity in language you think strange; and yet in the very chapter in which you set yourself to contemplate and to reprobate this *strange idea*, you cannot help resolving *purity*, into *usage and custom*, that is, with QUINCTILIAN, into *consensum eruditorum*; which surely is but saying in other words with the Bishop, that it consists *in the use of such terms, with their multiplied combinations, as the interest, the complexion, or the caprice of a writer or speaker of Authority hath preferred to its equals*—for equals they undoubtedly were, till that usage or custom took place. When this *consent of the learned* is once established, every writer or speaker, who pretends to *purity* of expression, must doubtless conform to it: but previously to such consent, *purity* is a thing arbitrary enough to justify the Bishop's conclusion, that this quality *is not congenial and essential to human speech*.

Next,



Next, the Bishop asks, 'What is ELEGANCE but  
 'such a turn of idiom as a fashionable fancy hath  
 'brought into repute?'

Here, again, you grow very nice in your inquiries into the idea of *fancy*, the idea of *fashion*, and I know not what of that sort. In a word, you go on *defining*, and *distinguishing* to the end of the chapter, in a way that without doubt would be very edifying to your young scholars in *Trinity College*, but, as levelled against the Bishop, is certainly unseasonable and out of place. For, define *elegance* as you will, it finally resolves into something that *is not of the essence of human speech*, but factitious and arbitrary; as depending much on the taste, the fancy, the caprice (call it what you please) of such writers or speakers, as have obtained the popular vogue for this species of eloquence; and so had the fortune to bring the turn of idiom and expression, which they preferred and cultivated, into general repute.

'Lastly,' the Bishop asks, 'What is SUBLIMITY  
 'but the application of such images, as arbitrary or  
 'casual connexions, rather than their own native  
 'grandeur, have dignified and ennobled?'

To this question you reply by asking another, *Whether sublimity doth necessarily consist in the application of images?* But, *first*, if what is called Sublimity, *generally* consists in the application of images, it is abundantly sufficient to the Bishop's purpose: *Next*, I presume to say, that the sublime of eloquence,

quence, or the impression which a genius makes upon us by his expression, consists necessarily and universally in the application of *images*, that is, of bright and vivid ideas, which is the true, that is, the received sense of the word, *images*, (however rhetoricians may have distinguished different kinds of them, and expressed them by different names) in all rhetorical and critical works. *Lastly*, I maintain that these bright and vivid ideas are rendered *interesting* to the reader or hearer from the influence of ASSOCIATION, rather than of *their own native dignity and grandeur*: of which I could give so many instances, that, for this reason, I will only give your *own*, which you lay so much stress upon, of *the famous oath by the souls of those who fought at Marathon and Plataea* [u]: where the peculiar ideas of *interest*, *glory*, and *veneration*, associated to the *image* or idea of the battle of *Marathon* and *Plataea*, gave a sublime and energy to this oath of DEMOSTHENES, *by the souls of those that fought there*, in the conceptions of his countrymen, which no other people could have felt from it, and of which you, Sir, with all your admiration of it, have certainly a very faint conception at this time.

I should here have dispatched this article of *Sublimity*, but that you will expect me to take some notice of your objection to what the Bishop observes, 'That this species of eloquence changed its nature, with the change of clime and language; and that the same expression, which in one place had the

[u] Dissert. p. 45. Dub. Ed. p. 48.

‘utmost *simplicity*, had, in another, the utmost ‘*sublime* [w]:’ An observation, which he illustrates and confirms by the various fortune of the famous passage in *Genesis*, *God said, Let there be light, and there was light*; so *sublime*, in the apprehension of LONGINUS and BOILEAU, and so *simple*, in that of HUETIUS and LE CLERC.

To this pertinent illustration, most ingeniously explained and enforced by the learned Prelate, you reply with much ease, “That this might well be, “and even in the same place,” and then proceed to inform him of I know not what union between *simplicity* and *sublimity*; though you civilly add, “That it is a point known to every SMATTERER in “criticism, that these two qualities are so far from “being inconsistent with each other, that they are “frequently united by a natural and inseparable “union [x].”

“Simplicity and *sublimity* may be found together.” I think the proposition false, in your sense of it, at least. But be it true, that these qualities in expression may be found together. What then? The question is of a passage, where these qualities, in the apprehension of great critics, are found separately; the one side maintaining that it is merely *simple*, the other, that it is merely *sublime*. *Simplicity* is, here, plainly opposed to *sublimity*, and implies the absence of it: BOILEAU, after LONGINUS, affirming that the expression is, and his adversaries affirming that it is

[w] Doct. of Grace, p. 53. Dub. Ed. p. 66. [x] Dissert. p. 58. Dub. Ed. p. 63.



*not, sublime.* Can any thing shew more clearly, that the *sublime* of eloquent expression depends on *casual associations*, and not on the nature of things?

But the Bishop goes further and tells us, what the *associations* were that occasioned these different judgments of the passage in question. The ideas suggested in it were *familiar*, to the sacred writer: they were *new* and admirable, to the Pagan Critic. Hence the expression would be of the greatest *simplicity* in MOSES, though it would be naturally esteemed by LONGINUS, infinitely *sublime*.

Here you cavil a little about the Effect of *familiarity*: but, as conscious of the weakness of this part of your answer, *Not to insist*, you say, *upon this, How comes it then that BOILEAU and many other Christian readers, to whom the ideas of creation were as familiar as to MOSES himself, were yet affected by the sublime of this passage?* You ask, How this comes to pass? How? Why in the way, in which so many other strange things come to pass, by *the influence of authority*. LONGINUS had said, the expression of this passage was *sublime*. And when he had said this, the wonder is to find two men, such as HUETIUS and LE CLERC, who durst, after that, honestly declare their own feelings, and profess that, to them, the expression was *not sublime*.

But more on this head of *Authority*, presently.

You see, Sir, I pass over these chapters *on the qualities of Eloquence*, though they make so large a part

part of your *Dissertation*, very rapidly : and I do it, not to escape from any force I apprehend there to be in your argument or observations, but because I am persuaded that every man, who knows what language is and how it is formed, is so convinced that those qualities of it by which it comes to be denominated *pure*, and *elegant*, and *interesting*, are the effects of *custom*, *fashion*, and *association*, that he would not thank me for employing many words on so plain a point. Only, as you conclude this part of your work with *an appeal*, which you think sufficiently warranted, against the most positive decisions of *fashion*, *custom*, or *prejudice*, to certain general and established principles of rational criticism, subversive, as you think, of the Bishop's whole theory, I shall be bold to tell you, as I just now promised, what my opinion is of these established rules of RATIONAL CRITICISM : by which you will understand how little I conceive the Bishop's system to be affected by this confident appeal to such principles.

I hold then, that what you solemnly call the established principles of rational criticism are only such principles as criticism hath seen good to establish on the practice of the Greek and Roman speakers and writers ; the European eloquence being ultimately the mere product and result of such practice ; and European criticism being no further rational than as it accords to it. This is the way, in which antient and modern critics have gone to work in forming their systems : and their systems deserve to be called rational, because they deliver such rules as experience has found most conducive to attain the ends of elo-

eloquence in these parts of the world. Had you attended to this obvious consideration, it is impossible you should have alarmed yourself so much, as you seem to have done, at the Bishop's bold Paradox, as if it threatened the downfall of Eloquence itself : which, you now see, stands exactly as it did, and is just as secure in all its established rights and privileges on the Bishop's system of *there being no Archetype of Eloquence in nature*, as upon your's, *that there is one*. The rules of criticism are just the same on either supposition, and will continue the same so long as we take the Greek and Roman writers for our masters and models ; nay, so long as the influence of their authority, now confirmed and strengthened by the practice of ages, and struck deep into the European notions and manners, shall subsist.

You need, therefore, be in no pain for the interests of eloquence, which are so dear to you ; nor for the dignity of your *Rhetorical office* in the University of *Dublin* ; which is surely of importance enough, if you teach your *young bearers* how to become eloquent in that scene where their employment of it is likely to fall ; without pretending to engage them in certain chimerical projects how they may attain an essential universal eloquence, or such as will pass for eloquence in all ages and countries of the world.

You see, Sir, if this opinion of mine be a truth, that it overturns at once the whole structure of your book. We, no doubt, who have been lectured in Greek and Roman eloquence, think it preferable to any other ; and we think so, because it conforms to  
certain



certain rules which our criticism has established, without considering that those rules are only established on the successful practice of European writers and speakers, and are therefore no rules at all in such times and places where a different, perhaps a contrary practice is followed with the same success. Let a Spartan, an Asiatic, an African, a Chinese system of rhetoric be given: Each of these shall differ from other, yet each shall be best and most *rational*, as relative to the people for whom it is formed. Nay, to see how groundless all your fancies of a *rational essential eloquence* are, do but reflect that even the European eloquence, though founded on the same general principles, is yet different in different places, in many respects. I could tell you of a country, and that at no great distance, where that which is thought supremely *elegant*, passes in another country, not less conversant in the *established principles of rational criticism*, for FINICAL; while what, in this country, is accepted under the idea of *sublimity*, is derided, in that other, as no better than BOMBAST.

What follows, now, from this appeal to *experience*, against your appeal to the *established rules of criticism*? Plainly this: That all the rhetors of antiquity put together are no authority against what the Bishop of Gloucester asserts concerning the nature of eloquence; since THEY only tell us (and we will take their word for it) what will *please or affect* under certain circumstances, while the BISHOP only questions, whether the same rules, under ALL circumstances, will enable a writer or speaker to *please and affect*.

*affect*. Strange! that you should not see the inconsequence of your own reasoning. The Bishop says, The rules of eloquence are for the most part local and arbitrary: No, you say, The rules are not local and arbitrary, FOR they were held reasonable ones at *Athens* and *Rome*. Your very answer shews, that they were local and arbitrary. You see, then, why I make so slight; on this occasion, of all your multiplied citations from the antient writers, which, how respectable soever, are no decisive authority, indeed no authority at all, in the present case.

Hitherto, the Bishop had been considering eloquence ONLY SO FAR as it is founded in arbitrary principles and local prejudices. For though his expression had been general, he knew very well that his thesis admitted some limitation; having directly affirmed of *the various modes of eloquence*, not that they were altogether and in all respects, but MOSTLY *fantastical*, p. 67. Dub. Ed. p. 87. which, though you are pleased to charge it upon him as an *inconsistency* [y], the reader sees is only a necessary qualification of his general thesis, such as might be expected in so exact a writer, as the learned Bishop. He now then attends to this limitation, and considers what effect it would have on his main theory.

• It will be said, *Are there not some more substantial principles of eloquence, common to all the various species that have obtained in the world?---Without doubt, there are.---Why then should not these*

[y] Dissert p. 80. n. Dub. Ed. p. 87.

• have

‘ have been employed, to do credit to the Apostolic  
 ‘ inspiration? For good reasons: respecting both the  
 ‘ Speaker and the Hearers. For what *is* eloquence  
 ‘ but a persuasive turn given to the elocution to  
 ‘ supply that inward, that conscious persuasion of  
 ‘ the speaker, so necessary to gain a fair hearing?  
 ‘ But the first preachers of the Gospel did not need  
 ‘ a succedaneum to that inward conscious persuasion.  
 ‘ And what is the *end* of eloquence, even when it  
 ‘ extends no further than to those more general  
 ‘ principles, but to stifle reason, and inflame the  
 ‘ passions? But the propagation of Christian truths in-  
 ‘ dispensably requires the aid of reason, and requires  
 ‘ no other human aid [x].’

Here, again, you are quite scandalized at the  
 Bishop’s paradoxical assertions concerning the *nature*  
 and *end* of eloquence; and you differ as widely from  
 him now he argues on the supposition of there being  
*some more substantial principles of eloquence*, as you  
 did before, when he contended that *most* of those, we  
 call principles, were arbitrary and capricious things.  
 You even go so far, as to insult him with a string of  
 questions, addressed *ad hominem*: for, having quoted  
 some passages from his book, truly eloquent and  
 rhetorical, you think you have him at advantage,  
 and can now confute him out of his own mouth.

“ Can any thing, you ask, be more brilliant, more  
 “ enlivened, more truly rhetorical, than these passa-  
 “ ges? What then are we to think of the writer and

[x] Doct. of Grace, p. 56. 57. Dub. Ed. p. 69. 70.



“ his intentions ? Is he really sincere in his reasoning ?  
 “ Or are these eloquent forms of speech so many  
 “ marks of falshood ? Were they assumed as a *suc-*  
 “ *cedaneum to conscious persuasion ?* And is the end  
 “ and design of them to *stifle reason and inflame the*  
 “ *passions [a] ?*”

To blunt the edge of these sharp and pressing interrogatories, give me leave to observe that the main question, agitated by the Bishop, is, whether divine inspiration can be reasonably expected to extend so far as to infuse a perfect model of eloquence, and to over-rule the inspired Apostles in such sort as that all they write or speak should be according to the rules of the most consummate rhetoric. He resolves this question, in the *negative*: *first*, by shewing that there is no such thing as what would be deemed a perfect model of eloquence subsisting in nature, a great part of what is called Eloquence in all nations, being arbitrary and chimerical; and, *secondly*, by shewing that even those principles, which may be justly thought more substantial, were, for certain reasons, not deserving the solicitous and over-ruling care of a divine inspirer. His reasons are these: *First*, that eloquence, when most genuine, is *but a persuasive turn given to the elocution to supply that inward, that conscious persuasion of the speaker, so necessary to gain a fair hearing, and which the first preachers of the Gospel had already by the influence and impression of the holy spirit upon their minds:* And, *next*, that *the end of eloquence, even when it ex-*

[a] Dissert p. 20. Dub. Ed. p. 21.

*tends no further than to those more general principles, is but to stifle reason and inflame the passion ; an end, of a suspicious sort, and which the propagation of Christian truths, the proper business of the sacred writers or speakers, did not require.*

You see these *Reasons*, in whatever defective, are both of them founded in *one common* principle, which the Bishop every where goes upon, and the best philosophy warrants, That, when the Deity interposes in human affairs, he interposes no further than is *necessary* to the end in view, and leaves every thing else to the intervention and operation of second causes. The Apostles wanted no succedaneum to an inward conscious persuasion, which the observance of the general principles of eloquence supplies: they were not, therefore, supernaturally instructed in them. They wanted no assistance from a power, that tends to *stifle reason and inflame the passion*: It was not, therefore, miraculously imparted to them. Every thing, here, is rational and closely argued. What was not necessary, was not done. Not a word about the inconvenience and inutility, in all cases, of recurring to the rules and practice of a chaste eloquence: Not a word to shew, that, where eloquence is employed, there is nothing but fraud and *falsehood*, no inward persuasion, no consciousness of truth: Not a word to insinuate, that either you or the Bishop should be restrained from being as eloquent, on occasion, as you might have it in your power to be, or might think fit: nay, not a word, against the Apostles themselves having recourse to the aids of human eloquence, if they had access to them, and found them

them expedient; only these aids were not REQUIRED, that is, were not to be claimed or expected from divine inspiration.

Thus stands the Bishop's reasoning, perfectly clear and just. The only room for debate, is, whether his ideas of the *nature*, and *end* of eloquence be just, too. *Eloquence*, he says, *is but a persuasive turn given to the elocution to supply that inward, that conscious persuasion of the speaker, so necessary to gain a fair bearing.* The general affirmation you do not, indeed cannot, reject or controvert; for the great master of eloquence himself confirms it in express words—*Tum optimè dicit orator, cum VIDETUR vera dicere.* QUINCTIL. l. iv. c. 2. And, again, *Semper ita dicat, TANQUAM de causâ optimè sentiat.* l. v. c. 13. that is, an inward conscious persuasion is to be supplied by the speaker's art. The Bishop's idea then of the *nature* of eloquence is, as far as I can see, the very same idea, which QUINCTILIAN had of it. Both agree, that eloquence is *such a turn of the elocution as supplies that inward conscious persuasion, so necessary to the speaker's success.* The Bishop adds, that this *supply* the inspired writers did not want. But you will say, perhaps, that merely human writers may have this *inward conscious persuasion*, as well as the inspired. What then? If human writers can do without this succedaneum, which human eloquence supplies to inward persuasion, who obliges them to have recourse to it? Yes, but they cannot do *so well* without it. Who then forbids them to have recourse to it? For neither are the inspired writers barred of this privilege: only, as being  
simply



simply UNNECESSARY, it was not præternaturally supplied. Your perplexity on this subject arises from not distinguishing between what is *absolutely necessary*, and what is *sometimes expedient*: Divine inspiration provides only for the *first*; the *latter* consideration belongs to human prudence.

But it is, further, a mistake to say, *that merely human writers have their inward conscious persuasion as well as the divine*. They may have it, indeed, from the conclusions of their own reason, but have they it in the same degree of strength and vivacity, have they the same *full assurance of faith*, as those who have truth immediately impressed upon them by the hand of God? I suppose not.

But the Bishop's idea of the END of eloquence, revolts you as much as his idea, of its *nature*. *What*, says he, *is the END of eloquence, even when it extends no further than to those more general principles, but to stifle reason and inflame the passions?* And what other end, I pray you, can it have? You will say, To adorn, recommend, and enforce truth. It may be so, sometimes: this, we will say, is its more legitimate end. But even this end is not accomplished but by *stifling reason and inflaming the passions*: that is, eloquence prevents Reason from adverting *simply* to the truth of things, and to the force of evidence; and it does this by agitating and disturbing the natural and calm state of the mind with rhetorical *diminutions or amplifications*. *VIS oratoris OMNIS*, says QUINCTILIAN, *in AUGENDO MINUENDOQUE consistit*. [l. viii. c. 3. sub fin.] Now what is this but *stifling reason*?  
But

But it goes further: it *inflames the passions*, the ultimate end it has in view from *stifling reason*, or putting it off its guard. And for this, again, we have the authority of QUINCTILIAN, *affectibus perturbandus et ab intentione auferendus orator. Non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia CIRCA MOVENDUM valet.* l. iv. c. 5. Or, would you see a passage from the great master of rhetoric, where his *idea* of this double end of eloquence is given at once? It follows in these words---*Ubi ANIMIS judicium vis afferenda est, et AB IPSA VERI CONTEMPLATIONE abducenda mens, IBI PROPRIUM ORATORIS OPUS EST,* l. vi. c. 2. That is, where the *passions are to be inflamed and reason stifled, there is the proper use and employment of the rhetorical art.* So exactly has the Bishop traced the footsteps of the great master, when he gave us his idea of the END of eloquence!

Well but this *end*, you say, is IMMORAL. So much the worse for your system, for such is the undoubted end of eloquence, even by the confession of its greatest patrons and advocates themselves. But what? Is this end immoral, in all cases? And have you never then heard, *that the passions*, as wicked things as they are, *may be set on the side of truth?* In short, Eloquence, like Ridicule, which is, indeed, no mean part of it, may be either well or ill employed; and though it cannot be truly said, that the end of either is simply *immoral*, yet it cannot be denied, that what these *modes of address* propose to themselves in ALL cases, is, *to stifle reason and inflame the passions.*

The Bishop's idea, then, of the end of eloquence, I presume, is fairly, and fully justified. But your complaint now is, that the Bishop does not himself abide by this idea. For you find a contradiction between what his Lordship says here—*that the end of eloquence, even when it extends no further than to those more general principles, is but to stifle reason and inflame the passions*, and what he says elsewhere—*that the principal end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to mislead reason and to cajole the fancy and affections* [b]. But these propositions are perfectly consistent, nor was the latter introduced so much as for the purpose of *qualifying and palliating* any thing that might be deemed offensive in the former. For though eloquence, chastly employed, goes no further than to *stifle reason and inflame the passions* (and the chastest eloquence, if it deserves the name, goes thus far), yet *the principal end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to mislead reason*, which is something more than *stifling* it; and to *cajole*, which is much worse than to *inflame*, the passions. Reason may be STIFLED, and the passions INFLAMED, when the speaker's purpose is to inculcate *right and truth*; Reason is only in danger of being MISLED, and the fancy and affections of being CAJOLED, when wrong and error are enforced by him. So very inaccurate was your conception of the Bishop's expression! which I should not have explained so minutely, but to shew you that, when you undertook to expose such a writer, as the Bishop, you should have studied his expression with more care,

[b] Dissert. p. 80. n. Dub. Ed. p. 87.



and should have understood the force of words at another rate, than you seem to have done in this instance.

Still you will ask, if the *end* be so legitimate, why should not the inspired writers be trusted with this powerful engine of human eloquence? The Bishop gives several reasons: It is a *suspicious instrument*, p. 57. It was an *improper* instrument for heaven-directed men, whose strength was not to be derived from *the wisdom of men*, but from *the power of God*, p. 59. But the direct and immediate answer is contained, as I observed, in these words---*The propagation of Christian truths indispensably requires the aid of reason, and requires no other aid.* 1. Christianity, which is a *reasonable service*, was of necessity to be propagated by force of reason; in the Bishop's better expression, IT INDISPENSABLY REQUIRED THE AID OF REASON; but *Reason*, he tells us in the next words, *can never be fairly and vigorously exerted but in that favourable interval which precedes the appeal to the passions.* 2. The propagation of Christianity, which indispensably required the aid of reason, REQUIRED NO OTHER HUMAN AID: that is, no other human means were simply REQUISITE OR NECESSARY. God, therefore, was pleased to leave his inspired servants to the prudential use and exercise of their own natural or acquired talents: but would not supernaturally endow them with this *unnecessary* power of eloquent words. The inspired writers, even the most learned, and by nature the most eloquent of them, made a very sparing use of such talents, *proudly sacrificing them*, as the Bishop nobly and eloquently says,

says, *to the glory of the everlasting Gospel*. But as the *end* was not, so neither was the *use* of eloquence, simply immoral or evil in itself. They were considerations of *propriety, prudence, and piety*, which restrained the Apostles generally, but not always, in the *use* of eloquence; which was less *decent* in their case, and which they could very well do without. When the same considerations prompt other men, under other circumstances, to affect the way of eloquence, it may safely, and even commendably, for any thing the Bishop has said on this subject as it concerns divine inspiration, be employed.

Admitting then the Bishop's ideas both of the *nature* and *end* of eloquence, the *want* of this character in the sacred writings is only vindicated, not *the thing itself* interdicted or disgraced.

The conclusion from the whole of what the Bishop has advanced on this argument, follows in these words:

‘What, therefore, do our ideas of fit and right tell us is required in the *style* of an universal law? Certainly no more than this---To employ those aids which are common to *all* language as such; and to reject what is peculiar to *each*, as they are casually circumstanced. And what are these aids but *CLEARNESS* and *PRECISION*? By these, the mind and sentiments of the Composer are intelligibly conveyed to the reader. These qualities are essential to language, as it is distinguished from jargon: they are eternally the

I

same,

' same, and independent on custom or fashion. To  
 ' give a language *clearness* was the office of Philo-  
 ' sophy; to give it *precision* was the office of Gram-  
 ' mar. Definition performs the first service by a re-  
 ' solution of the ideas which make up the terms:  
 ' Syntaxis performs the second by a combination of  
 ' the several parts of speech into a systematic con-  
 ' gruity: these are the very things in language  
 ' which are least positive, as being conducted on the  
 ' principles of metaphysics and logic. Whereas,  
 ' all besides, from the very power of the elements,  
 ' and signification of the terms, to the tropes and  
 ' figures of composition, are arbitrary; and, what is  
 ' more, as these are a deviation from those principles  
 ' of metaphysics and logic, they are frequently vi-  
 ' cious. This, the great master quoted above  
 ' [QUINCTILIAN] freely confesseth, where speaking  
 ' of that ornamented speech, which he calls σχήματα  
 ' λέξεως, he makes the following confession and apo-  
 ' logy—esset enim omne schema vitium, si non pe-  
 ' teretur, sed accideret. Verum auctoritate, ve-  
 ' tustate, consuetudine, plerumque defenditur, sæpe  
 ' etiam RATIONE QUADAM. Ideoque cum sit a  
 ' simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa, *virtus*  
 ' est, si habet PROBABILE ALIQUID quod sequatur  
 ' [c].

There is no part of your book in which you ex-  
 alt more than in the confutation of this obnoxious  
 paragraph. It is to be hoped, you do it on good  
 grounds—but let us see what those grounds are.

[c] Doct. of Grace, p. 58. Dub. Ed. p. 71.



The Bishop, in the paragraph you criticise in your vth Chapter, had said *that tropes and figures of composition*, under certain circumstances, there expressed, are frequently *vicious*. You make a difficulty of understanding this term, and doubt whether his Lordship means *vice* in a *critical*, or *moral* sense. I take upon me to answer roundly for the Bishop, that he meant *vice*, in the *critical* sense: for he pronounces such tropes and figures *vicious*, ONLY as *they are a deviation from the principles of METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC*; and therefore I presume he could not mean *vice* in the other sense, which is a *deviation from the principles of ETHICS*. All you say on this subject, then, might have been well spared.

This incidental question, or doubt of your's, being cleared up, let us now attend to the *more substantial grounds* you go upon, in your censure of the learned Bishop.

He had been speaking of *clearness and precision*, as the things in language, which are least positive. Whereas, all besides, from the very power of the elements and signification of the terms, to the tropes and figures of composition, are arbitrary; and, what is more, as these are a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, are frequently *vicious*.

In the first place, you say, it were to be wished that his Lordship had pleased to express himself with a little more precision—Want of precision is not, I think, a fault with which the Bishop's writings are commonly charged; and I wish it may not appear in this

instance, as it did lately in another, that your misapprehension of his argument arises from the very *precision* of his expression. But in what does this supposed *want of precision* consist? Why, in not qualifying this sentence, passed on *the tropes and figures of Composition*, which, from the general terms, in which it is delivered, falls indiscriminately upon ALL writers and speakers; for that “ALL men, who “have ever written and spoken, have *frequently* used “this mode of elocution, which is said to be *frequently* vicious [d].” Well, but from the word, *frequently*, which you make yourself so pleasant with, it appears that the Bishop *had* qualified *this bold and dangerous position*.---Yes, but this makes the position *still more bold*. Indeed! The Bishop is then singularly unhappy, to have his position, *first*, declared bold for want of being qualified, and, *then*, bolder still, for being so. But your reason follows.

“What makes this position still more hardy is, “that, however the conclusion seems confined and “restrained by the addition of that qualifying word “[frequently], yet the premises are general and unlimited. It is asserted without any restriction, that “figurative composition is a deviation from the “principles of metaphysics and logic. If then it be “vicious *as it is*, i. e. *because* [quatenus] it is such a “deviation, it must be not only *frequently* but *always* “vicious; a very severe censure denounced against “almost every speaker, and every writer, both sacred and prophane, that ever appeared in the “world [e].”

[d] Dissert. p. 24. Dub. Ed. p. 25. [e] Dissert. p. 25. Dub. Ed. p. 26.

Here your criticism grows very logical; and notwithstanding the confidence I owned myself to have in the *precision* of the Bishop's style, I begin to be in pain how I shall disengage him from so exact and philosophical an objector. Yet, as the occasion calls upon me, I shall try what may be done. *As these [tropes and figures of composition] are a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, they are frequently vicious.* Since the *Attribute* of this proposition is so peculiarly offensive to you, your first care, methinks, should have been to gain precise and exact ideas of the *subject*; without which it is not possible to judge whether what is affirmed of it be exceptionable, or no.

By *tropes and figures of composition*, you seem to understand *metaphors, allegories, similitudes*, and whatever else is vulgarly known under the name of *figures of speech*. For in p. 29, you speak of *Allegories, Metaphors and OTHER tropes and figures, which, you say, are no more than comparisons and similitudes expressed in another form*: And your concern, throughout this whole chapter, is for the vindication of *such tropes and figures* from the supposed charge of their being a *deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic*. But now, on the other hand, I dare be confident that the Bishop meant these terms, not in this *specific*, but in their *generic* sense, as expressing any kind of change, deflexion, or deviation from the plain and common forms of language. I say, I am confident of this, 1. because the precise sense of the words is such as I represent it to be; and I have observed, though, it seems, you have not, that the Bishop is



of all others the most *precise* in his expression. 2. Because QUINCTILIAN authorizes this use of those terms, who tells us that---*per tropos verti formas non verborum modo sed et sensuum, et compositionis*, l. viii. c. 6. And as to *figuram*, he defines it to be (as the word itself, he says, imports) *conformatio quædam orationis, remota à communi et primum se offerente ratione*, l. ix. c. 1. words large enough to take in every possible change and alteration of common language. So that all manners and forms of language, different from the common ones, may, according to QUINCTILIAN, be fitly denominated *tropes and figures of composition*. 3. I conclude this to be the Bishop's meaning, because the *specific sense* of these words was not sufficient to his purpose, which was to speak of ALL kinds of tropical and figured speech. Now though *allegories, metaphors and other tropes and figures, which are no more than comparisons and similitudes, expressed in another form*, belong indeed to the genus of figured language, they are by no means the whole of it, as so great a master of rhetoric, as yourself, very well knows. 4. I conclude this, from the *peculiar mode* of his expression: if the Bishop had said simply *tropes and figures of speech*, I might perhaps (if nothing else had hindered) have taken him to mean, as you seem to have done, only *metaphors, allegories, and other tropes and figures, expressing, in another form, comparisons and similitudes*, which, in vulgar use, come under the name of *tropes and figures of speech*: But when he departs from that common form of expression and puts it, *tropes and figures of COMPOSITION*, I infer that so exact a writer, as the Bishop, had his reasons for this change, and that he intended  
by

by it to express *more than tropes or figures of speech* usually convey, indeed ALL that can any way relate to the tropical and figurative use of words in *literary composition*.

It is now seen what the SUBJECT of this bold proposition is: namely, *tropical or figured language, in general*. This-figured language, as it is a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, is frequently *vicious*; i. e. is an acknowledged vice or fault in composition, as such. We now then see the force of the PREDICATE.

Well; but if this figured language “be vicious  
“as it is, i. e. *because, quatenus*, it is such a deviation,  
“it must not only be *frequently*, but *always* vicious.”  
The premises are general and unlimited: so must, likewise, be the conclusion. What sense, then, is there in the word, *frequently*? or what room, for that qualification?

See, what it is to be a great proficient in logic, before one has well learnt one's Grammar! As, i. e. *because quatenus*, say you. How exactly and critically the English language may be studied in *Dublin*, I pretend not to say: But we in *England* understand the particle *as*, not only in the sense of *because, quatenus*, but also, and, I think, more frequently, in the sense of *in proportion as, according as*, or, if you will needs have a Latin term to explain an English term, *prout, perinde ac*. So that the proposition stands thus: *These tropes and figures, ACCORDING AS they are a deviation from the principles of metaphysic and logic.*

*are frequently vicious.* The premises, you now see, are qualified, as well as the conclusion. Figured language, *WHEN* it deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, becomes vicious. Figured language is then---what? *always* vicious? But the Bishop did not say, that figured language is *always* a deviation from those principles. He only says, *when* it so deviates, it is vicious. It is implied in the expression that figured language at least *sometimes* deviates from those principles, and the Bishop, as appears, is of opinion that it *frequently* deviates: He therefore says, consistently with his premises, and with his usual accuracy, It is *frequently* vicious.

In short, the Bishop's argument, about which you make such a stir, if drawn out in mood and figure, would, I suppose, stand thus---"Tropical and figured language, *WHEN* it deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, is vicious---Tropical and figured language *FREQUENTLY* deviates from those principles---Therefore tropical and figured language is *FREQUENTLY* vicious." And where is the defect of sense or logic, I want to know, in this argumentation? But you impatiently ask, Are *metaphors, allegories, and comparisons* then included in this *figured language*, which is pronounced *vicious*? To this question I can only reply, That I know not whether *metaphors, allegories, and comparisons*, are, in the Bishop's opinion, *deviations* from the principles of metaphysics and logic: for I cannot find that he says any thing, in *particular*, of this kind of tropes and figures. But if you, or any one for you, will shew clearly, that *metaphors, allegories,*  
and



*and comparisons* are such *deviations*, the Bishop, for any thing I know, might affirm, and might be justified in affirming that they were in themselves *vicious*. But be not too much alarmed for your favourites, if he should: They would certainly keep their ground, though convicted of such *vice*; at least unless the Rhetoricians of our time should be so dull as not to be able to find out what QUINCTILIAN calls *probabile aliquid*, some probable pretext to justify or excuse them.

But, instead of troubling ourselves to guess what the Bishop *might* say on a subject on which he has said nothing, it is to better purpose to attend to what he *has* said on the subject in question. The Bishop has said, *That tropical and figured language is frequently vicious*. You ask when? He replies, *When it deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic*. But in what particular instances does this appear? He tells you this too. He gives you instances enough, to justify his affirmation, that tropical and figured language is *frequently* vicious; for he exemplifies his affirmation in ONE WHOLE class of such figured speech, as deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, and is therefore vicious, namely, *in the class of verbal figures*. ‘ This, [*i. e.* the truth  
‘ of the affirmation, That figured language, according  
‘ as it is found to be a deviation from the principles  
‘ of metaphysics and logic, is frequently vicious] the  
‘ great master, QUINCTILIAN, freely confesseth,  
‘ where, speaking of that ornamented speech, which  
‘ he calls *σχήματα λέξεως*, he makes the following  
‘ confession and apology--*esset enim omne schema vi-*

\* RTUM, si non peteretur, sed accideret. Verum  
 \* auctoritate, vetustate, consuetudine, plerumque  
 \* defenditur, sæpe etiam RATIONE QUADAM. Ideo-  
 \* que cum sit a simplici rectoque loquendi genere  
 \* deflexa, *virtus* est, si habet PROBABILE ALIQUID  
 \* quod sequatur [f].

THE difficulty, I trust, now begins to clear up.  
 Figured language, is frequently vicious. Of this we  
 have an instance given in one entire species of fi-  
 gured or ornamented speech, namely σχήματα λέξεως,  
 or *verbal figures*. Can any thing be clearer and  
 plainer? Yet, because you had taking it into your  
 head that by *tropes and figures of composition* the Bishop  
 understood, nay could only understand, *metaphors,*  
*allegories, and comparisons,* you dreamt of nothing,  
 here, but the same fine things. And though QUIN-  
 CTILIAN lay before the Bishop, when he quoted these  
 words, though the Bishop's own express words shew  
 the contrary, for he speaks not of tropes and figures  
 in general, much less of such tropes and figures  
 as you speak of, but solely of *that ornamented speech,*  
 called σχήματα λέξεως, you will needs have him  
 quote QUINCTILIAN in this place as speaking of  
*Rhetorical figures*. But let us attend to QUINCTI-  
 LIAN's words. *Esset omne schema vitium, si non pe-*  
*teretur, sed accideret.* What! Shall we think the  
 Bishop could mean to affirm of *rhetorical figures,*  
 that they would *always be vicious,* if they were not  
*sought for, but occurred of themselves?* For that, I  
 think, is the translation of---*si non peterentur, sed ac-*  
*ciderent.* Surely one way, and that the chief, in

[f] Quinc. l. ix. c. 3.

which

which *rhetorical figures, metaphors, allegories, and comparisons*, become vicious, is, when they ARE sought for, *solicitously hunted after, and affectedly brought in*. The very contrary happens with regard to these verbal figures: they are vicious, when they are NOT sought for and *purposely affected*. I conclude then, that his Lordship, who surely does not want common sense, and, I think, understands Latin, did not, and could not intend to exemplify his observation in the case of *rhetorical figures*.

Still you are something puzzled and perplexed by the Bishop's observation. Admitting him to mean, as his author does, *verbal figures*, how can these be considered as *a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic*? How? Why, has not the Bishop told us, or, if he had not, is it not certain in itself, that *to give a language clearness is the office of philosophy; and that Definition, a part of Logic, performs that service by a resolution of the ideas, which make up the terms*? But these verbal figures are often a deviation from, nay a willful defiance of, *all logical definition*. Witness the very instance you and QUINCTILIAN give us, in VIRGIL's *timidi damæ*. Logic defines *Damæ* to be the *females* of that species of animals, called *Deer*. The figurative VIRGIL confounds this distinction by using this term for the *males*, as well as *females*. But, universally, *Grammar* itself, whose peculiar office is to *give precision to language*, is a part of logic: the Bishop says, *its rules are conducted on the principles of Logic*. But *verbal figures*, even when they do not offend against the strictness of definition,

are



are universally violations, in some degree or other, of *Grammar*, i. e. of *Logic*. Yet these violations of *Logical Grammar*, QUINCTILIAN tells us, may be allowed, *si habent probabile aliquid quod sequantur*; that is, for some fantastical reason or other, by which the masters of Rhetoric are pleased to recommend them to us.

And now, Sir, let me ask, what becomes of your fine comment on QUINCTILIAN's chapter concerning *verbal figures*, and, particularly, of your nice distinction between these, and *rhetorical figures*, which the Bishop, no doubt, wanted to be informed of? The issue of your exploits in Logic and Criticism is now seen to be this, That you have grossly misrepresented the Bishop; and needlessly, at least, explained QUINCTILIAN. First, you make the Bishop talk of *rhetorical figures* ONLY, in the *specific* sense of these terms, when his Lordship was all the while speaking of *figured language*, in *general*. Next, you make him deliver a bold position concerning rhetorical figures, as being *frequently* vicious, because *always* deviations from the principles of metaphysics and logic; when all he maintains, is, That *figured language* is FREQUENTLY vicious according as it deviates from those principles; and, in particular, that *that* part of figured speech, called grammatical or verbal figures, is ALWAYS vicious.

To conclude, if you had shewn any compunction, or even common respect in exposing what you took to be the Bishop's absurdities on this subject, I should have made a conscience of laying you open on this head

head of *Rhetorical and Grammatical figures*. As it is, your unmerciful triumph over the poor Bishop, makes it allowable for me to lay your dealing with him before the reader in all its nakedness; and after what has been said, I cannot do it better than by letting him see how the Bishop's argumentation is represented by you, as drawn out in your own words, and that in full mood and figure.

"I should by no means, say you, willingly misrepresent the argument of my Lord Bishop; but upon repeated examination of the passage here quoted, I must state it thus:

"QUINCTILIAN declares, that what are called grammatical figures are really no more than faulty violations of grammatical rules, unless when purposely introduced upon some reasonable or plausible grounds."

THEREFORE,

"He confesses that tropes and figures of composition, as they are a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, are frequently vicious."

You add, "If this be a fair representation, it were to be wished that the learned author *had so far condescended to men of confined abilities*, as to explain the connexion between these two propositions [g]."

[g] Dissert. p. 34. Dub. Ed. p. 37.

As

As the *learned author*, I guess, may be better employed than in this unnecessary task, which you *wish* to impose upon him, I have taken upon me to discharge that office, with less able hands; and yet, have *explained the connexion between these two propositions* in such sort, that, if I mistake not, we shall never hear more from you, of any inconsistency between them.

I have now, Sir, gone through the several particulars of your Dissertation, and have shewn, I think, clearly and invincibly, that all your objections to the Bishop's paradoxical sentiments on the subject of Eloquence are mistaken and wholly groundless.

The two propositions, his Lordship took upon him to confute, 1. *That an inspired language must needs be a language of perfect eloquence*; and 2. *That eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech, and inherent in the constitution of things*: These two propositions, I say, are so thoroughly confuted by the Bishop, that not one word of all you say in any degree affects his reasoning, or supports those two propositions against the force of it. I am even candid enough to believe that, on further thoughts, you will not yourself be displeased with this ill success of your attack on the learned Prelate's *principles*; which are manifestly calculated for the service of religion and the honour of inspired scripture. For, though you attempt to shew us in  
your



your two last chapters, how the honour of inspired scripture may be saved on *other principles*, yet allow me to say that, for certain reasons, I much question the validity of those principles; at least, that the persons, most concerned in this controversy, will by no means subscribe to them. If there be an Archetype of eloquence in nature, 'one should be apt enough, as the Bishop says, to conclude, that when the Author of nature condescended to inspire one of these plastic performances of human art, he would make it by the exactest pattern of the Archetype [b].'<sup>1</sup> Or, whatever you and I and the Bishop might conclude, assure yourself that the objectors to inspired scripture will infallibly draw that conclusion. And, when they do so, and fortify themselves, besides, with the authority of so great a master of eloquence, as yourself, it will be in vain, I doubt, to oppose to them your ingenious harangues and encomiums on the eloquent composition of the sacred scriptures. Nay, it would give you, no doubt, some pain to find that, though they should accept your authority for the truth of their favourite principle of there being an *Archetype in nature of perfect eloquence*, they would yet reject your *harangues and encomiums* with that disdain which is so natural to them. The honour of sacred scripture will then hang on a question of *Taste*: and unluckily the objectors are of such an authority in that respect, that there is no appeal from their decisions of it.

The contemplation of these *inconveniences*, together with the *love of truth*, determined me to ha-

[b] Doct. of Grace, 52. Dub. Ed. p. 65.

zard this address to you. I will not deny, besides, that the mere *justice* due to a great character, whom I found somewhat freely, not to say injuriously treated by you, was, also, *one* motive with me. If I add still *another*, it is such as I need not disown, and which you, of all men, will be the last to object to, I mean a motive of *Charity* towards yourself.

I am much a stranger to your person, and, what it may perhaps be scarce decent for me to profess to you, even to your writings. All I know of YOURSELF, is, what your book tells me, that you are distinguished by an honourable place and office in the the University of *Dublin*; and what I have heard of your WRITINGS, makes me think favourably of a private scholar, who, they say, employs himself in such works of learning and taste, as are proper to instill a reverence into young minds for the best models of antient eloquence. While you are thus creditably stationed, and thus usefully employed, I could not but feel some concern for the hurt you were likely to do yourself by engaging in so warm and so unnecessary an opposition to a *writer*, as you characterize him, of *distinguished eminence* [i]. Time was, when even with us on this side the water, the novelty of this writer's positions, and the envy, which ever attends superior merit, disposed some warm persons to open, and prosecute with many hard words, the unpopular cry against him, of his being a bold and PARADOXICAL writer. But

[i] Adv. to the Dissert.

reflexion.

reflexion and experience have quieted this alarm. Men of sense and judgment now consider his Paradoxes as very harmless, nay, as very sober and certain truths; and even vye with each other in their zeal of building upon them, as the surest basis, on which a just and rational vindication of our common religion can be raised. This is the present state of things with us, and especially, they say, in the Universities of this kingdom.

It was, therefore, not without some surprize, and, as I said, with much real concern, that I found a gentleman of learning and education revive, at such a juncture, that stale and worn-out topic, and disgrace himself by propagating this clamour, of I know not what *paradoxical boldness*, now long out of date, in the much-approved writings of this great Prelate. Nor was the dishonour to yourself, the only circumstance to be lamented. You were striving, with all your might, to infuse prejudices into the minds of many ingenious and virtuous young men; whom you would surely be sorry to mislead; and who would owe you little thanks for prepossessing them with unfavourable sentiments of such a man and writer, as the Bishop of *Gloucester*, they will find, is generally esteemed to be.

These, then, were the considerations, which induced me to employ an hour or two of leisure in giving your book a free examination. I have done it in as few words as possible, and in a *manner* which no reasonable and candid man, I persuade myself, will disapprove.



disapprove. I know what apologies may be requisite to the learned Bishop for a stranger's engaging in this officious task. But to you, Sir, I make none: It is enough if any benefits to yourself or others may be derived from it.

I am, with respect, &c.

**THE END.**



AN  
ANSWER  
TO A  
LETTER  
TO  
Dr. THOMAS LELAND;

CONTAINING,  
AN EXAMINATION of the CRITICISM on  
the DISSERTATION, &c.

In which is particularly shewn, that the BISHOP  
of GLOUCESTER's Idea of the Character of an In-  
spired Language, as delivered in his DOCTRINE of  
GRACE, is by the learned Vindicator himself, ac-  
knowledged to be indefensible.

---

By THOMAS LELAND, D.D.

---

DUBLIN:

Printed for A. LEATHLEY, Bookseller in Dame-street.

M,DCC,LXV.

A. N. S. W. E. R.

TO A

F. H. T. E. R.

TO

D. THOMAS T. LEVAND;



Acquired by the British Museum

from the collection of

the late Sir John Lubbock

on the 1st of June 1881

for the purpose of

forming a permanent

collection of

the objects of

the British Museum

46.  
10. 10.  
13.

IN THOMAS T. LEVAND, D.D.

of the University of

Cambridge

and of the

British Museum

London

1881



A N  
A N S W E R  
T O A  
L E T T E R  
T O T H E  
Rev. Dr. THOMAS LELAND.

S I R,

**N**O apology is indeed due to me, for your engaging in the task of giving *your free thoughts* on my late *Dissertation*, &c. I claim the like indulgence on my part, and shall proceed to examine the subject-matter of your letter, I trust, with that decency which befits the character you have conferred upon me; but with the greater freedom, as I am not informed to whom I have now the honour of addressing myself: and what degree of respect and deference may be due to him, I can only collect from the subject and the *manner* of his criticism.

However

However obliging the tender of your services may be to VINDICATE the *design* and *made* of my Dissertation, I have yet *my reasons* for declining this offer. And if I were disposed to suspend, perplex, and confound the real subject of our debate, I might possibly turn aside to defend myself on points of no sort of consequence or pertinence, even although you declare that *you have nothing to object to them*. But, as I am neither inclined nor obliged to recur to such artifice, I pass on directly to that part of your letter, in which you profess to confine yourself to the *matter* of my Dissertation.

With whatever *alacrity* your vindication *may keep* *pacing it*, (the phrase, Sir, is of your own making) yet to stumble so desperately as it has done, even at first setting out, seems to presage *haste* rather than *speed*.---It begins with stating the occasion and subject of debate: the passage is quoted from Doctor *Middleton*, in which he asserts, “ that we should naturally expect to find an inspired language to be “ such as is worthy of God, that is, pure, clear, “ noble, and affecting even beyond the force of common speech ;---in short, the purity of *PLATO*, and “ the eloquence of *CICERO*,” &c. Then follows the observation of the *Bishop of Gloucester*, that this reasoning is founded on two propositions, both taken for granted, and yet neither true. “ First, that an “ inspired language must needs be a language of perfect eloquence ; and, that eloquence is something “ congenial and essential to human speech.”---You proceed thus: “ [*a*] The Bishop undertakes to shew

[*a*] Lett. p. 7. Dub. Ed. p. 126.

“the falsehood of these two propositions. You, Sir, contend for the truth of them.” An assertion (I mean with respect to the first of these propositions) not only groundless, but clearly contradicted by my plain, express, repeated declarations. I am loth to impute this to any worse cause, than a want of that ordinary degree of attention due to any work which you had undertaken to *criticise*.

Be pleased then, once again, to turn to the *Dissertation*, p. 81. Dub. Ed. p. 88. where I profess to consider his Lordship's character of an inspired language. I begin with expressing my sense pretty plainly of the first of these propositions. “The enemies of our holy faith, as well as some IMPRUDENT friends, have sometimes asserted that an inspired language should be a language of perfect eloquence.”—You see, Sir, I call it *imprudent* to contend for the truth of that proposition, which you represent me as contending for.—Look now to chap. 16. p. 89. Here, instead of concurring with Doctor *Middleton* in his notion of an inspired language, I have endeavoured to confute it. I have said that such a language must indeed be *worthy* of God, but that in this *worthiness* nothing more is implied, than that it should be abundantly *sufficient* for the purposes of his wisdom and goodness: that the purity of PLATO, and the eloquence of CICERO, were neither *necessary*, nor *proper* for these purposes, nor at all *consistent* with them; and that we are not to look for the refinements of human eloquence [b] “for *exquisite purity and elegance* in

[b] Diss. p. 92. Dub. Ed. p. 101.



“the apostolical writings, even supposing that the  
 “authors acquired their language by miraculous in-  
 “fusion.”---I have therefore good reason to express  
 my surprize at this your first assertion.

And, from denying me the honour of agreeing  
 with the learned Prelate in one point, merely because  
 I object to the *principles* on which he hath endeavoured  
 to establish it, you immediately proceed to  
 condemn me for *not dissenting* from his Lordship in  
 another.

With regard to the first of these propositions, the  
 Bishop hath affirmed, [c] that *the utmost rudeness and  
 barbarousness, the abounding in every fault that can  
 possibly deform a language, is one CERTAIN MARK  
 that this language is divinely inspired.* It seems I  
 have called this a *bold* assertion. I have spoken of  
 his Lordship's principle as *paradoxical*, I have men-  
 tioned something of *an hardy opposition to the general  
 sense of mankind.* But this you say is *invidious*, as  
 well as defective, in point of *generosity* [d]---Happily  
 you yourself have supplied me with an answer to  
 this severe charge----“ [e] One sees that he foresaw  
 “that it would be esteemed a bold affirmation.”----

Yes; and one sees a great deal more. One sees that  
 it *must* be so esteemed by every reader who considers  
 the terms in which it is conveyed. One sees that  
 his Lordship esteemed it and called it a proposition,  
 which he is [f] *BOLD to affirm.* One sees that he

[c] Doct. of G. p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 54. [d] Lett.  
 p. 8. Dub. Ed. p. 127. [e] Ibid. [f] Doct. of G.  
 p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 55.

speaks with complacency at least, if not with some degree of triumph, of the *many paradoxes* [g] *which he hath had the odd fortune to advance*. One sees then, that in speaking of his *learned labours*, I have but adhered to his Lordship's own expressions, and assented to his own opinion. Had I *unnecessarily* exposed what he was studious to conceal as a defect in his writings, this might have been called *invidious* and *ungenerous*. But surely I may be allowed to mention a particular which he himself avows, and which is in itself no matter of objection. If his Lordship hath advanced and *proved* his paradoxes, he hath been engaged in the noblest and most useful employment of a man of letters, that of overturning popular errors. At least there is *small hurt done* (as you express it [b]) *by the boldness of his principles* (and still less by calling them *bold*) *provided they turn out truths*.

Now in order to throw some light on that part of your criticism, which is spent in proving that the paradox above-mentioned *turns out* TRUTH, (if I still persevere in calling it a paradox, I have the additional support of your own authority) it will be necessary for me to state his Lordship's manner of confirming it, and to point out the particulars in which I apprehend, and have endeavoured to shew, that his reasoning is invalid.--It is evidently founded on what I call his *first and grand principle*, of "the *abundant sufficiency* of the *terms only* of a "language, *congruously* used, for conveying *clear intelligence*." And this is what I have said to be

[g] Doct. of G. p. 51. Dub. Ed. p. 64. [b] Lett. p. 9. Dub. Ed. p. 127.

—“such as no critic or grammarian can admit;” though in page 20 you have represented me so inattentive to his Lordship’s reasoning, as to call the *conclusion* of his theory, the *first* and grand *principle* whence he deduces his conclusion.

His Lordship’s whole reasoning is thus collected (and I hope fairly) in chap. 15. p. 81, 82, of the *Dissertation*.

“Language,” saith the learned Bishop, “consists  
 “of two parts, 1. Single terms, which are arbitrary.  
 “2. Phrases and idioms, which arise insensibly from  
 “the manners, customs, and tempers of those to  
 “whom the language is vernacular. When illiterate  
 “men would acquire the knowledge of a foreign  
 “tongue, they make it at first their only study to  
 “treasure up in their memory the signification of  
 “the terms; and when they come to talk or write  
 “in the speech thus acquired, their language is full  
 “of their own native idioms. If we suppose this  
 “foreign tongue to be instantaneously infused, the  
 “effect must be the same. Divine inspiration can  
 “only convey the terms and single words of one  
 “language corresponding to those of another. For  
 “an impression of phraseology or idiom requires a  
 “previous one of the tempers, fashions, and opinions  
 “of the people to whom the language is native,  
 “upon the minds of them to whom it is imparted.  
 “But this would be a waste of miracles without  
 “sufficient cause. For the terms of one language  
 “adapted to the idiom of another, abundantly  
 “serve the purpose of giving CLEAR INTELLI-  
 “GENCE,”

I begin



I begin [i] with examining this last proposition; and my first objection is, that it supposes what is not universally true, that the terms of one language *can* be expressed by corresponding terms in another. I say this is evidently supposed in his Lordship's argument. Turn to the following words of your own quotation. " [k] The divine impression must be "made either by fixing the terms or single words "only in the memory; as for instance, *Greek terms* "corresponding to the Syriac or Hebrew [terms]."—It is but to imagine the argument here interrupted by my *short question*—"But shall we always find "corresponding terms?" And you may not only comprehend the drift of it, but be furnished with an answer to two short questions of your own, " [l] Where does the Bishop say we shall? Or how "was it to his purpose to say it?—It is evidently implied in these few lines taken from his Lordship's argument. And it was to the purpose of his argument that it should be implied. For, if I point out a method of conveying clear intelligence, as amply sufficient for the purposes of Divine Wisdom, as the *only* method which can be pursued without a needless waste of miracles, surely it is necessary to suppose that this *only* method is in no one case whatever inconsistent with the nature of language. If a philosopher were to assign any cause as sufficient to produce any particular phenomenon, and as the only one by which it could be produced consistently with the nature of things; and if he were asked, Does this cause *always* exist? His vindicator might say, "He could not, for his life, apprehend the drift of

[i] Diff. p. 82. Dub. Ed. p. 89. [k] Lett. p. 12.  
 Dub. Ed. p. 130. [l] Lett. p. 15. Dub. Ed. p. 132.  
 K. 2 "this

"*this question.*" He might ask, "Hath he said that  
 "it does?" or, "How was it to his purpose to say  
 "it?" And yet if the question be not clearly an-  
 swered in the affirmative, we know what must be-  
 come of his hypothesis.----But the learned Prelate  
 himself hath much more reason to be offended at  
 this part of your criticism, than the author of the  
*Dissertation*. "He does indeed speak," you say,  
 "[*m*] of *such a correspondency of terms, as shall*  
 "*abundantly serve to give clear intelligence.*" And  
 this is ALL he had occasion to say.----Observe then  
 how the argument will stand upon the substitution  
 of your own words (for they are not his Lordship's)  
 ----"An impression of the idiom or phraseology of a  
 "language would be a waste of miracles without a  
 "sufficient cause: for----*such* an adaption of the  
 "terms of one language to the idiom of another, *as*  
 "shall *abundantly serve to give clear intelligence*, is  
 "*abundantly sufficient* for every useful purpose of  
 "divine inspiration; all which centered in *giving*  
 "*clear intelligence*," i. e. WHAT IS SUFFICIENT, IS  
 SUFFICIENT.

You best know what liberties you may take with  
 the noble writer. I on my part should have thought  
 it exceedingly disrespectful, as well as unjust, to  
 have represented him as reasoning in this manner,  
 even though a casual expression had given some  
 plausible pretence for such representation. But there  
 is not the least ground for it: nor doth his Lord-  
 ship say one word of what you have made him say:  
 and for this I appeal to your own quotation of his  
 whole argument.

[*m*] Lett. p. 15. Dub. Ed. p. 132.

"Well!

“ [n] Well! but an exact correspondency of terms is material. To what? To give clear intelligence? But if this be true,” &c.---By the manner in which this position is stated, one would imagine that it had been extracted from the *Dissertation*. But happily for me, it is neither affirmed nor implied in any one thing which I have offered against his Lordship’s reasoning. I say *happily*, because you have taken more pains to confute it than such a position deserved, and indeed not without success. If a correspondency of *words* with *words* be the only way in which divine inspiration can enable a speaker to convey intelligence, it is *material* that the nature of language should always admit of such a correspondency. But where have I asserted that it is *material for giving clear intelligence*? In treating of this part of his Lordship’s argument I have confined myself to shewing what was NOT *sufficient*, not what was necessary or *material* for this purpose. Nor have I any where assigned that as a condition *always necessary* to clear intelligence, which I have expressly affirmed is *sometimes impossible* to be obtained. I have not therefore the least concern with your judicious observations on TRANSLATION, for whatever purpose they might have been introduced. I do not (with Doctor Middleton) assign any powers to an inspired language superior to those of human speech. I do not pretend that, supposing the language of the Sacred Writings to have been miraculously infused, it must have the purity of *Plato*, or the eloquence of *Cicero*. Instead of affirming this, I affirm the direct contrary; and hence have concluded that it could



not have been the language either of the philosopher or the orator. --- But as this part of your criticism does not *affect*, so I am comforted to find that it is not *levelled* against any thing in the Dissertation. It is an answer to what you are pleased to declare I *will say* [e]. But I hope to be excused, if I confine myself to the defence of what I *have said*, what I *have assumed*, or what I *have supposed*. A critic may form what strange positions he pleases, and may call them mine: he may attack them with the utmost fury, and gain the most decisive victory. But I presume it is not at all incumbent upon me to give the least interruption to his career.

I proceed therefore to my second objection to his Lordship's idea of the inspiration of *terms ONLY*, with their grammatical *congruity*. And it is this, that "terms only, congruously used, are insufficient for the purpose of Divine Wisdom, *as the real purport of almost every sentence in every language is not to be learned from the signification of detached words, and their grammatical congruity, even where their signification may be expressed by corresponding words in another language* [p]." This, as you observe [q], I have endeavoured to prove. Let us see then how you have proceeded to shew that these endeavours have been fruitless; and I shall not willingly omit any one particular of all that you have advanced.

You begin with declaring, "that you cannot comprehend the pertinence of what you are pleased to

[e] Lett. p. 16. Dub. Ed. p. 133. [p] Diff. p. 82. Dub. Ed. p. 89. [q] Lett. p. 19. Dub. Ed. p. 135.

"call

"call my *learned* comment on the text of Cicerō's  
"letter to SERVIVS [r]."

If it be a *learned* comment, this is entirely beside my intentions. I meant it only as a *familiar* illustration; conceiving it to be a fair trial of his Lordship's method of conveying clear intelligence, to make the experiment on the first passage that occurred in the first author that came to hand. My *comment* then consists in shewing, that the sense of this short letter could not be conveyed to an *English* reader by using the terms of his own language, *congruously*, without deviating from the *Roman* idiom. You answer, that "you cannot comprehend the  
"pertinence of this:" an assertion which I cannot contradict.

In the next place you *affirm*, that "[s] a knowledge of the *terms* of a language, with that of their  
"grammatical *congruity*, would *methinks* enable a  
"writer to express himself *for the most part* intelligibly."---To this I answer, by *affirming* that I have proved the contrary: and that if this were true, yet METHINKS is of little service, where the question is what is *certain* and *demonstrable*; and FOR THE MOST PART is scarcely to the purpose, when we are enquiring what is ABUNDANTLY SUFFICIENT.

Thirdly you declare, that whereas "[t] his Lordship speaks of *terms ONLY* in opposition to *phraseology*, I seem to speak of *terms only* in opposition:

[r] Lett. p. 17. Dub. Ed. p. 134. [s] Ibid. Ibid.  
[t] Lett. p. 18. Dub. Ed. p. 135.

"to systematic congruity."---But as I really do not so speak; as I have declared that I do not, as you have quoted my declaration, and as you instantly retract your objection, it is not necessary to take any further pains to obviate it. But I cannot entirely pass over the reason on which you found it, and represent me as seeming to speak contrary to my express words.---"*Otherwise, I know not what to make of all you say,*" &c.---Such insinuations, frequently repeated, may indeed serve to persuade a cursory reader that there is something perplexed, inconsistent, or unintelligible in an argument, which he may not take the trouble of examining. But surely, Sir, it would have done more honour to the candor of your criticism, if you had shewn, or attempted to shew, that my reasoning *is* unintelligible, unless I be supposed to mean one thing, and to express another.

Your next objection is, that "I have endeavoured to prove my position by a *decent* instance from my country-man SWIFT [*u*]."---It is but too plain, that by *decent* you mean the direct contrary. I must therefore remind you, Sir, that my illustration offends in no particular, but that of not being quite grave and solemn. I have borrowed another of the same kind from another eminent countryman [*w*]. And if the learned and excellent Prelate thought it not inconsistent with decorum in a very serious and important debate; if he found it impossible to be always grave in contending against certain points; enough for me, that I have not betrayed greater

[*u*] Lett. p. 19. Dub. Ed. p. 135. [*w*] Diff. p. 84. b. Ed. 92.



levity than the man to whom a good judge ascribed every virtue under heaven.---And if I have the mortification to find that you are prepared to object to my proofs and illustrations, of whatever kind they may be; if, when taken from the grave writings of an antient, then *my learning expatiates*; if from the triflings of a modern, they are *indecent*; I am, on the other hand, comforted, by finding nothing offered to prove that they are not pertinent and decisive.

I come now to your objection to another of my instances given in a literal translation from a sacred writer [x], in order to shew that "the terms of one language, accommodated to the idiom of another, cannot convey clear intelligence." "It is true," you say [y], "In this instance I do not confine myself to the strict observance of *grammatical congruity*." "If I had done this, it would have appeared from my own instance, that *intelligence* might have been given, and with *tolerable clearness* too, even in a literal version."

Be pleased now, Sir, to recollect, that for the greater number of *syntactical* rules in every language concerns its *idiom*. This is justly observed by the learned Bishop. "What grammarians call *congruity*," saith he [z], "is more concerned in *this* part, [*i. e.* "idiom"] than in the *other*," [*i. e.* the use of single terms.] Accordingly his Lordship declares, that [a] *what was inspired was the TERMS, together with*

[x] Diss. p. 84. Dub. Ed. p. 92. [y] Lett. p. 19. Dub. Ed. p. 135. [z] Doct. of G. p. 42. Dub. Ed. p. 56. [a] Ibid. p. 44. Dub. Ed. p. 57.

THAT *grammatical congruity in the use of them which is dependent THEREON, i. e. on the use of the detached terms, or the accommodation of them to a foreign idiom.* This is what his Lordship hath declared is *abundantly sufficient* for conveying clear intelligence: and this is what is *strictly* adhered to in the translation from the sacred writer; which you *acknowledge is not sufficient*; and that to make it even *tolerably* clear, I should, instead of confining myself to those syntactical rules which respect the *terms only*, have proceeded to conform to the rules of *Roman* idiom. So that the method you have here chosen of vindicating the noble author, is neither more nor less than a direct *concession*, that to speak a language so as clearly to be understood, it is *not sufficient* to use *only* the *terms* of it according to the rules of *their* grammatical congruity, or in other words, that it is necessary to conform in general to the phraseology of that language, the very point for which I have contended, and which his Lordship hath denied.

But although you are thus obliged to give up that principle, which I have said, and you now find with good reason, that *no critic or grammarian could admit*, I mean the *abundant sufficiency* of *terms only* for conveying *clear intelligence*; yet still you are inclined to try the force of *other principles*, in order to support the Bishop's idea of inspiration, as conveying the *TERMS ONLY*.—Now, though the sole question in which I am concerned is, whether his Lordship's conclusion can be fairly deduced from *his own*

prin-

principles, as formerly delivered, yet I shall venture still further to try the strength of the *new* argument now brought to supply their defects. And as well as I can collect it, it stands thus.

“Instruction cannot indeed be conveyed by the  
 “*terms* of a *language*, without a competent know-  
 “ledge of its *phraseology*. But this is an inconveni-  
 “ence which inspiration itself could not remedy.  
 “For suppose that, as well as the *terms*, the phrase-  
 “ology or *idion* of the language were also inspired  
 “to the greatest perfection; still this idiom would  
 “be as strange and obscure to *those who are strangers*  
 “to the language, as any other. --- And therefore ---  
 “in order to give clear information in this language  
 “to *those who are NOT strangers to it*, inspiration  
 “can only convey a knowledge of the *terms* or *single*  
 “*words*.” --- But to obviate all suspicion of unfair  
 representation, I shall quote the passage at large from  
 your Letter.

“[*b*] Be it allowed, that if the *terms* of one  
 “language, even though a congruous construction  
 “be observed, be constantly and strictly adapted to  
 “the *idioms* of another, the expression will still  
 “many times be very dark and obscure: how is this  
 “obscurity to be prevented?” ---

Very easily! Nothing more being necessary than  
 that *competent knowledge of idiom*, which you allow

[*b*] Lett. p. 19. Dub. Ed. p. 136.



to be necessary for conveying clear instruction in any language.

---“ Take what language you will for the conveyance of instruction, *it will be necessary* for the reader or hearer to gain *a competent knowledge of its idioms* and phraseology, before he can receive the full benefit of it. So that unless there had been a language in the world native to all nations, and in the strictest sense of the word universal, I see not how inspiration itself could remedy this inconvenience.”—

The merciful Author of every *good and perfect gift* DID remedy this inconvenience in a wonderful manner. Instead of appointing any one of the various languages of the earth for the conveyance of divine truths, and which mankind was obliged to study, he enabled the *ministers and stewards of his mysteries* to speak with DIVERSE tongues, so as to dispense them to every hearer in *his own* native language without difficulty or obscurity; but what arose from the grandeur of the subject, not their incompetent knowledge of the language. And when the apostles *addressed themselves to the work of composing books for the instruction of the faithful*, it was ordained that these should be rendered into all the languages of all the tribes and nations of believers.—But to return to your argument.

---“ Suppose, as I said before, that the inspired language in which the apostles wrote had been the  
“ purest

“ purest Greek, still its *idiomatic phraseology* had  
 “ been as strange, to *all such* to whom that language  
 “ was *not native*, as the *Syriac* or *Hebrew* idioms, by  
 “ which the apostolic Greek is now supposed to be so  
 “ much darkened.”

By *all such to whom a language is not native*, I must suppose you mean *those to whom it is strange and unknown*. Else, the position is not true. (For instance, I am not so great a stranger to the *French* as to the *Chinese* idiom, though the *French* be not my *native* language.)----Observe then the sum of your whole argument: “ The idiomatic phraseology  
 “ of *one* STRANGE language, is equally obscure to  
 “ the hearer with that of *any other*, equally  
 “ STRANGE,----And therefore, when the Divine  
 “ Power enables a speaker to convey instruction to  
 “ this hearer, in his NATIVE language, it must be by  
 “ accommodating the *terms* of it to *one or other* of  
 “ these *strange idioms*.”

Suppose I had reasoned against his Lordship's idea of inspiration exactly in the same manner.----“ Be it  
 “ allowed, that the words of a language adapted to  
 “ a foreign idiom be sufficient for speaking it clearly  
 “ and intelligibly: yet what will this avail? Unless  
 “ the words were the same in all languages, there  
 “ must be still an inconvenience which even inspira-  
 “ tion could not remedy. Take the terms of what  
 “ language you will for the conveyance of instruction  
 “ to those *who understand them*, and suppose them  
 “ possessed by the speaker most accurately and per-  
 “ fectly ;

“fectly ; still these terms will be as unintelligible to those *who do not understand them*, as any other terms whatever *which they do not understand*.”--- Had I reasoned in this manner (and I boldly appeal to the reader whether it be not your own manner) I presume, Sir, I could not have been deemed worthy of your *criticism*.

And now we have seen the arguments from whence you CONCLUDE, that “nothing [c] said by me affects the learned Prelate’s notions of divine inspiration, as conveying *only the single words of one language*, congruously used, *corresponding to those of another*.” And thus it is that you have SHEWN, that “[d] no critic, who deserves the name, can reasonably object to this principle. As it *allows*”—My situation, it seems, makes it not easy for me to comprehend the force of this untoward particle. [As] : yet presumptuous as it may be, I venture to pronounce that here it must mean *because or inasmuch as*. To proceed then to your reason. “It *allows* all that is necessary to be supposed of an inspired language, its sufficiency to give clear intelligence.”---A disputant *allows* what his antagonist *demand*s or *affirms*. But surely you cannot mean to insinuate that I *demand* or *affirm* what I have expressly opposed? But possibly, as I have not the honour of writing in *England*, I may be again mistaken ; and that *allowing* means *providing for* all that is necessary to clear intelligence. In this case

[c] Lett. p. 20. Dub. Ed. p. 136. [d] P. 21. Dub. Ed. p. 137.

I must



I must answer, that I have proved by arguments, which it now appears that you have not been able to invalidate, that his Lordship's principle does not provide for all that is necessary to this purpose; and that you yourself have acknowledged this, not only by implication, but in the most express terms [e].

Yet still, "the intelligence conveyed by his Lordship's rule for conveying it, in an inspired language, is so clear, that had the idioms of this language been inspired as well as the terms, it could not, in the general view of Providence, who intended this intelligence for the use of all people and languages, have been clearer."

Providence indeed intended this intelligence for the use of all people; that is, the Divine Goodness was pleased to ordain, that the very same truths which were taught to the *Hellenistic Jew* (for instance) in words and phraseology to him well known, should also be conveyed to the *Parthian*, the *Mede*, the *Elamite*, &c. in the native language of each. But from this general view of Providence doth it follow, that he who speaks to the *Hellenist*, or *Parthian*, or *Mede*, or *Elamite*, in an idiom to him unknown, could not be more clearly understood, than if he were to use that of his native language? Let us perplex and torture this subject as we please, still the question now before us is no more than this,

[e] Lett. p. 19, 20. Dub. Ed. p. 135, 136.

"What

"What degree of knowledge in a language is necessary to speak it intelligibly; and in it to convey clear intelligence to those *to whom this language is vernacular?*" (to use the learned Prelate's own expression). And how can this question be elucidated, much less determined, by *informing* us, that it was the intention of Providence, that the truths delivered to one people in their own language, should also be delivered to many others in many other languages: *vernacular to each respectively?*

Having considered the arguments by which you vindicate the Bishop's position, I now proceed to your manner of accounting for my dissent from his Lordship. "[f] My unfavourable sentiments of the Bishop's principle," you say, "arises from my misconceptions of the circumstances, abilities, and qualifications of the apostles, when they addressed themselves to the work of their ministry, and especially to the work of composing books, &c." --- An assertion hazardous at least, because it is impossible to collect from any thing urged by me against what you call the Bishop's principle, what opinions or conceptions I had formed of these particulars. I have indeed asserted, "that we are not to expect such and such qualities in the apostolical writings, EVEN SUPPOSING that the authors received their language by miraculous infusion [g]." But where have I pronounced or insinuated that their language *must* have been either *wholly* or *in part* the effect of such infusion? Or if I had, if my

[f] Lett. p. 21. Dub. Ed. p. 137.  
p. 92. Dub. Ed. p. 101.

[g] Diff.

*conceptions* of some particular matters of fact had been ever so erroneous, how could this affect my reasoning upon a *general* question of criticism? I might have adopted the wildness of IRENÆUS, and contended for the sublime nature of the NUMBER of evangelists; or I might have impiously rejected the canon of the Holy Scriptures for the *Manichean* gospel of St. THOMAS. But such imaginations could not have been the *cause* of my arguing either justly or falsely on the *nature of language*. I say then, that the pains you have taken to rectify my conceptions of the *circumstances of the apostles when they addressed themselves to the work of their ministry*, seem to be unnecessary, as you have not offered the least *proof*, either that my conceptions of this point required to be corrected, or that they at all influenced, or were in any degree connected with the real subject of our debate, which is no more than a *plain question in criticism*, that might as well be determined by an old heathen, as by the ablest theologian or ecclesiastical historian in this or any other age. But I hope to make it appear, that I am more indebted to you for this part of your criticism, than for the mere information of the matter of fact contained in it.

“When the *Greek* language [b],” you say, “was first infused, it would, no doubt be wholly and intirely adapted to the *Hebrew* or *Syriac* idioms.” — Why, no doubt? Because the adaption of terms to a foreign idiom is abundantly sufficient to give

[b] Lett. p. 21. Dub. Ed. p. 137.

clear



clear intelligence to those who are acquainted with the terms only. This is what the Bishop hath asserted; this assertion, you have undertaken to *vindicate*; and to this, though you have repeatedly given it up, you now return.--But mark the very next succeeding Sentence.--“THIS *would render their expression*” [not abundantly sufficient for conveying CLEAR intelligence, but] “*somewhat DARK and OBSCURE to GREEK hearers;*” i. e. to hearers *only* acquainted with the *terms*.---Let our candid readers judge, whether I might not fairly decline all contest with a Critic, who *affirms* and *retracts* in the same breath.---“But then, it would be intelligible enough to “those to whom they first and principally addressed “themselves, the *Hellenistic Jews*, who, though “they understood *Greek* best, were generally no “STRANGERS to the *Hebrew Idiom*.”---What follows from this? Surely nothing more than this plain truth, that when a speaker would be understood, he must not only use such *terms*, but such an *idiom* as his hearers are NO STRANGERS TO. This is what I have contended for: this you are to overturn, as a vindicator of the learned Prelate, who denies it.---And now observe the two grand arguments which you have brought to overturn it.

First, you say, (p. 19.) “that if the hearer is not “acquainted with the *phraseology* as well as the “*terms* of the speaker, he will not understand him. “But what of that? Those who are acquainted “with NEITHER, must find him still more unintelligible.”

Now the argument runs thus " Though a speaker  
" may be obscure to those who are acquainted with  
" his *terms*, but strangers to his *phraseology*. What  
" of that? Those who are acquainted with BOTH,  
" will understand him well enough."

In both these points I have the honour of entirely  
agreeing with you. If they were not evidently of  
no sort of force against any thing advanced by  
me, I might be provoked to call them by the name  
of NEWS, or some such term: But, inoffensive as  
they are, I leave you, Sir, to the free enjoyment,  
and application of them to whatever use or purpose  
you may think proper.

But you are pleased to inform me still further [i],  
" That the Apostles, before they applied themselves to  
" pen the books of the New Testament, might have im-  
" proved themselves in the Greek tongue by ordinary  
" means, so as to be enabled to adapt its *phraseology*  
" to its *idioms*, as you express it.---That this is very  
" *supposeable*."---[k] That they had full leisure and  
" opportunity to acquire a competent knowledge of  
" the native *idiomatic Greek*, abundantly sufficient to  
" answer all ends of clearness and instruction."  
[That competent knowledge which here again you  
confess, in opposition to the Bishop of Gloucester, is  
necessary to answer these ends.]---" And that all this  
" is not only *supposeable* but *certain*, as appears from  
" the difference of their Styles."

[i] Lett. p. 22. Dub. Ed. p. 138. [k] Dub. Ed. Ibid.

Observe

Observe now, the question to be decided is, Whether, *supposing* the language of the New Testament to have been derived from Divine Inspiration, it *must* have such qualities as the Bishop hath pointed out? The business then of his VINDICATOR was, to shew that the *consequences* assigned by him as *necessary upon this supposition*, were fairly deduced from it: *not* that the supposition itself is false. Had his Lordship asserted, that such particular premises, *if true*, necessarily led us to such a particular conclusion, and had I presumed to assert, that his reasoning *arose entirely from misconception*, because these premises were *not true*; I presume I must have been exposed, and very deservedly, to still greater severity than you have expressed against me: And yet thus it is you reason against the *Dissertation*.

But the matter becomes infinitely worse, when we consider that although the *Dissertation* speaks of the Sacred Writings only *hypothetically*, the learned Bishop is *positive* and direct. He *ventures to say*, “[*l*] “That the Style of an inspired writer, who had “not afterwards cultivated his knowledge of the “language on the principles of *Grecian* Eloquence, “would be *precisely such* as we find it in the Books “of the New Testament.” --- “[*m*] JUST SUCH “with regard to its Style WHICH IN FACT WE FIND “IT TO BE.”---Here are express declarations that the language of the New Testament bears the character

[*l*] Doctrine of Grace p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 54.

[*m*] P. 45. Dub. Ed. p. 58.



of a language acquired by miraculous infusion. And this character is, the utmost *rudeness and barbarousness*, &c. --- This is his Lordship's position. And how is it defended? By observing that the language of the New Testament is *not intirely* derived from this miraculous original: that it does *not always equally* display that character of *rudeness*, which, as it was *at first* divinely inspired, and *never* cultivated upon the principles of *Grecian* Eloquence, it *must* have displayed; as this is not only *one certain* mark of inspiration, but the *necessary*, the *only* mark, if it be indeed true that inspiration *MUST* and *CAN* only impress the single words of a language with their signification.

Is this, to *vindicate*!---Or, when his Lordship tells us, that in the *Scripture-Greek, Syriacisms* and *Hebraisms* *must* be constant and perpetual, without a causeless waste of miracles, is this position supported by informing us, that these are *not* constant and perpetual?

But you observe [n], that "his Lordship *accurately* defines the *Scripture* language, as composed of "*Greek words* *VERY FREQUENTLY* delivered in *Syriac* and *Hebrew* idioms; and that this is perfectly consistent with his main principle;" [of the inspiration of *words ONLY*]--- I have often heard, that it is a point of prudence to reserve our *defence* till the *accusation* be first made. If it be *perfectly consistent*, if this definition doth not contradict his *main principle*, I have not misrepresented his Lordship, by

[n] Letter p. 24. Dub. Ed. p. 139.

adhering

adhering to the words of his reasoning, where he states, proves, and concludes in due form, and where I presume his expressions were no less accurate. But if I am mistaken; if by *accurately defining* you mean, that however he may have expressed himself elsewhere, yet this is THE CHARACTER OF AN INSPIRED LANGUAGE by which he abides: that although he declares, that divine inspiration *could only* have imparted *Greek words* to the apostles, yet his real meaning is, that it *did* convey that *competent knowledge* of the *Greek idiom* also, which we affirm, against his Lordship, to be necessary for speaking the language intelligibly: or, as you express it [o], that “the mixture of *Syriasm* and *Hebraisms* is not so constant and perpetual AS TO PREVENT their writings from giving *clear intelligence*.”—What is the amount of all this, but that an inspired language need not be *perfectly pure*? And who hath denied it? If *this* be what is meant by those bold assertions, “that an inspired language *must* abound in every fault that can deform a language; that inspiration *cannot* convey more than the single words of a language;”—I most cheerfully subscribe to them: but have too good reasons for wishing that they had not been exhibited in *features* so severe, that, as a vindicator of the learned Prelate, you have found it necessary not only to *soften* but to *erase* them.

But although you have so repeatedly acknowledged, that his Lordship's principle of “the abundant sufficiency of detached words only for conveying

[o] Ibid.

“clear

“clear intelligence” is utterly indefensible, yet still you contend that detached words only, is (not *all* that inspiration CAN convey, the position which you were to vindicate, and which you have given up, but) “all that we *need suppose* to have been thus conveyed, as the *rest* would be competently obtained by ordinary means.”---[p] That is, in other words, “although the impression of the single terms of any language with their *congruity* and signification would not have enabled the Apostles to preach the Gospel in that language, yet it would have been a foundation for their acquiring a sufficient knowledge of it by natural means, so as at length to have been enabled to speak it with abundant clearness; and therefore it is REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE, that divine grace assisted them thus far, and no further.”

A *reasonable* SUPPOSITION, contradicted by the WORD OF TRUTH itself, which expressly informs us, that the operation of divine grace *was* more extensive. [q] *Ευσημος Λόγος* is St. Paul's character of a language acquired by immediate inspiration, a language *easily, readily, and clearly* to be understood. You see then that the single question is, what qualities a language should have in order to be *Ευσημος, abundantly clear*? You see too, that when on this question you had once *deserted* the Bishop, and agreed with me, there was no more room for *vindication*. And you see, that this your *supposition* is in itself VAIN. For we read, that when the Apostles

[p] Lett. p. 24, 25. Dub. Ed. p. 140. [q] 1 Cor. c. xiv. v. 9.



were filled with the Holy Ghost, *in that very moment* they began not only to speak clearly *in divers tongues*, but [r] *Ἀποθυσίασας*, which commentators unite in explaining *præclare, sententiosè, mirifice loqui*. The numerous assembly of all nations not only heard them pronounce the *words* of their respective languages, but *understood the subject* of their discourse; *τα μεγαλεια τε Θεου*; and were astonished not only at this their sudden power of *utterance*, but at the sublime and marvellous *things* which they delivered.

I am now led to that part of your letter, wherein you are pleased to accuse me, of *cavilling* at an incidental observation of his Lordship, as well as of *strange misrepresentation* [s]. CAVILLING is the most odious and contemptible fault a writer can be guilty of. And though I should despise the charge, when made by some mean CRITICAL remarker, whose babbling absurdity was beneath my notice, yet when brought by YOU, I cannot but be impatient to clear myself.

Whether the observation you mention be *incidental* or not I shall not dispute. The Bishop hath made it a part of his grand argument: and at least it was no breach of candor not to have passed it by unnoticed. I shall quote the observation which I am charged with misrepresenting, as it is stated in the *Dissertation*, and as you yourself have stated it in your *Letter*.

[r] Aët. ii. 4. Dub. Ed. p. 140, 141.  
p. 25, 26, 27.

[s] Lett.

In the DISSERTATION,  
p. 82. D. E. p. 89.

“ An impression of  
“ phraseology or idiom  
“ requires a previous one  
“ of the tempers, fashi-  
“ ons, and opinions of  
“ the people to whom  
“ the language is native,  
“ upon the minds of  
“ those to whom it is  
“ imparted.”

In the LETTER, p. 27.  
D. E. p. 142.

“ What the Bishop af-  
“ ferts is, that the im-  
“ pression of the phrases  
“ and idioms of an in-  
“ spired language implies  
“ a previous impression  
“ of the tempers, fashi-  
“ ons, and opinions of  
“ the people to whom  
“ the language is native,  
“ upon the minds of them  
“ to whom the language  
“ is thus imparted.”

Your own comment upon this assertion is conceived in these very words. “ THAT IS, if a *knowledge* of  
“ the idioms had been *impressed*, a *knowledge* of the  
“ customs and manners, from which those idioms arise,  
“ and *without a knowledge of which they could not*  
“ *be understood*, must have been impressed likewise.”

—— Surely then, I have not misrepresented his Lordship, by stating and interpreting his observation precisely as you have done! It supposes, I have said,  
“ [i] that the knowledge of the idiom of any language  
“ implies a previous knowledge of the customs and man-  
“ ners of those to whom it is vernacular.” Nor have  
you, Sir, nor hath his Lordship said any thing less  
than this, or any thing different from this. Nor

[i] Dissert. p. 86. Dub. Ed. p. 94.

L

could

could my reasoning have *looked* more *directly* at his Lordship's argument, than by shewing, in the first place, that *this is not universally true* ; of that the knowledge of *one* doth not *always* imply a knowledge of the other. You desire me to inform you where the Bishop asserts that it does. — In these words (turn to page 44 D. E. p. 57 of his *Doctrine of Grace*) — “ Phrase or idiom arises from and is dependent on those manners, and *therefore* the force of expression *can* be understood *ONLY* in proportion to the knowledge of those manners.”

“ The Bishop,” you say [u], “ is speaking of *super-natural impression*, I, of *natural knowledge*.” — But hath not his Lordship declared expressly, that “[w] the *operation* is the same in both, and the *effect* the same ; and that they differ only in the mode of operating ? Why should a preternatural impression of idiom require a previous one of manners ? The learned Prelate and you have both repeatedly assigned the reason : “ Because the one cannot be understood without a knowledge of the other,” *i. e.* the knowledge of *idiom* always implies a previous knowledge of *manners*. [x] WHO SAYS THAT IT DOES ? Can this be a question now ? Are not his Lordship's ; are not your own repeated declarations *clear and express* ? — “ We may come to know the idioms of language without a divine impression.” — Very TRUE ! But may we in any case *come to know* them in the natural way, without first *coming*

[u] Lett. p. 28. Dub. Ed. p. 143. [w] Doct. of G. p. 43. Dub. Ed. p. 56.

[x] Lett. p. 27. Dub. Ed. 142.



*to know* the manners of those who use them? —  
 If your answer be, that *we cannot*; what is this  
 but to affirm, that the knowledge of one always re-  
 quires a previous knowledge of the other? If you  
 say *we can*, I answer, that the same knowledge may  
 also be *miraculously* impressed, without a previous  
 impression of manners: As the operation and effect  
 are confessedly the same in both, and no previous  
 condition is required for receiving knowledge by divine  
 inspiration, which is not necessary for acquiring it  
 by natural means.

Suppose I should assert, that the miraculous gift  
 of Tongues could not be received by any man who  
 had not previously received the *Tonsure*: I am an-  
 swered thus: "The assertion is hazardous. We  
 " know that this is not a necessary condition for  
 " acquiring languages in the natural way; why then  
 " should it be previously necessary for receiving the  
 " knowledge of them by immediate impression?" —  
 Would this be CAVILLING? Or would this answer  
 be invalidated by saying that it LOOKED ASKEW at  
 my position?

The learned Prelate hath asserted, that the im-  
 pression of the idioms of an inspired language implies  
 a previous one of *manners*, &c. *because* these idioms  
 cannot be understood without such a previous im-  
 pression. To this I answer, that the reason here  
 assigned is not *universally* true; that a knowledge  
 of idiom does not *always* require a previous know-  
 ledge of manners; that there are instances of phrase-

ology in every language as arbitrary, and as inexplicable from customs or manners as the detached terms themselves: that where phrases have obviously arisen from customs or manners, even the general import of these may be *learned*, and of consequence may be immediately *impressed*, without a previous knowledge of those customs, &c. And that the knowledge of idiom is so far from implying or requiring a previous one of manners, &c. that the very converse of this seems to be the safer principle, and that tempers and manners are not to be learned without some degree of previous acquaintance with the peculiarities of a language [y].

The conclusion I deduce is, that since this is the case in the acquisition of languages, by *natural* means, it is hazardous to assert with the learned Prelate, that, in that of *miraculous* inspiration, the impression of idiom requires a previous impression of manners.——And whether this be *cavilling* or *reasoning*, whether it be pointed *directly* at his Lordship's position, or *beside* it, let our readers determine. What you have urged against it I shall fairly lay before them in the full force of your own expression.

First, you say [z], "I entrench myself behind a *distant* and *secure* conclusion: And, to prove this, you quote an incidental part of my PREMISES, which is indeed not expressed in a peremptory and magisterial manner; for which I take all the shame that is due to me.

Secondly, you affirm, that "the tempers and man-

[y] Dict. 7. 88. Dub. Ed. p. 95.

[z] Lett. p. 28. D. E. p. 143.  
ners

ners of a people are not to be learned without some degree of previous acquaintance with the peculiarities of their language, *is a proposition exceptionable enough, but that you are in no humour to contest it [a].* — An ARGUMENT which, I presume, you will not think it necessary for me to answer.

Thirdly, you object to this proposition, that it *suggests some pleasant ideas [b]*. Now, though I am so unfortunately dull, as not to form the least conception of those *pleasant ideas* which it hath suggested to you, yet possibly it may have suggested very *pleasant* ones. For there is no proposition ever so *true* and *reasonable* but what a man of lively wit and fancy may turn into ridicule. You say that *Ridicule* is a species of *Eloquence [c]*. — Out with your pleasantry then, in all its force and poignancy; and without the least discomposure my answer shall be in your own words; I LEAVE THIS YOUR ELOQUENCE TO MAKE WHAT IMPRESSION UPON THE GENTLE READER IT MAY [d].

And thus have I minutely examined the first part of your Letter, which is employed in *vindicating* his Lordship's *character of an inspired language*. In which you say, "that you have *at least* shewn that his character *may be* a just one [e], notwithstanding any thing objected to it." — Let us suppose for a moment that this were true; that you had not repeatedly acknowledged his Lordship's opinions to be indefensible; that I had in no one instance offered

[a] Lett. p. 29. Dub. Ed. p. 143. [b] P. 29. Dub. Ed. Ibid.  
[c] P. 57. Dub. Ed. 166 [d] P. 34. Dub. Ed. 147. [e] Lett.  
p. 29. Dub. Ed. 143.



any thing to invalidate any one of your arguments ; still you have (and you confess it) been not very fortunate in your task of *vindication*. For you say that you have shewn, what (I will not say is nothing to the purpose, for it) is a direct subversion of the Bishop's grand position. He (as you observe) *batb told us, what the character of an inspired language MUST NEEDS be*. You have endeavoured to shew, that *this MAY BE a just one*. What *may be*, it is commonly observed, *may also possibly not be*. And, if it *may not be*, it is inconsistent to *assert* and impossible to *prove, that it MUST NEEDS be*.

I know there is a ready answer to all this. Nothing more is necessary than to observe, that *here my reasoning grows exceedingly logical*. But, alas, Sir, I have no claim to indulgence, but from my candid endeavours to reason as *logical'y*, that is, as *accurately*, as I can. Great Geniusses best know what liberties they may safely take. But to attempt to answer an argument, by the help of a few invidious words, as *learned, decent, logical, cavil, news, &c.* would be most unpardonable presumption in a PRIVATE SCHOLAR.

I now proceed to your examination of what I *seem*, you say, *to intend* by way of argument against another tenet of his Lordship, *viz.* that *ELOQUENCE is NOT congenial and essential to human speech*: passing over for the present your heavy charge of *Enthusiasm, airy flights* [*f*], &c.

And, first, you say, that, *in opposition to this tenet*, I have applied myself to shew, through several chapters, *what nobody denies*,——and——that *by some unlucky mistake*, I have intirely MISREPRESENTED the scope and purpose of all the Bishop has said on the subject of Eloquence [g].——You say, that *this is clearly seen from your examination of the Bishop's Theory, compared with my reasonings upon it*.——Allow me then to say a few words to the *first* part of these *my reasonings* and then I shall proceed to your *examination*.

When his Lordship was pleased to assert, that eloquence is not essential to language, but merely *arbitrary* and fantastical, the first thing incumbent upon me was, as I apprehend, to endeavour to collect from his reasoning what particular sense he affixed to this general word ELOQUENCE; or, as you express it, *to gain a precise idea of the SUBJECT of this proposition*. This was my first care. And it appeared to me, that by eloquence he could not mean mere *rhctorical artifice*; because, as I observe [b], he was too able and judicious a writer, not to see at once that his position in this sense could not answer to the purpose for which it was introduced. It also appeared that his Lordship had expressly attributed the epithets *arbitrary, variable, unessential, &c.* to *every thing* in speech which exceeded the bounds of *philosophical clearness* and *grammatical precision*. What hath his Lordship declared *not* to be *congenial* and *essential*? EVERY THING in speech beyond these bounds. What then

[g] P. 35. Dub. Ed. p. 148.

[b] Introd. p. 5.

can we suppose to have been included in his Lordship's idea of eloquence different from this, or less than this? Or, what advantage must I have given to you, Sir, who have looked through my argument with an eye so piercing, if I had not fixed my attention most exactly on that line which his Lordship hath himself drawn between that which is *positive, congenial, and essential*, and that which is *arbitrary, casual, and fantastical* in human speech? It was a *strict attention* then to the position of the learned Prelate, which *obliged* me to begin with considering ELOQUENCE in its *general* acceptation, as including all those modes of address which are *not confined* to the bounds of clearness and precision, but are principally intended to influence and persuade, by exciting passion or emotion. Or, what was I to have proved, but that which his Lordship denied? *viz. that all these modes, usually called e'loquent, were essential to speech: that our passions and affections have their peculiar forms of expression of the same kind in all language, though sometimes differing in the degree of boldness and vehemence: that they owe their origin neither to art nor refinement, but are in themselves the real, natural, and necessary result of real emotion. All this [i], you say, is what nobody denies.* Then, sir, unless it can be proved that ELOQUENCE is something different from those *forms of speech* which *are*, and which *only* are ELOQUENT, you do acknowledge that I have established my position.

[i] Lett. p. 35. Dub. Ed. p. 148.

“ But



" But that all this is nothing to the scope and purpose of what the Bishop hath said on the subject of eloquence, appears," you say, from your " brief examination of his theory." — Proceed we then to this examination.

" The position, *that eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech*, SUPPOSES, says the Bishop, that *there is some certain archetype in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is to be formed and modelled.* — But no such archetype has been assigned. — Permit us then to attend to the reasoning by which he undertakes to prove that no such archetype does or can exist."

With all my heart ! and you have reduced it to the smallest compass imaginable. These are *your own words* (p. 37.) — " The Bishop asserts, that there is no archetype, BECAUSE eloquence is a variable thing, depending on custom and fashion, nothing absolute in itself, but relative to the fancies of men," &c.

Take then the sum of the whole argument as you have represented it.

" Eloquence is not essential, but arbitrary, &c. *because* there is no archetype of eloquence. — But there is no archetype of eloquence, *because* it is not essential, but, arbitrary."

This is your state of what you call the Bishop's  
L 5 theory.

theory. And now let our readers judge, whether the respect due to his Lordship's reputation and abilities doth not compel me to retort your accusation, and to declare, that you *must* have *entirely misrepresented* the scope and purpose of all that he hath said.

And now to your pressing questions——“ [k] Do “ you know of any [archetype of eloquence] ? Do “ you refer him to any such ? ”——I should make no difficulty of answering these questions directly, if I were first assured in what sense I was to understand this word, or in which of those various senses you yourself have annexed to it. —The Bishop of *Gloucester* declares, that NATURE is the archetype of painting, [l] as this it is which the artist is to imitate and WORK BY. I have asserted, that manners, passions, and affections, have their modes of expression, all natural and necessary, congenial and essential to human speech. And this you say is incontestably true. I have therefore referred to these manners, &c. or, in other words, to HUMAN NATURE, as the real archetype of eloquence, in this sense of an archetype, being *that* which the orator is to *express*, and to which he is to accommodate his modes of speech ; and which accordingly ARISTOTLE directs him to study, and displays before him as the great object on which his attention is to be ever fixed, and which he is to WORK BY. You see then

[k] Lett. p. 36. Dub. Ed. p. 149. [l] Doct. of Gr. p. 66. Dub. Ed. p. 79.

that

that those chapters of my dissertation, which gave you so much offence, are a direct and pertinent answer to his Lordship's demand.

But by an *archetype*, it seems, you mean a particular composition, which may serve as a model for all other compositions: And again—a certain *sort* of composition, the model of all other *sorts*. *Do I know any composition, or any sort of composition, which will pass upon all men under the idea of an archetype!*—Sir, if you had but asked me what sort, or what particular composition I *liked* best, I could only have answered as the great Roman does to the same question, *Rem difficilem, Dii immortales! atque omnium difficillimam quærere videbare.*——But instead of indulging myself in any expression of surprise, I shall only take the liberty to observe, that I cannot possibly allow either of these your ideas of an archetype (which ever you may be pleased to adhere to) as just and accurate, until it hath been proved that there is no archetype of painting, *because* there is no one picture of GUIDO, TITIAN, or RAPHAEL, which can serve as an exact model of *all other* pictures; or no one of the various *sorts* of pictures, whether landscapes, portrait, history, &c. which may pass for an universal model of *all the several sorts*.

[*m*] But you have also used this word in another sense, as including all the *qualities* of speech which give it influence and persuasion, which critics enumerate as parts of perfect eloquence, and which the



orator should study to acquire. "His Lordship shews," you say, "that these are nominal, vague, and capricious. And this is proving that there is no archetype of eloquence." I have on my part endeavoured to shew that they are *not* nominal, that they have their several degrees of excellence independent on caprice or fashion. What is this then, but to assert that there *is* an archetype, and to refer to an archetype of eloquence, taking the word in this his Lordship's acceptation, which is also that of Cicero?

If then I have complied with the Bishop's demand, if I have pointed out an *archetype*, whether we are to understand this word in the sense of the *Greek*, or of the *Roman* critic, and of his Lordship, if this has been the method I have pursued, it still remains to be *proved* that I have *misrepresented* his Lordship's scope and purpose. And now, Sir, what do your triumphant questions amount to?——That I have not used a technical term of various acceptation, or that I have not used it in either of two new senses assigned by you, which you have not adhered to, and which therefore I humbly presume you saw, or at least upon attentive recollection must see, very good reasons for not adhering to.

And now I proceed to his Lordship's enumeration of those qualities which form the *archetypal idea* of eloquence.——I have said that [n]. *it might be observed* (though without insisting on it as a very important objection) *that his* DIVISION *is imperfect*.

[n] Dissert. p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 44.

*and illogical.* To this you answer, "that [o] he  
 " *touches on* eloquence only incidentally ; that it is  
 " not to be supposed that he should amuse himself  
 " with a minute detail of all the several particulars  
 " which go to make up this mighty compound."

——Let it be supposed that the part of his Lordship's treatise, on which we have been employed, is only incidental ; that he has treated the subject of it only incidentally ; and that greater precision would only have served to *amuse*. Yet pardon me, if I am not persuaded that his Lordship's *division* of eloquence was calculated to avoid minuteness and prolixity. And for this reason, because it was in his power, if he had thought it proper, to have been still much less *minute*. The learned Prelate and you know very well that Cicerō hath written a treatise on the *archetypal idea* of eloquence. He hath expressed it in *one short sentence*, the whole of which is contained in, and accordingly is, in another part of his works, reduced to *one single word*: (I shall not offend you by a quotation. I am not now speaking to my *young bearers*. What I allude to is, I am sure, no *news* to you.)——

Nothing more then was necessary than to prove, that the quality expressed by this word, and which includes all others, was nothing real, but merely nominal and fantastical, and the whole fabric of eloquence was at once demolished. If I am asked, why I did not pursue this method, in order to prove the contrary ; I answer, because I thought it necessary to follow the very steps in which his Lord-

ship hath chosen to proceed. If I am accused of prescribing a method of procedure, or of *imposing a task upon his Lordship*, I utterly disavow all such disrespectful intentions. I mean but to shew why I cannot agree with you, that in his division of eloquence into these three parts, PURITY, ELEGANCE, and SUBLIMITY, he hath sacrificed accuracy to *consistency*, when it was in his power to have been far more concise, and no less accurate at least.

But the division of eloquence into these constituent parts, you say, [p] is perfect. though not minute : as, " PURITY includes whatever comes under the idea of custom or grammatical use of speech ; ELEGANCE expresses those *embellishments* which are the effects of ART ; and SUBLIMITY stands for those qualities which are derived from GENIUS or natural PARTS."

As to your definition of PURITY, I have nothing to object to it : that ELEGANCE (as the word is used by rhetorical writers) includes *purity*, appears from the very words of their descriptions and definitions of this quality, as I have fully shewn in the *Dissertation*. But that a word may be made to signify any *qualities*, or any *things*, that a writer pleases, there is undoubtedly no disputing. For instance, were I to assert that HUDIBRAS is a very *sublime* poem, or the TALE OF A TUB a most *sublime* piece of prose, no critic will express the least surprize, when he



is informed that I use *sublimity* for those qualities of a composition which are derived from *parts* or *genius*.

But I must take the liberty to observe, that although you have affixed your own meaning to these terms, and *stretched* them out far beyond their usual extent, they are still too *short* for your purpose. Give your orator the utmost *propriety* of language, the utmost degree of the *embellishing art*, and the greatest extent of *genius* to raise up *vivid ideas*, still you have forgotten JUDGEMENT to *adapt*, without which the others are worse than useless. I might point out other qualities of a good writer or speaker, not reduceable to your three heads; but that I have sufficiently answered your question, *what else is required?*

As to the first of your three qualities, PURITY (for I now come to consider what you have offered against my ideas of them) "*I cannot help resolving it [q].*" you say, "*into usage and custom.*"——I have indeed contended, that it is in all languages universally and invariably founded and regulated on the same principles of *analogy*, *etymology*, and *custom*, or the consent of the learned; and therefore that it is not vague or variable [r].——But "surely  
" this is but saying in other words, *that purity consists in the use of such terms with their multiplied*  
" *combinations, as the interest, the complexion, or the*  
" *caprice of some writer or speaker of authority hath*

[q] Lett. p. 40. Dub. Ed. p. 152.  
Dub. Ed. p. 42, 43.

[r] Diff. p. 38, 39.

" preferred

" *preferred to its equals* ; FOR *equals* they undoubtedly were, till that usage or custom took place [1]."

—— That is, sounds, before they are chosen by consent, formed and modelled into a language, have no natural purity or *propriety* ; and *therefore*, when this consent hath once ascertained their use and application, they have *no propriety*, nor is the use of them regulated by any rule, but the interest, complexion, or caprice of some writer or speaker of authority. —— You, Sir, and in the small circle of my own studies, I have frequently met with writers, who have assumed an authority of making this their rule of propriety. But if I should ask whence a writer becomes of *authority* for pure or *proper* diction, your own answer is express, that whoever pretends to it, " must doubtless conform to usage " and consent." His own interest, complexion, or caprice, cannot then be the rule of propriety, when he himself is obliged to conform to other rules before his authority can be admitted.

Yet still, as words are all equals before usage or " custom hath taken place, purity is a thing arbitrary " enough to justify the Bishop's conclusion, that this " quality is *not congenial and essential to human* " *speech.*"

I hope not ! for then human speech can have no essential quality at all. Be pleased to observe, Sir, to what consequences this your reasoning would lead us in a moment. —— *Clear intelligence* is con-

[1] Lett. p. 40. Dub. Ed. p. 152.

veyed by words, *when* their signification *hath been* once ascertained by consent and custom. Previously to this consent they have no *natural* meaning, no clearness or significance. Therefore these qualities of *clearness*, &c. are arbitrary, and *not* essential to human speech; and if not essential, then *not* necessary in an inspired language, or rather utterly inconsistent, &c. &c.

Now, as no language can be *PURE* before it be a language, so neither can it have *purity*, *clearness*, *ease*, *gracefulness*, and *harmony* united, or, in one word, it cannot be *ELEGANT*, previously to its first formation and establishment by custom and consent.

——But as you have not been pleased to prove that these are not in all languages, the constituent qualities of an *ELEGANT* diction, or that they have not their foundation in truth, reason, and nature, the only thing incumbent on me, instead of repeating what I formerly offered on the subject of *ELEGANCE*, is to answer your objection to it.

It is expressed thus. “ [1] You grow very nice in  
“ your enquiries into the idea of *fancy* and the idea  
“ of *fashion*, and I know not what of that sort. In a  
“ word, you go on defining and distinguishing to  
“ the end of the chapter, in a way that without  
“ doubt, would be very edifying to your young scho-  
“ lars in *Trinity College*, but as levelled against  
“ the Bishop is *certainly* unseasonable and out of  
“ place.”

[1] Lett. p. 40, 41. Dub. Ed. p. 152.



As to the farcaſtical part of this objection (for as ſuch I preſume it was intended) I have already given a general answer to all the raillery or ridicule that I can diſcover in your Letter. I leave it to have its full effect upon the reader, without ſuppoſing or inſinuating, that it is poſſible this ridicule can ever be, in the leaſt, indelicate, or dull, or awkward, or illiberal.——To come to your aſſertion then, that my nicety in defining, &c. is “ certainly unſeaſonable and out of place.”

His Lordſhip is pleaſed to offer a *definition* of Elegance, as containing a *proof* that it is an arbitrary, capricious, and fantaſtical quality. I take the liberty of examining this *definition*, and endeavour to ſhew that it is *no* deciſive *proof* ſince it muſt be reſolved into one of two propoſitions, the firſt of which is no more than an aſſertion of the point to be proved, and the ſecond is *purely* IDENTICAL. This is the ſum of *my* defining and *difſtinguiſhing*. And why is this unſeaſonable? “ BECAUSE *Elegance* “ finally reſolves into ſomething arbitrary, as depending much on fancy and caprice [*u*].”—But I hope, Sir, I may without offence obſerve, that neither your aſſertion nor any aſſertion whatever can be proved by affirming, that *Elegance*, or any quality of ſpeech, is *fanciſul and capricious*, AS it depends on *fancy and caprice*.

And here I muſt take the liberty of obſerving, that you have choſen one particular manner of ar-

[*u*] Lett p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 153.

guing against my positions, which (pardon me) I cannot possibly allow to be in the utmost degree *pertinent* and *decisive*. I mean the frequent use of such forms as these — *I presume to say, I hold, I maintain, every reader will agree with me, no reader will object with you, methinks, in my opinion, my opinion is true* subverts, &c. These, you will find upon an attentive review, make up a very considerable part of your Letter. But these, I say, seem not intirely *pertinent*, because I have never presumed to specify what you do *not* say, what you do *not* hold, what you do *not* opine, &c. Nor can I allow them to be *decisive*, without taking shame to myself for not having originally submitted to an authority, which, however distinguished the Gentleman may be to whom I now address myself, I have good reason to believe is at least as weighty and respectable as his. — This being premised, I proceed to consider what you have offered on the subject of *SUBLIMITY*, the last member of his Lordship's division of *Eloquence*.

“ The Bishop asks, What is *SUBLIMITY* but the  
 “ application of such images, as arbitrary or casual  
 “ connexions, rather than their own native grandeur,  
 “ have dignified and ennobled ?” — You say [w], “ I  
 “ answer this question by asking another, *Whether*  
 “ *Sublimity doth necessarily consist in the application*  
 “ *of images ?* — In justice to myself I am obliged  
 to remind you, that *this is not* my answer. I have  
 said indeed that such a question *might be asked* [x].

[w] Lett. p. 41. Dub. Ed. p. 143. [x] Dissert. p. 45.  
 Dub. Ed. p. 48.

But instead of resting the argument on a matter not unworthy of notice, but not of the utmost moment, I proceed to what I expressly declare [y] is of *more especial moment* to the point in debate; and that is, to shew by many arguments and illustrations that those *images* or *vivid ideas*, or whatever you are pleased to call them which Critics denominate *sublime*, do *not* owe their grandeur, that is, their power of elevating, affecting, and transporting, to fancy, caprice, casual connexions, &c. but have their several degrees of dignity and grandeur, naturally, necessarily, and universally. — Against the force of what I offer upon this head, your argument is this:

[z] “ I MAINTAIN that these bright and vivid ideas: “ are rendered *interesting* to the reader or hearer from “ the influence of ASSOCIATION, rather than of *their* “ *own native dignity and grandeur*: of which I “ could give so many instances, that, for this reason, “ I will only give your *own*, which you lay so much “ stress upon, of the *famous oath by the souls of those* “ *who fought at Marathon and Plataea* [a]: where “ the peculiar ideas of *interest, glory, and venerati-* “ *on*, associated to the *image* or idea of the battle “ of *Marathon* and *Plataea*, gave a sublime and e- “ nergy to this oath of DEMOSTHENES, *by the souls* “ *of those that fought there*, in the conceptions of his “ countrymen, which no other people could have “ felt from it, and of which you, Sir, with all your “ admiration of it, have certainly a very faint con- “ ception at this time.”

[y] Dissert. p. 48. Dub. Ed. 51. [z] Lett. p. 42. Dub. Ed. 154.

[a] Dissert. p. 45. Dub. Ed. 45.



It will appear to any one who takes the trouble of examining, that far from *laying any stress* upon this *instance*, I have but mentioned it casually, and made no use or application of it at all to the proof or illustration of the point now before us. However, as you have certainly chosen it very properly and pertinently, I shall not refuse to join issue with you, upon this very instance.

DEMOSTHENES is enforcing the gallant and glorious conduct of his countrymen, in opposing a bold invader of their liberty—" Shall your unsuccessful "valour be condemned!" exclaims the Orator. " No! by the souls of those our brave countrymen " who fought at *Marathon* and *Plataea*! you have " acted nobly." This you say *had a sublime and energy* in the conceptions of his countrymen. And this sublimity you resolve into *the bright and vivid IDEAS* which it excited. What then were these ideas? National *interest*, you say, and *glory*, and *veneration* of their ancestors. And your position is, that these ideas did not owe their influence to a *native grandeur*; that they had no *natural* power of transporting and affecting; but that the emotions which they excited were merely accidental. — Indeed! Examine your own heart, and revolve what you have seen, or heard, or read. Have those species of action which are called *great* and *glorious* in every language, no *natural* influence upon our minds? Is that rapture of love and admiration which they excite, to be resolved into caprice and accident? The very dispute in which we are now engaged, is a direct proof that the

the interest which we take in the fortune of nations, the transport which we feel from instances of magnanimity and patriot virtue, is *natural* and *universal*. Else why have we ransacked all the records of antiquity? How could we have ever thought or heard of the battle of *Marathon* or *Platæa*? Or how could we be now engaged in a dispute on an allusion to these battles?

But you say, that the violent effect which this passage in DEMOSTHENES had upon his hearers arose “from the peculiar ideas of *glory*, *veneration*, &c. “being accidentally associated with the idea of the “battles of MARATHON and PLATÆA.”—I shall not enquire whether there was any *natural* connection between the idea of the glorious actions of their countrymen and that of the victories obtained by those actions; I will suppose there was not; and I will suppose, that by the *ideas* of *veneration*, &c. you mean the impression or emotion raised by the *objects* of *veneration*, &c. And is not this IMPRESSION *naturally* violent and transporting, because the OBJECT is presented to the mind by an association of ideas, or any accidental cause? A man is reminded by some casual circumstance of the death of his beloved friend, and bursts into a violent passion of grief. But does it follow from hence, that his agitation is casual or *unnatural*? — That I may adhere to the instance before us, I readily agree, that the image or *idea* of the battle of *Marathon* was strictly connected in the mind of an *Athenian* with those of the heroic valour of his ancestors and the glory of his country. But this, far from being the

the *cause* of that rapture which these latter *ideas* raised in his mind, was really the *effect* of it. For he must have frequently reflected with rapture on the great deeds performed at that particular place, before such a connection had been formed at all.

And surely you cannot mean, that the passage in debate amounts to no more than an incidental mention of the battles of *Marathon* and *Platæa*; which by an association of ideas reminded the hearers of the glorious deeds of former times. The very passage itself is an incontestable evidence against such a supposition. It is a lively expression of that rapture which the *speaker himself* felt from those *ideas* of national glory, &c. which he raised in others. *He himself* appeared to be violently transported, and hence principally the violent effect upon his hearers.

Or if your meaning be, that the image or idea of a particular battle fought at a particular place, hath no native dignity, but affects only by association; it is obvious to observe, that the idea raised by *DEMOSTHENES* in the minds of his hearers, was not barely the idea of a particular battle fought at a particular place. He swears not by the *battle of Marathon*, but by *the souls of those who fought at Marathon*. The idea thus raised was, that of a glorious victory, obtained in a glorious cause by the heroic valour of his countrymen. And the real question is nothing more than this, Whether such an idea be naturally grand and elevating, or no?

“ But



“But no other people,” you say, “except the Athenians could have felt the energy of this passage in DEMOSTHENES.”——A people strangers to the history of *Athens* could indeed feel no effect from it. A people not immediately interested in the fortune of *Athens*, though no strangers to the exploits of her citizens, could not be so violently affected by it.——Suppose an *English* Poet were to introduce an animated invocation of the Spirit of WOLFE. It raises a thousand vivid and transporting ideas in his countrymen. A *Prussian*, who knows the history of the late war in AMERICA, feels some part of this transport, though by no means so violently. A *Frenchman* is affected by the passage in a quite different manner. A *Japoneſe*, who we will suppose is only acquainted with the words, receives it with absolute insensibility. Does it follow, that this invocation is not really animated; that it owes its power of affecting to caprice or accident; that it amounts to no more than an incidental mention of the battle of QUEBEC; or that it has no real grandeur, because the image or idea of this battle is not naturally and universally grand and transporting? (which by the way is not true of the idea of any battle.) Or that the impression made by the ideas of national glory, patriot virtue, and an heroic contempt of danger, is merely local and accidental? Is not the emotion of GRIEF natural, because THOMAS is a stranger to the misfortunes of WILLIAM, or WILLIAM not so deeply affected by those of ROBERT as he himself?

Is

Is the effect of an august and grand scene of nature casual and capricious, because not felt by those who have never visited it, by those who are blind, or by those who are inattentive to it?—There are indeed certain previous conditions, some *sine quâ non*, always necessary to prepare and fit us for the impressions of passion, or even those of external objects. Yet still these impressions are *natural* and *universal*, i. e. ALL men, *thus previously circumstanced and fitted*, must feel them *naturally* and *invariably*.

You say, that “ I have *certainly* a very faint conception of the *sublimity* of this passage of DEMOSTHENES.” — To what *precise* degree of rapture and enthusiastic passion it might have exalted his hearers I presume not to determine; nor is it at all necessary. Though to affirm *certainly*, that my conceptions even of this are *very faint*, is to affirm more than you can readily prove. But if you mean, that I have but a faint conception, in general, of those emotions which it excited, those *ideas* of patriot worth, heroic virtue, respect and gratitude to illustrious defenders of civil liberty, the self-complacency and heart-felt satisfaction arising from the consciousness of good and generous actions — If this be your meaning, and it must be, if you adhere to your own declarations, “ that the sublimity of the passage arises “ from the *ideas* which it excited;” my only answer shall then be, that I should have deemed it exceedingly injurious to pronounce so peremptorily, I will not say, upon YOUR understanding, but upon YOUR

M

moral

*moral character*, unless I were supported by the clearest and most incontestable evidence.——But to proceed :

The learned Prelate, in order to establish his position of the *casual*, *arbitrary*, and *local* nature of *SUBLIMITY*, observes, “ that the same expression which in one place had the utmost simplicity, had, in another, the utmost *sublime* [a]” An observation which he illustrates and confirms by “ the various fortune “ of the famous passage in *Genesis*, *God said let there “ be light, and there was light*, so *sublime* in the apprehension of *LONGINUS* and *BOILEAU*; and so *simple* in that of *HUETIUS* and *LE CLERC*.”—To this you are pleased to say [b] *that I answer with much ease, “ that this might well be,”* [viz. an expression which in one place had the utmost simplicity, might have, in another, the utmost sublimity] “ and even in the same “ place :” and that I *CIVILLY* add, “ *That it is a “ point well known to every SMATTERER in criticism, “ that these two qualities are so far from being inconsistent with each other, that they are frequently united by a natural and inseparable union*”

I am compelled to observe, that you have here misrepresented both my *answer* and my *civility*. I have said, that it would be disrespectful to give such *answer*, supported by such a *reason* [c]. I therefore proceed to answer in another manner, not by appealing to every *smatterer* in criticism, but by endeavouring to illustrate and prove my position ; by shewing

[a] Doctrines of G p. 53. Dub. Ed. p. 66. [b] Let. p. 43. Dub. Ed. p. 155. [c] Dissertat. p. 58. Dub. Ed. p. 63.



that it was not invalidated by the dispute between HUET and BOILEAU, upon the passage in *Genesis* quoted by LONGINUS, and that this dispute, as the state of it really appears, from examining the authors themselves, was by no means favourable to his Lordship's principle, though introduced in order to support it [d].——This is the *substance* and the *manner* of my answer. What you have urged against it, I shall now consider.

“ *Simplicity and sublimity may be found together ! I THINK the proposition false, in your sense of it at least* [e].——A kind of argument to which I have already given a general and I hope a satisfactory answer.

——“ *But be it true that those qualities in expression may be found together. What then ? The question is of a passage, where these qualities in the apprehension of great critics, are found SEPERATELY ; the one side maintaining, that it is MERELY SIMPLE ; the other, that it is MERELY SUBLIME.*”

HUET and LE CLERC indeed maintain, that the passage in dispute is merely *simple* in opposition to *sublimity*. But surely, upon recollection, you will retract your assertion, “ that BOILEAU maintains, “ that it is merely *sublime* in opposition to *simplicity*.” If this must be supposed, in order to shew clearly that *the sublime of eloquent expression depends on casual as-*

[d] Dissertat. chap. 11.

[e] Lett. p. 44. Dub. Ed p. 155.

*sociations*, there must be good authority for supposing it. Hear then the very words of the *French* critic.

—“DIEU dise QUE LA LUMIERE SE FASSE, puis  
 “qu'on a joute, ET LA LUMIERE FUT FAITE. Cela  
 “est non seulement sublime, mais d'autant plus sublime,  
 “que les terms en étant fort SIMPLES — ils nous font  
 “comprendre admirablement, &c.”—Again—“D'où  
 “vient donc que cela ne vous frappe point ? Je vais vous  
 “le dire.—Prévenu comme vous l'êtes, que le *style sim-*  
 “*ple* n'est point susceptible de sublime, vous croyez, &c.”  
 —Again—“Les terms que le Prophete y employé,  
 “QUOIQUE SIMPLES, étant nobles, majestueux, con-  
 “venables au sujet, ils ne laissent pas d'être SUB-  
 “LIMES, &c. [f]”

“*Can any thing shew more clearly ?*”—Than  
 what ? Than that which is a gross mistake, and mis-  
 representation ?

The Bishop asserts, that nothing but the *simplicity*  
 of the controverted passage could be perceived by a  
*Jewish* reader ; because it suggested ideas to him  
 familiar ; but that it had a *sublimity* to a *Greek*, as it  
 conveyed ideas of theology to him novel and unfamiliar.

When to this, I answer, that the *grandeur* of ideas  
 is not effaced by familiarity, and that the *Greek* Cri-  
 tic observes this, you say I *cavil* [g]. But have you

[f] BOILEAU, tom. 3. Reflex. x. ou Refutation, &c.

[g] Lett. p. 44. Dub. Ed. p. 155.

made the least attempt to *prove* that the objection is *false* and *frivolous*? You declare, that I was *conscious of the weakness of this part of my answer*.—A mere assertion deserves no other reply than a mere assertion. And therefore I declare, that I *was not*; although I chose to lay the stress of my argument upon a matter of *fact*, rather than a matter of *sentiment* or *feeling*.—I ask, *Whence it comes, that readers to whom the ideas of creation were as familiar as to any Jewish reader, were yet affected by the sublime of this passage?*—[i] You answer, by the influence of *authority*. LONGINUS asserted, that it was sublime; and we believe him.——But whence did LONGINUS acquire this *authority* of dictating to mankind? How comes it, that we have implicitly submitted to *him*? (For even the opposition of HUET and LE CLERC proves to be but verbal, as I have shewn from their own Declarations [k].) And whence is it, that we do not as implicitly submit to some other critics, when they are pleased to inform us what we are to deem sublime? Whence, I say, the submission to this particular critic? who expressly disavows all power of dictating to our taste and feelings: who assures us that we are formed by *nature*, not by critical authority, to a sense of what is grand and beautiful: who tells us, that the decision of *no one man*, of *no particular set of men*, can be the criterion of what is noble and excellent in composition, but the

[i] Lett. p. 45. Dub. Ed. p. 156. [k] See Dissert. chap. 17.



concurrent approbation of all men, of all countries, of all ages, of all manners, tempers, and dispositions.

But I shall pursue your own method, and reserve myself for the examination of your *opinion* of what are called the *principles* of RATIONAL CRITICISM.

[l] You HOLD, that these are *only such as Criticism hath seen good to establish on the practice of Greek and Roman speakers and writers*. They are *rational*, because observed by these writers. And, *vice versa*, Greek and Roman writers are *eloquent*, because they conform to our rules of criticism; as you have declared, p. 48.

This opinion of the mutual power of critics and writers to establish and ennoble each other, *must INDEED overturn the whole structure of my THEORY, IF IT BE A TRUTH*: and therefore I expected to have found it a little better supported than by a simple declaration, *that this is your opinion*, however this declaration may be enlivened with expressions of contemptuous triumph. But, as here, I have no arguments to answer, I must be *bold to tell you*, on my part, not what *I hold*, nor, what is *my opinion*, but what is really and truly the matter of *fact*. And your own favourite authority QUINCTILIAN hath expressed it, as plainly and explicitly as possible.

[m] *Initium DICENDI*, saith he, *Jedit NATURA*. The general modes of *eloquent speech* were taught by *nature*. Hence are derived those expressions of

[l] Lett. p. 46 Dub. Ed. p. 175. [m] Lib. 3. chap. 2.

passion and emotion which are called *eloquent* : which men of genius found by experience to be suited to their purpose of influencing and persuading ; and by use and exercise of those *natural* means were enabled to command the attention, conciliate the regards, inform, delight, and animate the minds of their hearers. And thus they acquired the praise of Eloquence, while as yet CRITICISM was not.

But now, — *Initium ARTIS* [dedit] OBSERVATIO. Men of judgment and reflection *observed* the effects of pleasing and persuasive elocution, in the writers and speakers of renown : noted the means by which they were produced, and founded the rules of *criticism* upon the practice of these writers and speakers : rules not DEvised, *as seemed good*, but DISCOVERED to be *reasonable* in those illustrious examples, who DREW FROM HEAVEN, and supplied the critic from the same source. Criticism is indeed *no farther rational than as it accords to the practice of ancient writers* : but not rational, merely, *because* it accords to their practice (much less are these writers admired, merely *because* they conform to the rules of criticism) : but because *nature* and the great antients are the SAME ; and

— “ To copy NATURE, is to copy THEM.” POPE.

In the case of one species of eloquence, poetry, this is so amply explained in the text and commentary of the celebrated ESSAY ON CRITICISM, that I may be well excused from enlarging on it.

“ Strange !” you exclaim [n], “ that I should not  
 “ see the inconsequence of my own reasoning : the  
 “ Bishop says, that the rules of eloquence are for  
 “ the most part local and arbitrary. No : I say, the  
 “ rules are not local and arbitrary, FOR they were  
 “ held reasonable ones at *Athens* and *Rome*. My ve-  
 “ ry answer shews that they were local and arbi-  
 “ trary.”

Had I indeed reasoned in this manner, perhaps the argument might not have been deemed so intirely inconclusive. PERICLES, LYSIAS, HYPERIDES, DEMOSTHENES, among the *Greeks*, ANTONIUS, CRASSUS, HORTENSIUS, CICERO, among the *Romans*, all practised the same general rules of eloquence, with the same success. The experiment is made in many instances, at different periods, on different audiences ; still the success of these general rules is invariable. It seems then not intirely unreasonable to conclude, that these rules are not merely arbitrary. At least, by what method of arguing we can *hence* conclude that they *are* merely local and arbitrary, I profess myself totally incapable of discovering. — But be pleased to recollect, that the real state of my argument is in substance this [o] ; all the great speakers of *Athens* observed the same general rules, all the great speakers of *Rome* observed them ; all the polished nations of the earth, who ever thought of eloquence at all, have approved them as fit and proper. And now observe your own conclusion from this

[n] Lett. p. 49. Dub. Ed. p. 160.

[o] Dissert. p. 75. Dub. Ed. p. 82.



“ The same general rules of eloquence have been  
 “ approved in *all places* wherever they have been  
 “ examined ; therefore they are merely *local*. They  
 “ have been invariably and universally found by ex-  
 “ perience, and pronounced reasonable and natural.  
 “ And therefore they cannot be reasonable and na-  
 “ tural.” For

“ *These rules*,” you say [o], “ *are no rules at all* in  
 “ such times and places, where a different and PER-  
 “ HAPS a CONTRARY practice [from that of *European*  
 “ writers] *is followed with the same success*.” —  
 Here you have indeed come to the point, and the on-  
 ly point, which, if once established, will confirm  
 your theory beyond the power of controversy. It  
 is not any accidental difference in opinion of what is  
*elegant or finical, sublimity or bombast* ; it is not any  
 national prejudice or partiality, with respect to parti-  
 cular qualities or excellencies of speech, that can  
 prove these excellencies to be merely nominal and  
 capricious : (as hath been explained in the *Disserta-*  
*tion*) [p]. But if you can point out any one man, in  
 any one nation, who hath pleased, animated, and  
 affected his hearers, with all the success of an *Athe-*  
*nian* or *Roman* orator, by methods directly CONTRARY  
 to those of *European* eloquence ; who hath found  
 harshness, dissonance, and rudeness as well calculated  
 to engage the ear, as elegance and harmony ; the  
 display of presumption, ignorance, and vice, as ef-  
 fectual to conciliate the affections, as modest cefe-

[o] Lett. p. 48. Dub. Ed. p. 159.

[p] P. 66, 67. Dub. Ed. 72, 73.

rence, knowledge, and virtue ; who hath elevated the mind by the application of mean and sordid images, and roused the passions by uninteresting objects ; then indeed, the excellencies of composition may be no more than local, capricious, and imaginary. But if no such instance can be pointed out, it is to little purpose to object that such an instance *may* PERHAPS exist,

But the knot, it seems, may at least be cut asunder, by the help of a *necessary qualification* of the Bishop's *general thesis*. ——— “ Hitherto he hath been considering eloquence ONLY SO FAR as it is founded on arbitrary principles and local prejudices.” ——— “ Though his expression had been general, he knew very well that his thesis admitted some limitation, having directly affirmed of the *various modes of eloquence*, not that they were altogether, and in all respects, but mostly fantastical [q].” ——— And this you are pleased to say, “ *I charge upon him as an INCONSISTENCY.*”

Sir, I bring no such charge against him. I use no such harsh expression. I have indeed *acknowledged* (as the laws of candor required) that his Lordship had used such qualifying expressions. And to obviate all suspicion of unfair representation, I was obliged to assign the reasons, why I take no notice of such expressions in the course of my reasoning [r]. ——— First, because his Lordship had not used them, where he states his argument in due form.

[q] Lett. p. 50. Dub. Ed. p. 160. [r] Differ. p. 80. Dub. Ed.

And can this be denied? — Secondly, because his *conclusion* will not admit of them. — And doth he not expressly declare, in what you call [s] *his conclusion from the whole*, that “ what is required “ in the style of an universal law is this, to employ “ the aids of *clearness* and *precision*, the *essential* qualities of language, and to REJECT *all besides*, because ALL BESIDES are *arbitrary*?” — Could I have supposed, consistently with the respect due, I will not say to his Lordship, but to any *private scholar*, that he had concluded thus? “ Because ALL *besides* “ are *only so far* arbitrary *as* they are founded on arbitrary principles, therefore *clearness* and *precision* “ are the *only* qualities of speech which are NOT arbitrary, and which of consequence are to be employed, and ALL *besides* REJECTED.”

This is the reasoning which you ascribe to a great and learned Prelate! — If to dissent from him, and to support my dissent with decency, be to INSULT him, what is this VINDICATION?

But I shall now proceed to consider, how you have further defended his Lordship against this my *insolence*.

He asks [s], “ What is eloquence but a persuasive turn given to the elocution, to supply that inward, “ that *conscious* persuasion of the speaker, so necessary “ to gain a fair hearing?” — In answer to this question, I took the liberty, among other particulars,

[s] Lett. p. 61. Dub. Ed. p. 169. [t] Doct. of G. p. 56. Dub. Ed. p. 69.



of producing a passage from his own work, in which he hath conveyed his argument in the most striking forms of eloquence, and in which it is not possible to suppose, that he was not perfectly sincere; and that his eloquence was not the *real and natural result* of a lively and sincere conviction, far from being *assumed*, to supply the want of such a conviction [u]. —

This you call “*insulting him, with a string of questions addressed ad hominem.*” — As to the charge of *insulting*, I am confident the learned Prelate will himself acquit me of it. As to the argument, whatever it may amount to, let us attend to what you have offered against it.

You observe, and truly, that the MAIN QUESTION agitated by the Bishop is, “Whether divine inspiration can be reasonably expected to extend so far, as to infuse a perfect model of eloquence [w].” — And that he “*resolves this question in the negative.*”

— “*Upon reasons founded on one common principle, which the Bishop every-where goes upon, that when the Deity interposes in human affairs, he interposes no farther than is NECESSARY to the end in view.*” — “*What was not necessary was not done.*” — “*Not a word to insinuate, that either you or the Bishop should be restrained from being as eloquent, on occasion, as you might have it in your power to be. Nay, NOT A WORD against the APOSTLES themselves having recourse to the aids of human eloquence, if they had access to them, and found them expedient* — For

[u] Dissert. p. 19, 20. Dub. Ed. p. 20, 21. [w] Lett. p. 52, 53, 54, 55. Dub. Ed. p. 162, 163.

“ *neither are the inspired writers barred of this privilege : only AS BEING SIMPLY UNNECESSARY IT WAS NOT SUPPLIED. — Your perplexity arises from not distinguishing between what is ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, and what is sometimes expedient.* ”

The trouble of accounting for my *perplexity* may be spared, till the fact itself be proved, that I have been *perplexed*. — If I understand you rightly, the REASONS you here assign for giving the negative to the main question (“ whether an inspired language “ should be a language of perfect eloquence ? ”) are those, and those only, which you allow to be defensible. You have wrought them up with the greatest care ; you have intermixed some little raillery to enliven them ; you have been pleased to tell me what *I will say* PERHAPS, and then have fully refuted what I have never said. And now, after all these pains, what pity it is ! that you should have TOTALLY MISREPRESENTED the *reasons* on which the Bishop gives the negative to this *main question* : nay, that you should conclude with a quotation which PROVES that he gives his negative upon QUITE DIFFERENT principles !

“ What therefore do our ideas of fit and right tell us is required in an universal law ? — To employ those aids which are common to all languages as such ; and to REJECT what is peculiar to each. And what are these aids but CLEARNESS

and

and PRECISION [x] ?” ——— You see, Sir, every single quality of speech but these two are *interdicted*. All modes of eloquence are not only *not required* but TO BE REJECTED. If his Lordship had indeed denied, that an inspired language should be a language of perfect eloquence, BECAUSE it WAS NOT NECESSARY that it should ; far from giving you the trouble of vindicating him, I should have most readily subscribed to his determination. ON THIS PRINCIPLE I have, in the DISSERTATION, given the negative to the *main question* : and I felicitate myself, that I have taken that part in this controversy, which you yourself, upon mature reflection, have found it necessary to embrace. ——— If you have the least doubt remaining, whether his Lordship hath reasoned upon a *different* principle, or no ; if you are not perfectly satisfied, that he is not on OUR side, attend to his own words in another part of his work.

“ Suppose, that in some cases an authentic scripture, designed for a religious use, demanded this quality of *local* eloquence : ——— let this, I say, be supposed, yet still it would not affect the case in hand : since it would be *altogether unsuitable* to the peculiar genius of the gospel [y].” ——— Observe ——— not SIMPLY UNNECESSARY, but ALTOGETHER UNSUITABLE. ——— Again,

[x] Doct. of G. p. 56. Dub. Ed. p. 70. [y] Doct. of G. p. 59 Dub. Ed. p. 72.

“ Thus



“ Thus we see how UNSUITABLE this quality of  
 “ *local* eloquence would be to the *peculiar genius* of  
 “ the gospel. Yet, as there is in the OLD TESTA-  
 “ MENT, much of this ornament of style, and more  
 “ imagined, it may not be improper to explain the  
 “ reason of THIS DIVERSITY, and shew how *consistent*  
 “ the use of it is in *those places* with the principles  
 “ already laid down [z].”

There is a DIVERSITY, you observe, between the  
 cases of the OLD and New Testament. Ornamented  
 style *may be admitted* in the one, BUT IS UNSUITA-  
 BLE TO THE PECULIAR GENIUS OF THE GOSPEL.  
 — Which not only *may be*, but MUST NEEDS BE  
*utterly rude and barbarous.*

And thus having shewn, that in this point, as well  
 as in the first part of your Letter, you have receded  
 from those principles which you were engaged to de-  
 fend, nay, that you have not only thus acknowledged  
 them to be indefensible, but deserted to that side  
 which you professed to oppose; nothing remains for  
 me, but to proceed to some less material parts of your  
 VINDICATION, still to be considered.

That eloquence is nothing more than a *succedaneum*  
 to conscious persuasion in the speaker, you say [a],  
*cannot be controverted, for* QUINCTILAIN confirms it  
 in [these] *express words.* *Tum optime dicit orator,*  
*cum VIDETUR vera dicere,* l. 4. c. 2. — And  
 again, — *Semper ita dicat, TANQUAM de causa*  
*optime sentiat,* l. 5. c. 13.

[z] P. 62. Dub. Ed. p. 75. [a] Lett. p. 54. Dub. Ed. p. 164.

The first quotation is taken from that part of his work where he treats of the eloquence of the bar, and from that chapter which speaks *de narratione*, or of *stating the case*. "This," saith the master, "should be done clearly and plainly, although bad judges are apt to condemn a narration which is not ornamented. They think they could speak as well themselves; and will not allow it to be *good speaking*, but only a *true state* of a matter of fact. But this very judgment proves the merit of the speaker. For *he states his case* BEST, *who gives it the appearance of TRUTH*." He then proceeds to instruct the advocate how he is to manage a state of the case or narration, partly or entirely *false*, and to give it this *appearance of truth*.

The second quotation is taken from a chapter, in which the *lawyer* is instructed in the method and manner of *confuting* his adversary. "Let him not be always too solicitous," saith the author, "about strengthening his argument; if he is over-studious to confirm it by others, this will be thought a tacit acknowledgment of its weakness. No; *let him assume an air of confidence, and speak as if he had the best opinion possible of his cause*."——And for these and such-like precepts he makes a formal apology in the first chapter of his 12th book.

What then are these, or any such quotations to your point? You say their purport is, that *an inward conscious persuasion is to be supplied by the speakers art* [b]. Very true! When a speaker is not at all, or but weakly persuaded of the truth of what he is saying, he knows

[b] Leitt. p. 54, 55. Dub. Ed. p. 164.

he is to affect, and he does affect a real and strong persuasion. And how? by using certain modes of eloquence which are suited to his purpose; which is a direct *proof* that such modes are *in themselves* the natural and real effusions of sincere and lively conviction, instead of being a succedaneum or substitute to such conviction. How else could they serve his purpose? — If I had asserted that eloquent forms were never assumed to supply the want of sincere persuasion, then indeed a thousand such quotations might be produced from QUINCTILIAN to confute the assertion. But in the present case, one single passage to prove that he had regarded eloquent forms as *necessarily*, and in their nature a SUCCEDANEUM to sincerity, would have been of much greater force, though not finally conclusive, as I should have still appealed from his authority to common observation and experience.

You have likewise endeavoured to prove from QUINCTILIAN, that the END of all eloquent modes of speech is *to stifle reason, and inflame the passions*.

—“*Vis oratoris OMNIS, says QUINCTILIAN, “in AUGENDO MINUENDOQUE consistit:”* in AMPLIFYING and DIMINISHING *consists the whole of a speaker’s force.* “*What is this, you ask, but stifling reason [c]?*” I shall readily tell you what it *may be* and certainly *is* in many cases. It is *informing* reason, and correcting false impressions made by the passions and imagination. — If a prophane libertine were to



say, that the *distant* prospect of *some* future recompence is not to be compared with the *immediate pressing bitter* calamities of a *long series* of years in this life, we might well ask *what is this but flitting reason?* But when the apostle tells us in the *same kind* of *figurative* language, that *our* LIGHT affliction, *which is* BUT FOR A MOMENT, *worketh for us a far MORE EXCEEDING AND ETERNAL WEIGHT* of GLORY; what is this I ask, but *informing* reason, and correcting false impressions of the senses and imagination?

The purport of your second quotation (when considered not as it stands detached in your Letter, but united with the context) appears to be no more than this: "A pleader at the bar, who would gain his cause, must not always divide his argument into distinct heads; he must sometimes deceive his judges; he must avoid precision; he must perplex and confound his hearers by working on the passions. *Here his abilities, as a speaker, will be most conspicuous.*"

— Now, to borrow your favourite phrase, *I cannot for my life conceive* how this tends at all to prove what is or what is not the end of eloquence. —

But I need not dwell on your quotations, because I am satisfied to abide by your own interpretation of that which you produce, as containing your whole theory. —

" *Ubi ANIMIS judicium VIS afferenda est, et AB IPSA VERI CONTEMPLATIONE abducenda mens, IBI PROPRIUM ORATORIS OPUS EST, 1. 6.*

" c. 2. *that is,*" you say, "*where the passions are to be enflamed, and reason stifled, there is the proper*"  
" use

" *use and employment of the RHETORICAL ART* [d]."

Very probably ! But be pleased to recollect, that at present we are only concerned about what you yourself speak of as a different thing, *the practice of a CHASTE ELOQUENCE* [e]. RHETORICAL ART has not the least share in our debate : nor was it ever a question whether the sacred writings should be a consummate piece of RHETORICAL ART. ——— Suppose one were to observe, that where a question in debate could not be supported ; where it was to be perplexed and confounded ; the attention to be diverted by invidious observations and sarcastical attempts, by defending positions never controverted, and arguing against assertions never advanced ; ——— *there* was the proper employment for the CRAFT of a DISPUTANT : could this tend at all towards informing us what is the *nature and end* of REASONING ;

I should now pass over two instances, in which you have been pleased to represent my positions as quite different from my own *expressed* intentions ; but that here your triumph seems a little too exalted, as well as precipitate.

The *end* of eloquence, saith his Lordship, is *to stir reason, and inflame the passions*. ——— " Well ! but THIS *end*, you say, is IMMORAL, So much the worse for your system ——— But what ! is this *end* immoral in all cases ? and have you never then heard ?" &c. [f]. ——— But all this, and a great

[d] Lett. p. 57. Dub. Ed. p. 166. [e] P. 54. Dub. Ed. p. 164.

[f] Lett. p. 57. Dub. Ed. p. 166.

deal more might have been spared, if you had but been pleased to attend to my own words, I have indeed said, that a *succedaneum* to sincerity is in its nature and its end IMMORAL. The end of such a succedaneum, which I call immoral, I have expressly said is to *betray* and to *deceive*. Thus in the introductory chapter of the DISSERTATION the question I propose to consider is, whether eloquent forms naturally tend to the purpose or end of *betraying* or *deceiving*? and in summing up my arguments on the nature and end of eloquence, I say that it is not necessarily the INSTRUMENT of FRAUD [g] I have never once enquired whether it be or be not immoral to inflame the passions. What his Lordship calls the end of eloquence, and you the ultimate end [b], I have all along considered as the means by which the ultimate end is produced. If I do not object to your terms, mine, I am bold to say, are at least as proper; and what is more, I have given sufficient notice of the sense in which I use them.

Again, you declare that I find a CONTRADICTION between what his Lordship says in one place, "that the end of eloquence is to stifle reason, and inflame the passions;" and what he says elsewhere, "that the PRINCIPAL end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to MISLEAD reason, and to CAJOLE the fancy and affections." Which two propositions, you say, and take pains to prove, are

[g] Diss. p. 78. Dub. Ed. p. 84.  
Ed. p. 165.

[b] Lett. p. 56. Dub.

perfectly



perfectly consistent [i] ! Now, Sir, if you had employed these pains to prove, not that they were *two* propositions, *perfectly consistent*, but the very *same* proposition expressed in different terms, this, and *only* this, could have removed my objection. Whence could you possibly collect that I *find a contradiction* between these two propositions ? My words are these : “ *He at first asserts that the end of eloquence is to stifle reason, and inflame the passions.*” But when *he comes to* QUOTE THIS *observation* [when he speaks of it as an observation *made above*] *he hath changed it into a* QUITE DIFFERENT *proposition* [k] ; viz. *The principal end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to mislead reason, and to cajole the fancy and affections.* And have not you laboured to demonstrate that this is a *quite different* proposition ?——You have urged your charge of my *not understanding* the Bishop’s expression, in a *manner* which may possibly be justified, if the charge itself can be supported. For indeed I know not any thing more likely to provoke one’s indignation and contempt, than to find a person presuming to criticise any work, which it plainly appears he has not *studied* ; to which he hath not even adverted with the ordinary attention of a *candid reader*. But how is your charge supported ? By shewing that *your own* conceptions of his Lordship’s expressions were the *SAME* with *mine*, and by PROVING what I have ASSERTED.

[i] Lett. p. 48. Dub. Ed. p. 165.  
Dub. Ed. p. 86.

[k] Diss. p. 80. Note

And

And thus am I at length arrived at that part of your Letter, in which *your* exultation is indeed unbounded ; which you seem to have industriously removed from its proper place, and reserved for the *close of all*, to leave the reader's mind possessed with the most unfavourable impression of *my dealing* with the learned Bishop. That part, I mean, which respects his Lordship's assertion of the *frequent viciousness* of tropes and figures, *as they are* a deviation from metaphysical and logical principles.—— But before I proceed to defend my examination of what his Lordship hath been pleased to offer upon this subject, I must observe, that to several of your objections my answer can be but brief and summary. For instance :

When you say [l] *I make myself pleasant* with the Bishop's expressions, I can only reply, that I have not treated them with any degree of levity, or the least approach towards ridicule.

When you declare that I have not treated him with COMMON RESPECT [m] ; as the charge is general, the general tenor of my work is the best refutation of it ; and relying upon this, I appeal to his Lordship's own candor, as well as that of every ingenuous reader.

And when you are pleased to say that I was DREAMING [n] ; my best answer must be to shew that I was really *awake*, and that I reasoned neither *wildly* nor impertinently.

[l] Lett. p. 64. Dub. Ed. p. 172. [m] P. 75. D. Ed. p. 180.  
[n] P. 72. Dub. Ed. p. 178.

This being premised, I proceed to those objections which may be, and require to be, answered more particularly.

The learned Prelate observes, [o] that “ *clearness* and *precision* are the qualities of speech which are essentially and invariably the same, AS BEING conducted on the principles of metaphysics and logic. ALL BESIDES, from the very power of the elements, &c. to the TROPES and FIGURES of composition, are arbitrary; and—these latter, AS THEY ARE A DEVIATION from those principles of metaphysics and logic, are frequently VICIOUS.”

In examining this assertion, I do indeed express a doubt [p] whether the word *vicious* is to be here taken in the *critical* or the *etibical* sense.——You answer roundly [q] that his Lordship meant VICE in the *CRITICAL* sense. —Be pleased now to observe for what *purpose* this assertion is introduced.——

The question to be proved is, that no qualities of speech, but those of *CLEARNESS* and *PRECISION* only, are to be admitted as consistent with the genius of the apostolical writings. The proof assigned is, that ALL BESIDES are arbitrary, and——frequently VICIOUS——that is, you say, FAULTY in composition. But is this a reason for REJECTING them? Are we not assured by his Lordship, that an inspired language MUST have an abundance of FAULTS? That ONE CERTAIN MARK of its divine original is, that it should abound in EVERY FAULT that can pos-

[o] Doct. of Gr. p. 58. Dub. Ed. p. 70.  
Dub. Ed. p. 34.

[p] Diff. p. 32.  
[q] Let. p. 63. Dub. Ed. 171.



fibly disgrace a language?—Judge then whether my *doubt*, or your *round answer*, be more honourable and respectful to his Lordship; and whether the *moral* acceptation of this word *vicious* be not indeed the *only* one in which it can taken consistently with his general argument. So that what I have said on this subject, instead of being *superfluous*, is indeed the only part of my argument which *might not have been spared*.

You say, “I charge the Bishop’s position as bold, first because it *is not* qualified, and then as bolder still, because it *is* qualified by the addition of the word *frequently* [r].”——Were I long hackneyed in the ways of controversy, perhaps I should be less surprized at such an assertion as this. It is indeed surprizing that you should advance it; and still more surprizing that you should add a quotation from my own work, which proves that it is utterly groundless.——But as this kind of CRITICISM can reflect no dishonour upon ME, I pass it over, and proceed to the first instance which you have produced of my *gross misrepresentation* of the Bishop.

In examining his Lordship’s position of “the frequent viciousness of tropes figures and of composition, *as they are* a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic,” you say that, “[s] *in the first place, I make him speak of* RHETORICAL FIGURES ONLY *in the specific sense of these terms, when his Lordship was all the while speaking of* FIGURED LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.”

[r] Lett. p. 64. Dub. Ed. p. 172.  
P. 79.

[s] P. 74. Dub. Ed.

That

That his Lordship used the terms *tropes and figures of composition*, in the GENERIC sense, I readily allow. That in this sense, and this only he *affirms*, that WHEN they are a deviation from metaphysical principles, they are vicious, I also agree with you.---- Now, Sir, be pleased to recollect (for to your own knowledge of the rules of sound reasoning I appeal) that in order to invalidate this *general* assertion, nothing more was necessary, than to shew that the PREDICATE of your proposition (I am warranted by your own example to use such terms of art) could not be affirmed of some one species or individual included in the SUBJECT: or, in other words, to produce any one instance of any one trope or figure, which was evidently not *vicious* when a deviation from metaphysical accuracy. And surely no man will deny, that an infinite number of such instances may be produced, or that the finest tropes and figures, ever used by orator or poet, are not, in the *form of expression*, the most flagrant deviations from metaphysical accuracy. I say, that in order to prove that tropes or figures in the generic sense are not *faults in composition*, when ever they are unmetaphysical, I need but have quoted a few such expressions as these:

*Omnia ventorum concurrere PROELIA vidi.*

---- Immenſum cœlo venit AGMEN aquarum.

-----RUIT ARDUUS ÆTHER,

Et pluvia ingenti ſata LÆTA, boumque LABORES  
Diluit-----

Can any thing be more beautiful? Can any thing be more unmetaphysical? Can then his Lordship's *general* assertion be just?

So that, if I had used the terms *specifically*, that is, if in my reasoning on his Lordship's position I had confined myself to any particular species of tropes and figures, still I had reasoned properly and pertinently. But if you take the trouble of revising the fifth chapter of the DISSERTATION, you will find that my examples are taken from *every* species of tropical and figurative composition, from tropes of *significance*, and tropes of *ornament*, from figures of *speech*, and figures of *sentiment*. If I have dwelt on some more particularly, the reason is, that they are the boldest and most obvious violations of metaphysical precision: I mean in the *expression*. But instead of confining myself to one species, as I might have done, what is affirmed of ALL I deny of ALL.---I have therefore neither mistaken, nor misrepresented the SUBJECT of your proposition.---Let us then consider what is *affirmed* of it.

It is affirmed, I say, in general, that tropes and figures are a deviation from metaphysical principles. This you call the *second* instance of my *gross misrepresentation* [1].---But doth not his Lordship expressly declare, that CLEARNESS and PRECISION *alone* are the qualities of speech which conform to these principles? A declaration, I presume, sufficient for my justification, even if he had proceeded no further.---But his Lordship is still more explicit. "THESE," saith he, "are the very things in language which are least positive, AS BEING conducted on the principles of metaphysics and logic; whereas ALL BESIDES, from the very power of

[1] Lett. p. 74. Dub. Ed. p. 180.



“ the elements, &c. to the tropes and figures of  
 “ composition, are arbitrary ; and what is more, as  
 “ THESE are a deviation from those principles, they  
 “ are frequently VICIOUS [u].”

In the *first* clause of this sentence [AS BEING] evidently signifies [BECAUSE THEY ARE.] Let then every candid reader judge whether the same particle [AS] in the *second* clause, plainly related and connected to this, must not be interpreted in the same manner ; and whether I was not fully warranted to render the expression [*as these are a deviation, &c.*] by [*because these are a deviation, they are THEREFORE, &c.*]

I might here proceed to shew, that the crime of not having *well learned* my grammar cannot be fairly charged on ME. I might shew that [ACCORDING AS, IN PROPORTION, &c.] cannot at all answer your purpose ; and that such interpretations must make the *general reasoning*, of a *kind* which you have indeed sometimes ascribed to his Lordship ; but which I should think it disrespectful to suppose he could have used. But I am happily freed from the trouble of all further disquisition, as my interpretation of this sentence, which you condemn with so much severity, is warranted by an *authority*, which you must acknowledge to be decisive ; I mean YOUR OWN.---In page 71. you say, his Lordship “ *exemplifies his affirmation in one whole class of such* “ *figured speech as deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, and is* THEREFORE VICIOUS.” ---Here you have explicitly declared your sense of

[u] Doct. of G. p. 58. Dub. Ed. p. 71.

this particle [As] the important subject of our contest.---And I could have wished that you had done me the justice to declare, with equal precision, what there is in my situation, the place of my abode, or the place of my BIRTH, which fixes the mark of ignorance and misrepresentation on the *very same* exposition of it, when delivered by *me*, which, coming from *you*, is perfectly correct, just, and proper.

To proceed now, to what his Lordship calls the *confession* and *apology* of QUINCTILIAN; and you, an *exemplification* of his general position.

That tropes and figures of composition (taken in the *generic* sense) are *vicious*, as they are a deviation from metaphysical principles, his Lordship hath expressly declared. He hath also expressly declared, that QUINCTILIAN *confesses* this in a particular passage, where, speaking of a particular class of figures, he says, "that ordinarily they are *faults*, but in "some cases they may be *excellencies*."---I represent the argument here, as I did formerly, in *his own* words, with this difference only, that instead of giving the supposed confession in *Latin*, I translate the substance of it fairly into *English*.---In stating the Bishop's question, you take pains to shew, that what he affirms of tropes and figures, is affirmed of them in *general*. When he comes to produce the quotation of QUINCTILIAN you declare, that "he speaks *not* "of tropes and figures in *general* [*w*]." Judge then, whether it was disrespectful to wish that his Lordship *had explained* how this quotation amounts to a *confession* of what he hath affirmed.

[*w*] Lett. p. 72. Dub. Ed. p. 178.

But

But you say, that *it is an EXAMPLE of one whole class of such figured speech as deviates from metaphysical principles, and is THEREFORE vicious.*---If so, it is an example most unhappily chosen. For, even if what were true of *one species* must therefore be true of *all*, yet the quotation, far from proving the truth of your general assertion, even in *one species*, proves the DIRECT CONTRARY, *viz.* that the figures of this class, however unmetaphysical, *may yet be EXCELLENCIES in composition: far from being therefore FAULTS.*

I shall but sum up your reasoning, in a manner which I am contented to abide by, as a fair representation, and then leave it to the candid reader.

“ Tropes and figures of composition *in general*,  
 “ when they deviate from the principles of metaphy-  
 “ sics and logic, are *therefore FAULTS* in compo-  
 “ sition. Because

“ *One particular class* of figures always deviates  
 “ from those principles, and is therefore always  
 “ *vicious or faulty.*---And this appears from a quo-  
 “ tation, in which QUINCTILIAN declares, that

“ The tropes and figures of this class, though  
 “ they *always* deviate from grammatical or metaphy-  
 “ sical principles, instead of being always FAULTS,  
 “ are *sometimes EXCELLENCIES.*”

One word more, before I dismiss this subject, of your state of his Lordship's argument in mood and figure.---Thus it is.---“ Tropical and figurative  
 “ language, when it deviates from the principles of



“ metaphysics and logic, is vicious.---But it frequently deviates, &c. therefore it is frequently “ vicious [x].”

You want to know where is the defect of sense or logic in this.---I shall answer your question directly. The MAJOR is evidently false ; nay, is proved to be false from the very quotation brought to support it. And the CONCLUSION is just nothing at all to the question to be proved ; which is, whether tropes and figures, *as they are* a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, are *therefore* vicious, or faults : or (if you chuse not to adhere to your own words) whether they be FAULTS, *so far forth as* or *accordingly* as they are a deviation from these principles.

*Tropes and figures are frequently faults in composition!*---Indeed, Sir, it requires no formal reasoning to prove this. It is a melancholy truth exemplified every day, and which no critic ever thought of denying.

I have now gone through the several particulars of your VINDICATION. I have shewn what those arguments are which you call INVINCIBLE ; which prove, that *all my objections* to the learned Bishop's sentiments on the subject of eloquence are *wholly groundless* ; which shew, that *not one word* of all I say SUPPORTS a proposition, which a *great deal* of what I say is intended to OVERTURN.

That an inspired language must be a language of perfect eloquence, is a proposition which I *deny* as

[x] Lett. p. 69. Dub. Ed. p. 176.

positively.

positively as his Lordship; and the PRINCIPLES on which I have denied it have the additional advantage in this our controversy, that no one who contends for the truth of his Lordship's, *can possibly question the validity* of mine. If, for instance, it be true, *that the utmost rudeness and barbarousness is one certain mark that a language is divinely inspired*; it must also be incontestibly true, that *all the rudeness of stile, which can be discovered in the apostolical writings, affords neither PROOF nor PRESUMPTION, that the authors were NOT divinely inspired*. If every form of eloquence is to be rejected as inconsistent with the peculiar genius of an inspired scripture, surely it follows that *perfect purity, elegance, and refinement, are neither proper, nor necessary, nor possible, in an inspired scripture*. If these be qualities merely *imaginary and capricious*, the merits of an inspired composition are surely to be determined by other qualities.

But my principles, it seems, are attended with an inconvenience, arising from the manner in which they must be received by objectors to an inspired scripture.

"If there be an archetype of eloquence in nature, one should be apt to conclude, that when the Author of nature condescended to inspire one of those plastic performances of human art, he would make it by the exactest pattern of the archetype [y]."  
 ---At least this is a conclusion which objectors will INFALLIBLY draw.

---As I am not so deeply in their Secrets, as to know in what manner they will, or will not argue, I cannot contradict this peremptory assertion. I must suppose you assert on good grounds. It is indeed a

conclusion well suited to them and to their cause: and for the honour of those, who are far worthier of honour than the most eminent of their herd, I wish that they may be left in full and peaceable possession of it.---If the Author of nature were to inspire a composition exactly conformable to the rules of the most refined human eloquence, or if the purposes of his wisdom and goodness required such a composition, no doubt it would be perfectly conformable to these rules.---Strip your proposition of its terms of art, and it amounts to no more than this. And this is a kind of *foundation* which our adversaries are indeed well used to build on; but little reason have we to fear any superstructures which they may erect upon it.

If I were to assert that the sacred writings must be exactly conformable to the rules of eloquence; that they must possess those qualities which make up the *archetypal idea* of eloquence in a perfect degree, even beyond the force of common speech, this indeed would be to make *the honour of scripture hang on a question of TASTE*. In like manner, when you assert that *an inspired scripture MUST be utterly barbarous*, this, I humbly apprehend, to make *the honour of scripture hang on a question of taste*: which I concur with you in deeming imprudent, although I cannot conceive by what right, or upon what grounds, you have been pleased to invest our adversaries with such a sovereign power over all questions of taste, that there is to be *no appeal from their decisions* [2].---But I have said that it is not *necessary*, that it is not



*proper*, that it is not *possible*, that the apostolical writings should have all the qualities of human eloquence in a consummate degree; and this is resting the honour of scripture on a question of *reason* and *judgment*. "That the objection of our adversaries is UNREASONABLE "and INJUDICIOUS." This is my grand principle. If I have also added, that it betrays ignorance and want of taste in literature, I have added what is incontestibly true, though I have not rested the cause upon it. And if the *scorner* should treat these my principles with *disdain*, why should I be mortified, when TRUTHS of so much greater moment have not escaped his profane derision?

*You were moved*, you say, *to hazard your address to me*, among other motives, by that of CHARITY *to myself* [a].---Let me request your serious attention to a few of the marks of this *virtue*, as they appear in a controversial writer.

CHARITY, in such a writer, never misrepresents; never ascribes obnoxious principles, or mistaken opinions, to an opponent which he himself disavows; is not so earnest to refute, as to fancy positions never asserted, and to extend its censure to opinions which WILL PERHAPS be delivered. CHARITY is utterly averse to SNEERING, the most despicable species of ridicule that most despicable subterfuge of an impotent objector. CHARITY never supposes that all sense and knowledge are confined to a parti-

[a] Ibid.

cular circle, to a district, or a COUNTRY. CHARITY never condemns and embraces principles in the same breath; never *professes* to confute what it *acknowledges* to be just; never presumes to bear down an adversary with confident assertions; CHARITY does not call dissent insolence, or the want of implicit submission a want of common respect.

Whether these marks of charity appear in your address or no, I presume not to determine. If they do, your readers will not fail to give them due honour.

Pardon me, however, if I cannot clearly discover the *charity* of the concluding paragraphs of your Letter. DISGRACE and DISHONOUR are here denounced against me. I am accused of a warm and unnecessary opposition to all men of sense and judgment, and particularly to the UNIVERSITIES of ENGLAND, *who vie with each other in building on the principles of the learned Prelate, as the SUREST basis on which a rational vindication of our common religion can be raised*;---of propagating *stale and worn out clamour*;---of *striving with all my might to infuse prejudices into the minds of ingenious and virtuous youth*. Thus, while I am threatened with the indignation of all the learned in Britain, the signal is also given to the society in which I am stationed, to regard me as a pernicious member.

How have I merited all this severity? What crime have I committed? or what mischief have I wrought?

I have

I have a just and sincere reverence for the genius and learning of the Lord BISHOP of GLOUCESTER. But I cannot be persuaded that his Lordship ever demanded, or that the united voice of all the learned in these kingdoms ever, at *any juncture*, concurred in paying an implicit submission to his sentiments, or those of any other great and eminent writer. If I have presumed to differ from him, be pleased to remember that it has been on such a *subject* as doth not require the extent of his Lordship's abilities to fathom; and where more confined abilities may have the advantage of discovering several particulars, which might well have escaped his view amidst a variety of greater objects.---The guilt of dissenting from his Lordship may at least claim some indulgence from you, since it now appears that you yourself are involved in it.

Be pleased also to recollect, that in a considerable part of my dissent I am countenanced by a vast number of respectable authorities: and that whatever deference may be due to the sentiments of his Lordship, there is a deference also due to those of QUINCTILIAN, CICERO, LONGINUS, ARISTOTLE, PLATO, and many other names of great literary eminence both in antient and in later times.

It would be impertinence for *me* to expatiate on that profound reverence which I most sincerely entertain for those LEARNED BODIES mentioned in this dispute (I know not with what propriety.) That they will ever build their vindication of our faith



faith upon the *surest basis* indeed I cannot doubt. And God forbid that I should have the disposition or the power to give the least interruption to the labours of these great MASTER-BUILDERS !---As I am both inconsiderable and inoffensive, I cannot believe upon the authority of any nameless writer whatever, that I can possibly have incurred their displeasure.

And as to the SOCIETY of which I have the honour to be a member ; here, my *conduct* must be my defence against any charge made by a *stranger*. And *little thanks* should I here deserve indeed, were I not to the utmost of my power, both by precept and example, to encourage ingenious youth to PROVE all things (however authorized) with a decent freedom, lest *some one*, I know not who, should call this *propagating clamour*.

But as you have declared so expressly in favour of my *sentiments* and *opinions*, I shall please myself with the hopes that reflection may also dispose you to entertain more favourable thoughts of my *motives* and *intentions*.

I am with respect, &c.

Trinity-College, Dublin,  
Dec. 1, 1764.

THO. LELAND.

